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ABSTRACT
This dissertation provides an extensive examination o f a corporate control 
transaction that has not been previously examined in the finance literature, an 
incomplete acquisition. An incomplete acquisition is defined as an offer for a sufficient 
amount o f  equity in a target firm to give the bidder effective control that is not 
accompanied by a disclosed intention to acquire the remaining minority shares.
An original database o f incomplete acquisitions is developed and used to 
examine three major aspects o f  these unique control transactions. First, descriptive 
data about the prevalence o f incomplete acquisitions and the mechanisms that are used 
to effect these transactions are provided and event study methodology is used to assess 
the market valuation effects o f incomplete acquisition announcements. Second, the 
pre- and post-acquisition operating performance o f incomplete acquisition targets is 
examined. By analyzing both the valuation effects and subsequent operating 
performance o f  incomplete acquisitions, this study provides evidence to distinguish 
among alternative hypotheses that generate differential predictions about the wealth 
effects o f  changes in control, the distribution o f wealth between targets and acquirers, 
and the subsequent performance o f target firms. Third, the ultimate disposition o f the 
parent’s controlling stake and the minority interest in the target and the valuation 
effects o f  disposition transactions are examined.
Empirical results indicate that incomplete acquisitions are value enhancing for 
targets and have a non-negative effect on the wealth o f  acquirers. The analysis o f  
target operating performance indicates that target firm performance is similar to control 
firms both before and after the acquisition. The normal pre- and post-operating
x
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performance suggests that increases in target shareholder wealth at incomplete 
acquisition announcements are not due to the market’s anticipation o f gains from 
improved efficiency or synergy. The evidence is also inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that, subsequent to  the acquisition, acquirers are able to  expropriate the wealth o f 
minority shareholders. The finding of normal pre- and post-acquisition target 
performance combined with the evidence o f significant gains in aggregate shareholder 
wealth are consistent with the information hypothesis which posits that positive private 
information concerning target value is revealed by the bidding and acquisition process.
xi




A large body o f evidence in finance indicates that the market for corporate 
control enhances economic welfare by inducing a more efficient allocation o f resources. 
In a conventional corporate control transaction (i.e., mergers and acquisitions), one 
corporation obtains control o f another corporation by purchasing all o f the outstanding 
equity o f  the targeted corporation. Another typical form o f corporate control event is 
an asset sale (sometimes termed a divestiture), a transaction in which a buyer acquires 
ownership and full control o f  a wholly owned subsidiary (or other asset) from a selling 
firm. Both o f  these forms o f corporate control transactions are commonly observed 
events that have been studied extensively in the finance literature. In contrast to 
conventional mergers and acquisitions and asset sales, corporations have conducted an 
alternative form o f corporate control transaction that has not been previously examined 
in the finance literature. This form o f corporate control transaction can be termed an 
incomplete acquisition. There are two key aspects o f  this transaction. First, one 
corporation (the acquirer) gains a controlling interest in another corporation (the 
target) that is already a publicly traded firm at the time o f the control event. Second, 
the acquired target corporation continues to trade as a majority controlled subsidiary o f 
the acquirer for an extended period o f time after the transaction. These incomplete 
acquisitions are the subject o f this study.
An incomplete acquisition, more specifically, is defined as an offer for a 
sufficient amount o f the equity o f a target firm to give the bidder effective control o f
1
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the target firm that is not accompanied by an intention to acquire the remaining 
minority shares. As a result, the target firm becomes a subsidiary o f the acquirer but, in 
contrast to a conventional acquisition, there remains a legally distinct, but affiliated 
operating firm in which there is a minority interest that continues to trade for a 
significant period. This dissertation examines and analyzes three major aspects o f 
incomplete acquisitions. First, descriptive data about the prevalence o f incomplete 
acquisitions is provided, the alternative mechanisms used to effect these transactions 
are examined, and the disposition events that terminate this form o f corporate 
governance structure are determined. Second, the market valuation effects o f 
announcements o f  incomplete acquisitions and o f  disposition events that terminate 
incomplete acquisitions are generated and evaluated. Third, the post-acquisition 
operating performance o f  incomplete acquisition targets is examined. These empirical 
results provide a body o f evidence about the effects o f  incomplete acquisitions that is 
used to test the applicability o f alternative hypotheses that are developed based on the 
finance literature to explain this unusual corporate control event. This dissertation also 
addresses the public policy issue o f the desirability o f permitting this form o f  corporate 
control transaction.
Incomplete acquisitions are corporate control events that, although less 
frequent than conventional mergers and acquisitions, are not uncommon. From this 
perspective alone, they merit study as a mechanism for transferring corporate control. 
Such an analysis fills an important gap, because the finance literature has not previously 
examined these transactions. Although there are numerous studies o f conventional 
mergers and acquisitions, there is only one major empirical study by Holdemess and
2
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Sheehan (1988) that examines a subject that is directly related to incomplete 
acquisitions, namely the role o f majority ownership o f corporations. However, 
Holdemess and Sheehan's study examines the existence o f  majority ownership rather 
than its creation and covers both individual and corporate majority owners.1 Thus, 
their sample is more heterogeneous than the incomplete acquisition sample developed 
in the current study. In contrast to the work o f  Holdemess and Sheehan, this 
dissertation provides a descriptive analysis o f incomplete acquisitions, as well as tests 
o f  hypotheses on the valuation and operating performance effects o f  these transactions.
Part o f  the explanation for the fact that incomplete acquisitions have not been 
previously studied is that, although there are many sources o f data for conventional 
mergers and acquisitions, there is no existing database o f incomplete acquisitions. 
Consequently, developing such a database and documenting the prevalence and 
characteristics o f incomplete acquisitions is, by itself, an important contribution to the 
finance literature.
In this dissertation, the valuation and operating performance effects o f these 
transactions are examined. These results provide perspective on the possible 
motivations for the use o f incomplete acquisitions rather than conventional mergers and 
acquisitions. In a competitive economy, economic considerations are likely to motivate 
the use o f  the most efficient mechanism in achieving a desired objective. Thus, 
research on the use o f incomplete acquisitions rather than complete acquisitions as a
1 Their sample consists of 114 firms with majority owners. Of the 65 corporate majority shareholders
in their sample, 25 are foreign and 11 are private corporations. Thus, their sample includes only 29 
publicly-held corporate parents. Moreover, many of these majority ownership positions arc the result 
of carve-outs of the minority interest. Thus, their sample contains only a small number of incomplete 
acquisitions as defined in this study.
3
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means o f effecting a change in control is important because it can enhance an 
understanding o f the valuation effects o f  changes in control.
Holdemess and Sheehan (1988) suggest that measuring the market’s reaction to 
the unanticipated formation of majority blocks can best assess the effect o f majority 
blocks on firm value. However, they argue that in practice this procedure is not 
feasible because the Williams Act requires disclosure o f equity holdings by an investor 
once the level o f  5% ownership o f all outstanding shares o f a corporation is reached.
In the current study, however, the reaction to unanticipated formation o f majority 
control can be assessed. This is because, in an incomplete acquisition, the intention to 
gain majority control is typically announced at the outset o f  the acquisition process. In 
some cases, the acquirer establishes a toehold prior to announcing the incomplete 
acquisition, which may increase market expectations o f a change in control that will be 
capitalized at the announcement o f the toehold position. In these cases, the share price 
response to the incomplete acquisition represents a lower bound on the total valuation 
effect.
Existing theories o f mergers and acquisitions generate differential predictions 
concerning the wealth effects o f changes in control, the distribution of wealth between 
targets and acquirers, and the subsequent performance o f the target firm. By analyzing 
both the valuation effects and subsequent operating performance of incomplete 
acquisitions, this study can provide evidence that distinguishes among the existing 
hypotheses. Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) 
summarize the findings o f  numerous empirical studies o f mergers and acquisitions and 
conclude that, on average, corporate control transactions increase the wealth o f target
4
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shareholders, while returns to bidding firm shareholders are typically small and not 
statistically significant. Malatesta (1983) and Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) find that 
changes in corporate control increase the market value o f the combined firms.
Although prior research provides evidence that changes in control enhance 
value, the source o f  this increase in value is unclear. Since target firms are typically 
absorbed by acquirers, previous studies o f  subsequent operating performance have 
focused on the performance of the combined entity. However, target firms are typically 
small relative to acquirers. As a result, it may be difficult to detect changes in the 
operating performance o f the target within the combined entity. In contrast, 
incomplete acquisition targets continue to publicly trade as majority-controlled, legally 
distinct entities. As such, following the change in control, the target firm must generate 
publicly reported financial data that are separate from the data reported by the parent. 
Thus, incomplete acquisitions provide a unique opportunity to directly examine the 
activities and operating performance o f the target subsequent to the change in control. 
This evidence provides a basis to discriminate among the existing theories about the 
effects o f  mergers and acquisitions.
A distinguishing feature o f incomplete acquisitions is that there are several 
alternative mechanisms by which the controlling interest is established. First, an 
acquirer may seek control by making a tender offer to shareholders of the target firm. 
Generally, the acquirer specifies the percentage o f ownership being sought in the tender 
offer announcement and indicates that not all shares tendered will necessarily be 
acquired. These transactions may be either hostile or friendly.
5
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Second, the target may agree as a result o f  negotiations with the acquirer to 
issue a  sufficient amount o f  new common stock to the acquirer so as to effectively 
transfer control from the current shareholders to the acquirer. Unlike other 
mechanisms o f  control change, this method provides new equity financing to the target 
and there is no sale o f stock by existing shareholders to the acquirer. In addition, since 
this transaction is negotiated between the acquirer and the target firm’s management, 
by its nature it cannot be hostile. From this perspective, this type of incomplete 
acquisition transaction can be viewed as a form o f private placement o f  equity, in which 
majority control is created.
Third, if the target firm has a concentrated ownership structure, the acquirer 
may obtain a controlling interest in the target by acquiring shares o f stock from 
individual or corporate blockholders through negotiated purchases o f existing blocks.
In these transactions, the target firm has a concentrated ownership structure that is 
transformed into an ownership structure that has a single majority owner.
Finally, the acquirer can gain control through open market purchases o f target 
firm stock. Some incomplete acquisitions involve a combination o f these methods. 
Although each method entails the creation o f a majority interest, it is likely that the 
market reaction to  the announcement o f  a change in control may be different, 
depending on the method by which majority control is established. Therefore, 
hypotheses based on differences in the effects o f alternative methods for establishing 
control are offered and the differential wealth effects across methods are examined.
An important facet o f  the literature on the market for corporate control focuses 
on divestitures and corporate restructuring transactions. This literature is used in this
6
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study as a basis to generate hypotheses about the reasons for undertaking an 
incomplete acquisition and to make predictions about the differential valuation effects 
o f  the alternative mechanisms for establishing control. Since an incomplete acquisition 
allows the acquirer to take control o f the target while maintaining a publicly traded 
minority interest in it, an incomplete acquisition can be viewed as a combination o f a 
conventional acquisition and an equity carve-out o f  a wholly owned subsidiary. Thus, 
research into incomplete acquisitions may shed light on unresolved issues relating not 
only to mergers and acquisitions, but also to corporate restructuring transactions that 
create publicly traded minority interests, such as equity carve-outs o f subsidiaries.
More specifically, Schipper and Smith (1986) argue that the positive share price 
reaction to equity carve-out announcements can be attributed to enhanced disclosure 
and external monitoring that reduce information asymmetries between managers and 
investors. From this perspective, the parent firm's increase in value from an equity 
carve-out results from an increase in the value o f the subsidiary. Similarly, an 
incomplete acquisition may be more value enhancing than a complete acquisition if 
there are important benefits to separate audited financial reports, or to the writing o f  
managerial contracts based on target stock price performance rather on accounting 
information or parent stock prices.
Alternatively, an incomplete acquisition may be viewed as a means for an 
acquirer to obtain control o f  a target and gather private information about its activities 
while retaining options about future financing decisions. For example, the 
observability o f  the target share price may facilitate the subsequent acquisition o f the 
minority interest or allow the parent to more easily divest the majority interest. This
7
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perspective for incomplete acquisitions is also related to Nanda's (1991) model o f 
equity carve-outs. Nanda argues that equity carve-outs are motivated by the parent’s 
desire to obtain external financing through the issuance o f equity in the subsidiary 
rather than the parent when the subsidiary’s equity is overvalued and the parent’s 
equity is undervalued. Thus, an incomplete acquisition allows the acquirer to  retain the 
option to issue seasoned equity in the majority controlled subsidiary when the 
subsidiary’s equity is overvalued and the acquirer’s equity is undervalued.
An important aspect o f  incomplete acquisitions is a key distinction between the 
legal status o f  these corporate control transactions in the United States relative to 
European countries, including the United Kingdom. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires that when an acquirer 
obtains 30 per cent or more o f the ownership o f the common equity o f another firm, 
the acquiring firm is required to extend the offer to all remaining target shareholders at 
the highest price per share that the acquirer paid to obtain its stake. This requirement, 
which applies throughout Europe, reflects the presumption that incomplete acquisitions 
foster expropriation o f minority shareholders. Within the United States, prominent 
legal scholars have also suggested that this form o f corporate governance leads to 
expropriation o f  minority shareholders and that the U.S. should adopt the European 
approach to  incomplete acquisitions.
Within the finance literature, Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that target firm 
shareholders have an incentive to free ride on the acquirer’s discovery o f the target 
firm's real value. As a result, target shareholders have an incentive not to sell their 
shares to  the acquirer, and if the acquirer anticipates this behavior, the market for
8
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corporate control will fail. Grossman and Hart indicate that the ability o f an acquirer to 
conduct an incomplete acquisition so as to expropriate the wealth o f non-tendering 
shareholders is an essential requirement to discourage free riding. This perspective 
predicts that expropriation o f the minority wealth is an intrinsic characteristic o f 
incomplete acquisitions, and that this expropriation is an essential prerequisite for an 
effective market for corporate control. As such, expropriation o f minority interests in 
an incomplete acquisition is viewed as an important element o f American corporate 
law. The evidence developed in this study can determine whether incomplete 
acquisitions are value enhancing transactions or a mechanism that generates wealth 
transfers from minority shareholders to acquirer shareholders. Thus, research into the 
valuation effects and operating performance o f incomplete acquisitions has important 
implications for public policy.
To summarize, the research entailed in this study evaluates the stock market’s 
response to announcements o f incomplete acquisitions, examines the post-acquisition 
performance o f incomplete acquisition targets, and assesses the eventual outcome o f 
these transactions. Data on incomplete acquisitions are analyzed to determine how 
these transactions occur, whether this form o f parent-subsidiary organization is 
permanent or transitory, and what is the ultimate disposition of the controlling stake. 
Overall, this integrative analysis o f the effects o f  incomplete acquisitions furthers an 
understanding o f how value is created by a change in control. The remainder o f this 
dissertation is organized into three parts, which are reviewed in the following sections.
9
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1.2 The Valuation Effects of Incomplete Acquisitions
An analysis o f  incomplete acquisitions does not exist in the finance literature. 
Thus, in Chapter 2 the literature on related transactions is discussed in order to 
generate hypotheses about the valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisitions. First, the 
extant literature on the valuation effects o f conventional mergers and acquisitions is 
examined since these transactions are similar to incomplete acquisitions in several ways. 
Existing theories on the valuation effects on conventional mergers and acquisitions are 
presented as a framework for generating hypotheses on the valuation effects o f  
incomplete acquisitions. Second, two hypotheses on the role of control are presented, 
specifically, the value enhancement hypothesis and the expropriation hypothesis.
Within the context o f  value enhancement, theories concerning the allocation o f gains 
between target and acquirer shareholders are presented. Third, the potential benefits 
and costs o f  incomplete acquisitions relative to complete acquisitions are assessed. 
Finally, the literature on other transactions that are typically viewed as mechanisms for 
restructuring, particularly equity carve-outs and private placements, is examined to 
provide additional perspective on incomplete acquisitions. Similarities and differences 
that exist between these restructuring mechanisms and incomplete acquisitions are used 
to generate hypotheses about the differential valuation effects o f the alternative 
mechanisms by which majority control is established. The literature on the role of 
bloclcholders is also reviewed since acquirers in incomplete acquisitions can be viewed 
as majority blockholders.
The development o f  the sample o f incomplete acquisitions is explained in 
Chapter 3. In addition, event study analysis, the methodology used to determine the
10
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valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisitions, is described. The chapter concludes with a 
presentation o f  descriptive statistics on the distribution o f  targets and acquirers by 
market capitalization, industry segment, and the frequency o f announcement events 
over the sample period. The data indicate that incomplete acquisitions are not frequent 
events, but they also are not uncommon. These transactions continue to occur 
throughout the sample period, indicating that incomplete acquisitions are transactions 
that continue to survive in the face of competition from alternative mechanisms 
available in the market for corporate control.
In Chapter 4, event study methodology is used to obtain the announcement 
effects o f  incomplete acquisitions on stock prices for both target and acquiring firms, as 
well as the effects on the combined wealth o f the target and acquirer. The results 
indicate that incomplete acquisitions generate large gains in wealth for target 
shareholders, non-negative returns to acquirers, and positive gains in the combined 
wealth o f targets and acquirers. When the sample is disaggregated by the method used 
to establish control, the results indicate that there are differential share price reactions 
to targets across the four basic methods through which control is established. There 
are large gains in response to tender offers by and the issuance o f equity to the 
acquirer, but only small gains for block trades and open market purchases. The returns 
to acquirers are consistently small regardless o f the method used to establish control. 
When the sample is disaggregated by the degree o f relatedness between the target and 
acquirer industry, no significant differences are observed. These results suggest that 
there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that synergies are the basis o f  the gains 
in wealth from incomplete acquisitions.
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1.3 Pre- and Post-Acquisition Operating Performance
The existence o f a separate, but affiliated corporate entity with continued public 
trading in its shares allows a direct examination o f the target’s operating performance 
following the change in control and an assessment o f whether this performance is 
sensitive to the mechanism by which control is established. In Chapter 5, the long-run 
operating performance o f these majority-owned subsidiaries is examined. Analysis o f  
the data indicates that majority-controlled target firms continue to trade publicly for a 
mean (median) period o f 5.7 (4.2) years. This lengthy period o f continued trading 
allows for an analysis o f the long-run operating performance o f  the target to determine 
whether or not there are improvements in performance following a change in control. 
The evidence consistently indicates that the operating performance o f target firms 
subsequent to incomplete acquisitions is not significantly different from the 
performance o f benchmark firms. These operating performance results suggest that 
there are no significant gains or losses to minority shareholders and indicate that there 
is no evidence to support either the hypothesis that minority shareholders free ride on 
the acquiring firm or the hypothesis that the acquirer exploits the minority shareholders.
1.4 The Valuation Effects of the Disposition of the Majority Stake
Chapter 6 investigates the ultimate disposition o f the majority stakes generated 
by incomplete acquisitions. Data on dispositions provide evidence about the effects o f  
alternative forms o f disposition and provide insight into the reasons why incomplete 
acquisitions are undertaken. Approximately one-half o f the targets o f  incomplete 
acquisitions are subsequently merged into the parent, about one-eighth are 
subsequently merged into a third party acquirer, about one-eighth are sold to a third
12
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party with the publicly traded interest continuing to  trade, and about one-eighth 
continue to trade as majority-controlled subsidiaries. The remainder o f  the sample is 
spread across a variety o f categories, such as the liquidation or bankruptcy o f the 
subsidiary, the spin-off o f  the majority interest to parent shareholders, or the repurchase 
o f  the parent's majority interest by the target.
Overall, the results indicate that the preponderance o f incomplete acquisitions 
ultimately become completed transactions. Event study methodology is used to 
investigate the valuation effects o f  alternative forms o f  disposition. The results indicate 
that parent-subsidiary mergers and third party buyouts o f subsidiaries generate large 
gains in shareholder wealth for target firms, but that other disposition events produce 
little gain to target shareholders. Disposition events consistently have no significant 
effect on share prices o f acquirer firms. There is no evidence o f a relationship between 
interim operating performance and the ultimate disposition o f the majority-controlled 
subsidiaiy.
Conclusions about the evidence presented in this dissertation are found in 
Chapter 7. A review o f the results o f the numerous aspects o f  this study is presented, 
conclusions are drawn, and topics for future research are suggested.
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CHAPTER 2
THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE ACQUISITIONS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents hypotheses about the valuation effects o f  announcements 
o f  incomplete acquisitions on targets and acquirers. Since these acquisitions can be 
accomplished in several different ways, particular attention is paid to the valuation 
effects o f the alternative methods by which the controlling interest is created. Since 
incomplete acquisitions have many similarities to traditional mergers and acquisitions, 
the first part o f  the chapter reviews the existing literature on mergers and acquisitions. 
Next, two perspectives on the role o f control, value-enhancement and expropriation, 
are used to generate hypotheses about the valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisitions. 
Incomplete acquisitions are similar to equity carve-outs in that after the transaction 
both structures are characterized by a majority interest held by a corporation with a 
public minority interest remaining for some period o f time. The literature on equity 
carve-outs is used to generate hypotheses about the benefits and costs o f an incomplete 
acquisition governance structure. Finally, because incomplete acquisitions have not 
been previously studied, the literature on other transactions that are typically viewed as 
mechanisms for restructuring, particularly equity carve-outs and private placements of 
equity, is examined to provide perspective on the alternative mechanisms used to 
accomplish incomplete acquisitions.
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions
Because incomplete acquisitions are in many ways similar to conventional 
mergers and acquisitions, a discussion o f theories and empirical evidence on the
14
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valuation effects o f  traditional mergers and acquisitions provides a useful framework 
for generating hypotheses about the valuation effects o f incomplete acquisitions. 
Previous empirical studies have found that on average firms that are a target o f  mergers 
and acquisitions exhibit a statistically significant positive share price response at initial 
acquisition announcements. Jensen and Ruback (1983) average the results o f 
numerous studies o f acquisition announcements and find that there is an increase in 
target firm share price o f approximately 20% for mergers and 30% for tender offers. In 
contrast, early studies o f bidding firms report different results depending on the 
methodology, time period, and sample used.2 Regardless o f whether bidding firm share 
price movements are positive or negative, they are generally small and not statistically 
significant or at least much less significant than those of target firms. More recently, a 
number o f studies, including Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1991), Servaes (1991) and Byrd and Hickman (1992), find significantly negative 
average returns to buyers in conventional mergers and acquisitions. Overall, a 
consensus has formed that capital markets view changes in corporate control as value- 
enhancing events since these events generate an increase in the combined shareholder 
wealth o f  bidders and targets, a result that is largely due to the substantial positive 
impact o f  acquisition announcements on the value o f target firms. Nevertheless, certain 
observers (e.g., Roll (1986)) disagree with this consensus and argue that corporate 
control events reflect the impact of wealth transfers rather than net gains.
2 Bradley (1980), Asquith (1983), and Dennis and McConnell (1986) report positive price movements 
for bidding firms while Dodd (1980), Firth (1980) and Eger (1983) report negative price movements.
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Several theories have been offered to explain overall wealth gains in response to 
mergers and acquisitions. Efficiency theories and information theories are the two 
predominant in the literature. Other theories include agency theories, market power 
theories, and financial consideration theories.3 Efficiency theories are based on the 
assumption that the combined value o f the target and acquirer will be greater than the 
sum of their pre-acquisition values. Specifically, the combined entity is able to realize 
the benefits o f  economies o f  scale or operating synergies due to the combination.4 In 
either case, the change in control should induce an increase in the subsequent operating 
performance o f  the combined firm, and hence, an increase in shareholder wealth at the 
time of the announcement. In support o f this efficiency view, Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1983) find that when an unsuccessful control bid is not followed by a successful 
takeover within five years, the target firm experiences a reversal o f the positive price 
response at the initial announcement.
The premise o f  efficiency theories is that corporate control activity is socially 
optimal and that the post-merger performance o f the combined firm should, on average, 
be better than the performance o f the separate firms. Thus, it is presumed that overall 
wealth is enhanced by changes in corporate control, so that the combined shareholder 
value o f the target and acquiring firm increases at acquisition announcements. In an 
efficient capital market, investors will bid up the market value o f the constituent firms 
to reflect this gain at the announcement. This gain in value is allocated between the 
shareholders o f  the bidder and the target, with the allocation o f the wealth effects likely
3 The categorization of merger and acquisition theories varies among authors. The categories used 
herein are generally based on Copeland and Weston (1988), pp. 682-690.
4 These efficiency gains are considered in Jensen and Ruback (1983).
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to depend on the competitiveness o f the market for corporate control. For example, if 
the market for control is perfectly competitive, the gains will be captured exclusively by 
the target firm shareholders.
Information theories posit that the bidding and acquisition process reveals 
positive information concerning the target’s future earnings performance. In this view, 
bidding firms expend valuable resources to generate private information about 
undervalued firms. Thus, a bid is a credible signal about the future prospects o f  the 
target firm. This hypothesis is supported by results indicating that a tender offer causes 
a permanent upward revision in the target’s share price even if the offer is unsuccessful, 
as documented in Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley (1980) and Firth (1980). While 
the Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) study, discussed above, is often interpreted as 
evidence against the information hypothesis, Roll (1987) argues that their findings are 
fully consistent with the information hypothesis if  the subsequent occurrence o f a rival 
bid increases the probability o f the existence o f positive private information about the 
target firm while decreasing both the probability that the bidder has sole possession o f 
the information and the probability that the initial bidder will succeed. Like efficiency 
theories, information theories predict that the combined shareholder value o f the target 
and acquiring firm will increase at the acquisition announcement and that the 
competitiveness o f the market for control will determine the allocation o f the gains.
Agency theories suggest three alternative perspectives on the role o f the market 
for corporate control.3 The first two explanations, the empire-building hypothesis and
s The discussion of the three agency theory views of mergers and acquisitions is based on Weston, 
Chung, and Siu (1998), pp. 80-82.
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the hubris hypothesis, suggest that mergers are a result o f  agency problems between the 
managers and shareholders o f the acquiring firm. Mueller (1969) argues that if 
managers can benefit solely by increasing firm size, then managers have an incentive to 
engage in inefficient acquisitions. Alternatively, Roll ((1986) suggests that managers 
are overly optimistic in their evaluation o f  potential merger targets. As a result, bidders 
pay too much for targets, resulting in a redistribution o f wealth from acquiring 
shareholders to  target shareholders. Consistent with the view that mergers are a result 
o f  agency problems, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that the post-transaction 
performance o f merging firms is typically worse than that o f their non-merging 
counterparts, implying that mergers do not create value.
The empire building and hubris hypotheses emphasize the importance of agency 
problems at acquiring firms that induce managers to undertake acquisitions that are not 
in the best interests o f shareholders. I f  overbidding occurs as a result o f agency 
problems, the gains in wealth obtained by target firm shareholders are offset by losses 
sustained by the shareholders o f bidding firms. In addition, there should be no 
improvement in the post-transaction operating performance o f the combined entity, and 
sales o f  previously acquired assets should be common.
The final agency cost explanation, the inefficient management hypothesis, 
suggests that mergers and acquisitions serve as a mechanism for disciplining inefficient 
target managers.6 Consequently, a merger allows the control o f  the assets o f the target 
firm to  be transferred to an acquirer that can manage them more efficiently, enhancing
6 Some authors include the inefficient management hypothesis under the rubric of efficiency theories; 
still others classify it as an information theory.
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the value o f  the target firm. This hypothesis was first suggested by Manne (1965) who 
contends that when alternative mechanisms, such as managerial compensation and the 
market for managers, fail to discipline target managers, the threat o f a takeover 
resolves agency problems by allowing the market for corporate control to monitor 
management. He argues that if managers o f firms perform sub-optimally, due to 
inefficiency or agency problems, the takeover market allows outside managers to gain 
control o f  the target’s assets and increase efficiency by moving resources to a higher 
valued use.
The inefficient management hypothesis emphasizes the importance o f takeovers 
as a mechanism that reduces agency problems and enhances managerial performance, 
so that the presence o f the market for corporate control contributes to economic value. 
In addition, the improved management o f target operations that results from the change 
in control should be evidenced by improved performance in the target’s operations.
Another reason given for mergers and acquisitions is that consolidation 
increases the market share o f the combined entity and hence its market power. 
However, Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) find little share price reaction for 
competitor firms in response to acquisition announcements and conclude that 
monopoly power is not a motive for mergers.
Finally, financial considerations offer other explanations for mergers and 
acquisitions, such as tax motives, financial synergies, and risk reduction through 
diversification. Tax motives include conversion o f  ordinary income into capital gains, 
offsetting net income with accumulated tax losses, and valuation for estate tax
19
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purposes.7 Financial synergy theories argue that the combined firm may realize 
economies o f  scale in financing operations o f  the combined entity. Diversification 
theories suggest that bankruptcy costs are reduced by the combination o f the target and 
acquirer cash flow streams.
2.3 The Role of Control: Value Enhancement vs. Expropriation
Even though overall value may be enhanced by changes in corporate control, 
strategic considerations may inhibit a change in control. Specifically, Grossman and 
Hart (1980) argue that outside agents have a disincentive to acquire an undervalued 
target firm that has a diffuse ownership structure because o f a free-rider problem that 
occurs if target firm shareholders have the option to remain shareholders following the 
takeover, for example in the case o f  a tender offer. In effect, target firm shareholders 
will rationally infer that the target firm is worth more than the price offered by the 
acquirer in a tender offer, or the bidder would not have made the offer. As a result, 
target shareholders will respond strategically by declining to tender their shares, and 
instead will free ride on the acquirer’s information. If  each shareholder takes this view, 
the offer for control will not succeed. If  potential acquirers anticipate this behavior, 
there will be little incentive for them to search for undervalued firms. Thus, there is a 
breakdown in the market for corporate control because the potential acquirer cannot 
capture enough o f  the benefits from the change in control to offset the costs o f  the 
takeover, even when the change in control is economically desirable.
7 A discussion of the key tax provisions for mergers and acquisitions is contained in Auerbach and 
Reishus (1988).
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Several solutions to this free rider problem that allow the bidder to share in the 
takeover gains are developed in the literature. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that 
the free rider problem can be mitigated, allowing the bidder to profit from the takeover, 
when the bidder is able to take actions that dilute the value o f the target firm shares that 
are not tendered. More specifically, if an acquiring firm can allocate to itself a 
sufficient proportion o f the post-acquisition gains, for example gains from efficiencies 
that occur after the transaction, the incentive o f target firm shareholders to free ride is 
eliminated. Another method used to circumvent the free rider problem is the two-tier 
offer, studied by Comment and Jarrell (1987), in which the front-loading o f  an offer 
eliminates the incentive o f target shareholders to free ride. Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) 
argue that some stockholders will be pivotal to the success o f the bid and thus, cannot 
free ride. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), and Chowdhry 
and Jegadeesh (1994) argue that the free rider problem can be avoided when a large 
shareholder is able to  accumulate a large fraction o f the equity before making the offer 
(a toehold) and thereby profit on the appreciation of the toehold.
A distinct but closely related literature concerns the ability o f acquirers or 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the wealth o f minority shareholders. Brudney 
and Clark (1981) and Bebchuk (1989) argue that there is an inherent conflict o f  interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders that is not effectively resolved by market 
forces or legal statutes, which permits a controlling firm to expropriate the interests o f 
minority shareholders. If  the majority shareholder is able to expropriate sufficient 
wealth from the minority shareholders, all target shareholders have an incentive to 
tender their shares when the intention to gain control is announced. In effect, it is
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undesirable to become a minority shareholder in the subsidiary because the acquiring 
firm will gain a disproportionate share o f any subsequent gains from the takeover. 
Corporate law statutes o f European countries assume that a pattern o f expropriation o f 
minority shareholders is characteristic o f  incomplete acquisitions. European law 
requires that bidders that obtain control o f  a  target firm, by purchasing a majority but 
not 100% o f the target firm’s shares, must be prepared to purchase all remaining 
minority shares on terms equivalent to the highest price the bidder has paid for target 
shares. Overall, the expropriation hypothesis implies that if  shares o f the target firm 
continue to trade after the acquisition, there should be an observable deterioration in 
the target firm’s post-transaction operating performance. It is this expectation o f poor 
subsequent performance that motivates target firm shareholders to tender their shares, 
eliminating the free rider problem.
An incomplete acquisition can be viewed as the formation o f a large (majority) 
blockholder. The finance literature suggests two distinct and opposing organizational 
roles for large-block shareholders that are similar to the value enhancement and 
expropriation hypotheses o f the market for corporate control. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) develop a model in which large-block shareholders enhance value by monitoring 
managers. Moreover, they argue that large shareholders mitigate agency problems 
because they have both an interest in profit maximization and in control over a firm's 
assets. This blockholder hypothesis suggests that the creation o f majority ownership 
through an incomplete acquisition should increase overall value, with the gain in value 
shared by the bidder and the target. This blockholder hypothesis predicts that an 
acquiring firm will make sufficient changes in the operations o f the target firm to
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improve its post-transaction performance. These activities generate gains for the 
bidder through an increase in the value o f the target firm stock it acquires, and these 
gains are shared with minority shareholders. In contrast, Fama and Jensen (1983) 
suggest that large-block ownership can lead to the expropriation o f dispersed 
shareholders, such as by fostering the private consumption o f corporate wealth. From 
this perspective, the acquiring firm in an incomplete acquisition can sustain an increase 
in its value as a result o f  its ability to control the target firm's assets and expropriate 
value from minority shareholders. Thus, there should be a deterioration in the post­
transaction performance o f the target firm.
There have been several empirical studies o f majority blockholders. Holderness 
and Sheehan (1988) examine a sample o f corporate and individual majority 
blockholders. They find no evidence to suggest that majority blockholders expropriate 
or consume corporate resources. Their results suggest that the benefits o f  majority 
ownership lie in direct management rather than more effective monitoring. In contrast 
to the study o f  Holderness and Sheehan, Rosenstein and Rush (1990) compare a 
sample o f  corporations with individuals who are partial owners to a control sample o f 
non-partially owned firms. Their evidence is consistent with the wealth transfer 
hypothesis. Specifically, they conclude that wealth transfers are effected through 
intercorporate transactions, that is, transactions conducted at terms that are favorable 
to the blockholder. However, their results also indicate that the negative effect of 
partial ownership on shareholder wealth is mitigated when the partial owner has a 
majority interest.
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Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) examine the share price effects o f  13D filings, 
which report corporate investments o f  5% or more o f  the target company’s equity and 
find that these announcements increase target firm value. In their study, the mean 
(median) equity stake acquired is 20.9% (23.3%). In contrast, an incomplete 
acquisition involves transactions in which a majority stake is established; i.e., there is a 
change in control. Barclay and Holderness (1989) find that, on average, substantial 
premiums are paid to buy large blocks o f equity, and that large blocks o f equity sell for 
a greater premium than smaller blocks.
2.4 Benefits and Costs of Incomplete Acquisitions
In a competitive economy, the observation o f  a unique mechanism for 
transferring corporate control (i.e., an incomplete acquisition) implies that this 
mechanism conveys certain benefits that are not available through a conventional 
merger or acquisition. In this section, the literature on equity carve-outs is used to 
generate hypotheses about the benefits and costs o f an incomplete acquisition 
governance structure. Incomplete acquisitions are similar to equity carve-outs in that 
after the transaction both structures are characterized by a majority interest held by a 
corporation with a public minority interest remaining for some (perhaps temporary) 
period o f  time. In an equity carve-out, a portion o f a wholly-owned subsidiary’s 
common stock is offered for sale to the public. In the typical case, parent control over 
the subsidiary’s assets is not relinquished; instead a publicly traded minority interest is 
created.
Whereas significantly large, negative excess returns are well documented as the 
response to firms announcing seasoned equity offerings, Schipper and Smith (1986)
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find positive abnormal returns o f about two percent during the five-day period when 
the parent announces an equity carve-out. They hypothesize that the positive reaction 
to carve-out announcements is in part attributed to a reduction in information 
asymmetries between managers and investors and/or to gains in efficiency associated 
with the new governance structure. Thus, the positive excess return to the parent firm 
reflects an increase in the subsidiary's value. They identify several characteristics that 
distinguish an equity carve-out from a public offering o f seasoned equity. These 
characteristics include: i) the separation o f subsidiary and parent assets for purposes o f  
external equity financing, ii) the initiation of public trading o f the subsidiary’s common 
stock, iii) the restructuring o f asset management and incentive contracts for managers, 
and iv) the creation o f  a publicly held minority interest. They attribute the positive 
share price reaction to equity carve-outs to these distinguishing characteristics. One o f  
the benefits o f a carve-out is that the separation of subsidiary growth opportunities 
from parent assets avoids the negative implications about managers’ private 
information regarding the value o f the parent’s assets. In addition, public listing o f 
subsidiary stock improves investor understanding o f the subsidiary through increased 
financial reporting requirements and increased incentives for information collection and 
monitoring by outside agents, such as analysts and other market participants. Although 
a publicly-held minority interest may spur monitoring o f the subsidiary, it may also 
create conflicts o f  interest between the minority shareholders and the parent firm 
shareholders. Finally, a carve-out permits the restructuring o f managerial 
responsibilities and the initiation o f incentive contracts based on the subsidiary’s share 
price that may improve the efficiency o f asset management.
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An important characteristic o f  incomplete acquisitions is the continued trading 
o f the public minority interest and filing o f  financial statement disclosures. These 
aspects o f  incomplete acquisitions may mitigate agency problems by allowing effective 
market monitoring o f target managers. Unlike complete acquisitions in which the 
target is fully absorbed into the acquirer, incomplete acquisitions are characterized by a 
much higher degree o f transparency. The target’s share price and financial statements 
continue to be observable to market participants after incomplete acquisitions. The 
willingness o f  the acquirer to bear the direct and indirect costs o f  this disclosure 
suggests that there are offsetting benefits to the higher degree o f transparency.
An incomplete acquisition may be more value enhancing than a complete 
acquisition if  there are benefits to separate externally audited financial reports or to the 
writing o f  managerial contracts based on the target’s stock price performance. 
Specifically, the availability o f a market-determined value for the target’s stock may 
strengthen the motivation, evaluation, and compensation o f  target managers or 
facilitate the eventual acquisition of the subsidiary by another firm since a market price 
for the entity is continuously observable. Incomplete acquisitions may allow synergies 
to be captured while allowing the publicly held minority interest to improve the 
monitoring o f  managers.
Another aspect o f  this high degree o f transparency is that it may mitigate 
agency problems between the acquiring firm’s managers and shareholders. By allowing 
the minority interest to continue to trade and maintaining the high degree o f 
transparency intrinsic to a public subsidiary, the acquiring firm managers convey 
positive information about the value o f the target. This is in contrast to a complete
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acquisition in which the target value is subsumed within the acquirer, making it difficult 
for investors to judge the subsequent performance o f the acquisition.
Nanda (1991) also offers a motive for carve-outs that is applicable to 
incomplete acquisitions. Specifically, Nanda shows that if the consolidated corporation 
is undervalued, new equity financing through a carve-out allows the parent firm to take 
on positive net present value projects that would have been foregone if the only option 
were to issue equity in the undervalued parent. Similarly, an incomplete acquisition 
allows the acquirer to retain the option to obtain future financing through the issuance 
o f seasoned equity in the target, rather than the parent.
2.5 Differential Valuation Effects of Incomplete Acquisition Mechanisms
An interesting aspect o f incomplete acquisitions is that there are several 
methods by which control is established. Moreover, two o f these methods are unique 
to this form o f  corporate control transaction because no shares are acquired from 
dispersed shareholders. These two methods are the issuance o f  new equity by the 
target to  the acquirer, and the purchase o f several existing blocks o f stock to form a 
majority stake. In contrast to tender offers in which the acquirer negotiates with 
incumbent management and target shareholders decide atomisticaliy whether or not to 
tender their shares, new equity issues and block purchases establish control without 
purchasing any shares from dispersed shareholders. By sorting incomplete acquisitions 
according to the manner by which control is established, the wealth effects o f  these 
alternative methods for establishing majority control can be analyzed.
The information hypothesis o f  mergers and acquisitions focuses on the positive 
private information generated by an acquirer. From a different perspective, studies of
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bidding, control contests, and takeover defenses focus attention on information 
asymmetries between the buyer and seller. The assumption is that the seller has 
valuable private information about the firm that is not known to potential buyers, or 
that a buyer has valuable private information that is not known to the seller. From this 
perspective, certain methods for conducting incomplete acquisitions are more likely 
than other methods to reduce these information asymmetries. Specifically, transactions 
that involve the issuance o f new equity to the acquirer can reduce information 
asymmetry because bidding firm managers and target managers can convey information 
privately as a basis for negotiating terms o f the transaction. Similar considerations 
apply to  block transactions that lead to majority control. In either case, an acquirer 
obtains control without purchasing shares from dispersed shareholders. New equity 
issues entail negotiations between the bidder and target managers that can result in the 
placing o f  the block o f  shares at a discount, which may or may not be in the interest of 
dispersed target firm shareholders. Thus, target firm shareholders may capture a 
greater share o f the gains by selling their holdings directly to the acquirer through a 
tender offer or a block sale than in transactions in which managers negotiate a new 
equity issue to the acquirer. In contrast, a tender offer is a public transaction that is 
actually a series o f individual transactions between the acquiring firm and target firm 
shareholders directly. In addition, the impact o f establishing control on the combined 
wealth o f target and bidding firm shareholders may vary across these alternative 
methods.
When a buyer obtains a controlling interest in a target firm via the acquisition o f 
shares from large blockholders, each (non-majority) blockholder acts in its own
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interest, or coordinates its actions with other blockholders, without any need to 
consider the interests o f  the remaining minority shareholders. In contrast, in an 
incomplete acquisition via a tender offer, existing shareholders individually decide 
whether to  sell their shares to the bidder and the number o f  shares tendered may or may 
not constitute a majority o f the shares in the target firm. The creation o f  majority 
ownership through a new equity issue is the result o f  negotiations between target firm 
managers and the acquirer, and typically requires that a majority o f the existing 
shareholders approve the transaction recommended by management. In contrast, the 
creation o f  majority ownership through the purchase o f existing, but non-controlling 
blockholder shares requires only the consent o f  the blockholders involved. This 
difference in the role o f  non-block shareholders suggests that the target firm's share 
price response to the announcement o f  an incomplete acquisition through a block 
purchase will be less favorable than the response to other acquisition forms.
Incomplete acquisitions that arise from the sale o f new seasoned equity by the 
target to the acquirer are closely related to carve-outs because they also involve a 
primary equity offering o f the target’s stock. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 
present evidence that suggests that parents may conduct carve-outs when outside 
investors are likely to price the new shares higher than parent managers’ perceived 
value o f such shares. This reasoning suggests that the gain in parent firm value occurs 
despite a decrease in the value o f the subsidiary. From this perspective, incomplete 
acquisitions through the issuance by the target o f  new shares to the acquiring firm 
would convey negative information about the target.
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In contrast to carve-outs, however, an incomplete acquisition through the 
issuance o f new seasoned target equity is conducted privately between the target and 
the acquiring corporation rather than through an initial public offering. Moreover, 
unlike a carve-out in which the parent typically receives the proceeds o f the equity 
issuance, in an incomplete acquisition the proceeds o f the stock offering go to the 
target firm, although in return the target firm is under the control o f  the acquirer. 
These differences suggest that an incomplete acquisition via new equity issuance may 
be more similar to a large private placement o f equity. From this perspective, 
incomplete acquisitions through the issuance o f  equity in the target would convey 
positive private information generated through negotiations between the acquirer and 
target management.
Wruck (1989) examines a sample o f  private sales o f equity in which the firm 
sells a block o f  equity to a single investor or a small number o f  investors. She finds 
that the announcement o f a private sale o f equity is associated with a 4.5% increase in 
non-participating shareholder wealth. This result is in contrast to the finding that 
shareholder wealth falls an average o f 3% at announcements o f seasoned equity 
offerings.8
Firm commitment seasoned equity offerings are generally sold to a dispersed 
group o f investors and thus decrease ownership concentration. Wruck contends that 
the increase in ownership concentration engendered by private placements is value- 
increasing. Her sample o f private equity placements does not focus on a complete
( See Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986).
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change o f  control; instead the block o f securities sold has an average (median) o f  about 
20% (12%) o f the firm’s equity voting rights. The mean (median) post-purchase stake 
o f the buyer is about 26% (18%). Thus, some o f her events involve only a small 
change in ownership concentration. Nevertheless, in W ruck’s regression analysis, the 
change in ownership concentration variable is only significant when the level of 
ownership is greater than 25%. There is a significantly negative coefficient on the 
dummy variable for the establishment o f control, indicating a negative effect on the 
target when the buyer announces its intention to  establish control. W ruck’s 
explanation for this result is that managers have conveyed control without shareholder 
approval and perhaps at shareholder expense.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) also find that private placements o f equity have a 
positive share price effect. They argue that this effect is due to the monitoring role 
provided by large shareholders. The size o f  the price discount in a private placement is 
viewed as compensation for the transactions costs the blockholder absorbs in the 
process o f  becoming informed about the firm.
In contrast to Wruck’s and Hertzel and Smith's private placements samples, the 
sample o f  incomplete acquisitions studied in this work involves the creation o f a more 
than 30% and typically, more than 50% controlling interest in a target firm by another 
corporation. This greater degree o f  increased ownership concentration may create 
value by aligning management and shareholder interests either through increased 
monitoring or the replacement o f management. From this perspective, the 
announcement o f  an incomplete acquisition should have a positive effect on overall 
value. However, incomplete acquisitions through block purchases are characterized by
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a lesser degree o f  change in ownership concentration than other forms o f incomplete 
acquisitions (i.e., ownership is already concentrated before the acquisition). Therefore, 
if increased ownership concentration is value-increasing, then incomplete acquisitions 
that greatly increase concentration should have a more positive effect on the value 
generated by the acquisition than those that entail only a slight increase in 
concentration.
The creation o f control through new equity issuance entails a large cash 
infusion for the target. This method is a form o f private financing that can allow the 
target to finance positive net present value projects, i.e., growth options. From this 
perspective, the share price response to incomplete acquisitions via new equity issuance 
may be more favorable than for transactions effected through other methods. 
Alternatively, the cash infusion may convey negative information about agency 
problems between the target managers and shareholders. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 
(1995) argue that such agency problems are an important element in asset sales. They 
demonstrate that the positive share price response to asset sales is confined to  those 
selling firms that do not retain the proceeds. If agency problems characterize 
incomplete acquisitions via new equity issuance, the share price response to these 
transactions should be less favorable than for transactions effected through other 
methods.
In addition, incomplete acquisitions through new equity issues are intrinsically 
friendly transactions, in contrast to tender offers, which may be friendly or may incur 
the hostility o f  target firm managers. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find that target 
firms experience significant negative returns when the management o f the target firm
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announces opposition to the proposed acquisition. Management hostility may be in the 
interest o f shareholders if an offer is an inferior bid, or if hostility spurs competitive 
bidding. Alternatively, managerial hostility may signal inefficient, entrenched managers. 
Thus, the predicted impact o f  management resistance in incomplete acquisitions is 
ambiguous. Evidence on the impact can be obtained by comparing the stock price 
response to friendly versus hostile offers in incomplete acquisitions.
Another distinction between new equity issues and block purchases is whether 
shareholder approval o f  the transfer o f  control is required. Both the NYSE and Amex 
require shareholder approval o f  issues that “significantly” increase the number o f voting 
securities outstanding. Shareholder approval is also required when the sale necessitates 
the issuance o f  more shares than are currently authorized. Given the rules o f the 
exchanges, incomplete acquisitions o f listed firms that occur through the issuance o f 
additional shares are likely to require shareholder approval. In contrast, creation o f  a 
controlling stake through a tender offer or purchase o f  existing blocks can generally be 
effected without the approval o f  the shareholders.
This study explores whether the share price reaction to incomplete acquisitions 
differs depending on whether new financing is generated in conjunction with the change 
in control. Both new equity issues and purchases o f existing blocks are expected to 
reduce information asymmetries between the bidder and the target, and at the same 
time avoid the free rider problem intrinsic to tender offers. Furthermore, new equity 
offerings have a greater effect on ownership concentration than block purchases. This 
suggests that the stock market response to  the announcement o f an incomplete 
acquisition through the issuance o f new equity will be more favorable than the response
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to the announcement o f a block purchase. Alternatively, new equity offerings could be 
undertaken when the target is overvalued. This suggests that the stock market 
response to an incomplete acquisition through new equity issuance would be less 
favorable than for an incomplete acquisition through a block purchase.
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CHAPTER 3
SAMPLE DEVELOPMENT, METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3.1 Introduction
The first part o f  this chapter describes the development o f the incomplete 
acquisitions sample. The methods used for data collection and sample construction are 
described. The second part o f the chapter presents the methodology used to analyze 
these events. The final part o f the chapter contains descriptive statistics for the sample 
o f  incomplete acquisition announcements.
3.2 Sample Development
The sample o f incomplete acquisitions is collected from several different 
sources, since there is no single comprehensive data source on this topic. First, a 
search for events involving a controlling interest9 by one corporation in another 
corporation is conducted using Standard & Poor’s Stock Reports, the periodical 
Mergers and Acquisitions, and the Wall Street Journal Index. A search o f  these 
sources generates a large set o f potential incomplete acquisitions occurring between 
1962 and 1997. Relevant news articles are obtained and examined to determine the 
substance o f  the transaction and whether and by what means control is established. 
Second, announcement dates o f events that meet the definition of an incomplete 
acquisition are identified using the Wall Street Journal Index and the Lexis-Nexis 
Company News database. Third, transactions are eliminated when the incomplete 
transaction is a two-step merger, that is, an initial offer for a controlling interest in the
9 A controlling interest is defined as a 30% or greater interest in the target. However, tests of the main 
results are also conducted on the subsample of firms in which the percentage of control is between 
30% and 70%. The results are qualitatively the same for this subsample.
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target is quickly followed by a compulsory second offer that eliminates the remaining 
minority shareholders through a ffeezeout. Transactions are also eliminated from the 
sample for events in which the establishment o f  control and the intention to 
subsequently merge the subsidiary with the parent or sell the subsidiary are announced 
concurrently. From this set o f  events, transactions are eliminated if the target firm is 
not trading on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes during the 
period o f  analysis for the relevant event. The final sample consists o f  275 target firms 
and 217 parent firms. The sample o f  paired targets and acquirers that are trading 
during the period o f  analysis consists o f 217 transactions.10
3.3 M ethodology
This study begins the analysis o f incomplete acquisitions by measuring the 
security valuation effects o f these transactions. Event study methodology is used to 
measure the share price effects o f the initial announcement o f these transactions and the 
share price effects o f  the ultimate outcome for events in which there is a subsequent 
disposition o f  the minority interest. The purpose o f this methodology is to adjust 
realized stock returns for market-wide movements in order to isolate the component o f 
the returns that is due to the event being examined. Daily stock price data are collected 
from the files o f  the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The standard event study methods described in Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) are used to measure the stock price reaction to incomplete acquisition 
announcements. Under semi-strong form market efficiency, the stock price reaction
10 Sample observations are sometimes missing certain data items necessary to a particular analysis. 
Thus, the sample size varies depending on the analysis being conducted. Also, although only 217 
acquirers are listed on CRSP, SIC codes are available for 227 acquirers.
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provides an unbiased valuation adjustment corresponding to the information contained 
in the announcement and an estimate o f the change in shareholder wealth o f  acquiring 
firms and target firms around the announcement o f  an incomplete acquisition. The use 
o f  standard event study methodology permits a comparison o f  the results in this study 
with the results o f  previous research using similar methodology.
Event study methodology requires estimates o f  the parameters o f the returns 
generating process. These estimates are obtained via an ordinary least squares 
regression using the market model over the estimation period from day -180 to day 
-61:
Rit = a ,  +$iRmt + e„
where:
R* = the return for firm i on day t,
oti =  the mean return not explained by the market.
Pi = firm i’s relationship with the market’s return (i.e., its risk factor),
Rtoi -  the return on the market index on day t,
Bit = the statistical error or the regression residual.
Events with more than 60 missing observations over the estimation period are 
eliminated. The event period is defined as the period surrounding the announcement 
date, t=0. The predicted return for firm i on day t in the event period is the return 
given by the market model on that day using the estimates o f oti and Pi from the 
estimation period. Thus, the predicted return is:
Ri t = a ,+ ^ R mt
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Abnormal returns" are calculated as the difference between the arithmetic return and 
the conditional expected return derived as the prediction value obtained from a least 
squares regression over the estimation period using the return on the CRSP equal- 
weighted index as the explanatory variable. The abnormal return, AR, is defined as: 
ARjf = Rit -  Rit
The stock price reaction for firms announcing an incomplete acquisition is 
estimated by calculating the average abnormal return, A R , during the period around 
the event date. Abnormal returns are averaged for each day in the event period to 
obtain average abnormal returns:
  1
ARt — Z dRjt 
N t / = i
where N, is the number o f sample firms trading on day t. The cumulative abnormal
return, CAR, is defined as the sum o f the daily average abnormal returns during the
event period. The required calculation is:
'»  ____
CAR = Z ARt
where ti is the first day in the event period and t2 is the last day in the event period.
The analysis focuses on the two-day event window (-1,0) and the seven-day 
event window (-5, +1). The date that the announcement appears on the newswire is 
classified as day -1. The date that the announcement appears in the Wall Street Journal 
is classified as day 0. To test for statistical significance, the null hypothesis is that the
11 Abnormal returns arc also referred to as excess returns or prediction errors. The term prediction 
error is probably the most accurate, however, the term abnormal return is the most commonly used.
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average abnormal return equals zero for each event subperiod. The test statistic is 
constructed as the ratio of the average abnormal return or cumulative abnormal return 
to its standard deviation (the square root o f  the product o f the number o f  days in the 
event window and the variance) estimated over the pre-event period. This test statistic 
is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis if  the abnormal returns are 
independent, identically distributed and normal. Qualitatively similar results for 
significance are obtained, but not reported, using the z-statistic and the standardized 
cross-sectional test ofBoehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991).
This study focuses on whether incomplete acquisitions result in an 
enhancement o f  overall value. Thus, the analysis requires the calculation o f average 
combined cumulative abnormal returns and average combined market values. Market 
values for targets (MKTVALt) and acquirers (MKTVALa) are calculated as the 
number o f shares outstanding times the stock price six weeks prior to the 
announcement date. Combined cumulative abnormal returns (COMBCAR) are 
calculated as:
COMBCAR = wTCARr  + wa CARa
MKTVALt 
where wT -  M KW AL^  + MKTVALa
________MKTVALa
and Wa  ~ MKTVALt + MKTVALa
The average combined cumulative abnormal return is:
---------------  1 N
COMBCAR = —  I  COMBCARt .
N / = l
Combined market values are calculated as:
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COMBMV = ( MKTVALt  * CART) + (m KTVALa  x  )
The average combined market value is:
-------------------  1 N
COMBMV = — I  COMBMV,
N  , = 1
Since COMBMV = (mKTVALt  + MKTVALa ) x COMBCAR, the average combined
market value is a value-weighted average o f the combined cumulative abnormal returns 
while the average combined cumulative abnormal return is an equal-weighted average 
o f the combined cumulative abnormal returns. For this reason, the signs may differ 
between COMBCAR and COM BM V. Median values o f COMBCAR and 
COMBMV, which by definition must have the same sign, are also presented in this 
analysis.
The analysis is conducted both in the aggregate and by disaggregating the
sample o f  incomplete acquisitions in accordance with the manner by which control is
established. The announcement effects are also disaggregated in accordance with the
ultimate disposition o f the minority interest, that is, whether the minority interest
continues to trade or is later extinguished through a parent-subsidiary merger, a sale to
a third party, or another means. The methodology described above is used in Chapter 4
to study the stock market reaction to the ultimate disposition o f the majority stake.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
There is little information in the finance literature about incomplete acquisitions.
Thus a descriptive analysis o f these transactions contributes to knowledge about this
type o f  corporate control event. Descriptive statistics for the sample o f incomplete
acquisition announcements are found in Tables 1 through 6. Table 1 provides the
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distribution o f  incomplete acquisition announcements by year for the period 1967 to 
1997. While there are incomplete acquisition announcements each year, except 1996, 
there appears to  be some concentration in the periods 1968-1969, 1974-1975 and 
1979-1987. This pattern is broadly consistent with overall merger and acquisition 
activity over the sample period.
The distribution o f market values for 230 incomplete acquisition targets and 
184 acquirers are reported in Panels A and B o f Table 2. The market value is defined 
as the product o f  the number o f shares outstanding and the price per share six weeks 
prior to the announcement date. The mean (median) market value for the full sample of 
230 target firms is $174 million ($35 million). The mean (median) market value for the 
full sample o f 184 acquirer firms is $1.74 billion ($147 million). Firms that are targets 
o f  incomplete acquisitions are typically much smaller than acquiring firms. Holdemess 
and Sheehan (1988) report a mean (median) equity value o f $409 million ($66 million) 
for 114 majority-owned (either by individuals or corporations) firms listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or American Stock Exchange (Amex) during 1978 to  
1984. The sample o f incomplete acquisitions includes firms that are traded over-the- 
counter or on NASDAQ which accounts in large part for the smaller target market 
values observed in the sample o f incomplete acquisitions. In addition, Holdemess and 
Sheehan do not provide information about the mechanism by which majority control 
was established, but it is likely that equity carve-outs are common in their sample.
For incomplete acquisitions effected through tender offers, the mean (median) 
market value o f  69 target firms is $230 million ($47 million) and the mean (median)
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Table 1 - Distribution of Incomplete Acquisition Announcements by Year
Number o f incomplete acquisitions occurring in each year, 1967-1997.
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Table 2 - Market Value Descriptive Statistics for Incomplete Acquisition Targets 
and Acquirers
The distribution o f  market values for 230 incomplete acquisition targets are reported in 
Panel A. The distribution o f market values for 184 incomplete acquisition acquirers are 
reported in Panel B. The relative size o f target market value to acquirer market value 
is given in Panel C.
Panel A: Target firms by acquisition type
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Market value* ($ millions)
Full sample 230 174.2 35.4 0.4 5,569.3
Tender offers 69 229.7 46.9 2.9 5,569.3
New equity issues 61 94.6 29.4 0.4 759.8
Block purchases 56 63.8 26.7 0.7 559.7
Open market purchase 10 91.1 58.1 6.5 266.5
Panel B: Acquirer firms by acquisition type
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Market value* ($ millions)
Full sample 184 1,740.7 147.3 2.8 58,857.4
Tender offers 52 733.5 119.8 2.8 14,860.8
New equity issues 51 2,694.4 310.7 14.8 53,337.3
Block purchases 47 695.8 134.5 5.8 7,191.3
Open market purchases 8 144.7 81.9 6.8 389.1
Panel C: Relative size of target firm to acquirer firm:
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Relative size of target to acquirerb
Full sample 140 78.41% 22.72% 0.11% 1,066.48%
Tender offers 45 150.04% 71.08% 0.79% 1,066.48%
New equity issues 38 22.78% 6.51% 0.11% 180.90%
Block purchases 37 48.97% 26.04% 1.41% 336.59%
Open market purchase 7 146.09% 79.53% 18.64% 432.17%
'Market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the stock price six weeks prior 
to the incomplete acquisition announcement.
b Relative size is calculated as the market value of the target divided by the market value of the 
acquirer.
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market value o f 52 acquirer firms is $734 million ($120 million). In comparison, Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991) report mean (median) equity values o f $466 million ($134 
million) for targets and $1.74 billion ($546 million) for acquirers for a sample o f 
successful tender offers occurring from October 1968 to December 1986. Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) report mean (median) equity values o f  $570 million ($207 million) for 
targets and $1.59 billion ($862 million) for acquirers for a sample o f tender offers 
occurring from 1980 to 1987. Their sample includes only firms in which both the 
bidder and target are listed on the NYSE or Amex at the time o f  the bid. The inclusion 
o f firms traded over-the-counter may account for the smaller market values observed in 
the sample o f  incomplete acquisitions through tender offers.
For incomplete acquisitions effected through the issuance o f new equity, the 
mean (median) market value o f 61 target firms is $95 million ($29 million) and the 
mean (median) market value of 51 acquirer firms is $2.69 billion ($311 million). These 
figures are similar to those reported in Hertzel and Smith (1993), where issuing firms in 
private equity placements from January 1980 to May 1987 have mean (median) equity 
values o f $95 million ($46 million). Thus, the targets in incomplete acquisitions 
through the issuance o f new equity are similar in size to firms conducting private 
placements o f  equity.
For incomplete acquisitions effected through block purchases, the mean 
(median) market value o f  56 target firms is $64 million ($27 million) and the mean 
(median) market value o f 47 acquirer firms is $696 million ($135 million). Across 
incomplete acquisition methods, it appears that tender offer targets are somewhat
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larger than new equity issuance targets and block purchase targets, and that new equity 
issuance acquirers are larger than tender offer acquirers and block purchase acquirers.
The relative size o f target firms to acquiring firms is reported in Panel C of 
Table 2. The relative size is calculated as the market value o f the target divided by the 
market value o f  the acquirer. For the full sample o f  140 paired targets and acquirers, 
the mean (median) relative size o f the targets is 78.4% (22.7%).12 For tender offers, 
the mean (median) relative size o f the targets is 150.0% (71.1%). These figures 
confirm the earlier observation that tender offer targets are generally larger than the 
new equity issuance and block purchase targets. The mean (median) relative size o f 
new equity issuance targets is 22.8% (6.5%) and is consistent with the observation that 
the acquirers are generally larger for this method o f  incomplete acquisition. The mean 
(median) relative size o f block purchase targets is 49.0% (26.0%). In comparison,
Byrd and Hickman (1992) report a mean (median) relative size o f 68% (30%) for 
targets o f  traditional tender offers while Loderer and Martin (1990) report a median 
relative size o f  20.9% for targets in tender offers and 9.4% for targets o f  mergers. 
Overall, the relative size o f incomplete acquisition targets to parents is comparable to 
those in other studies o f corporate control changes. Moreover, the finding that the 
relative size o f  new equity issuance incomplete acquisition targets is much smaller than 
the relative size o f  tender offer incomplete acquisition targets parallels the finding that
12 In a few cases, the acquirer is majority-owned by another corporation. Since acquirer market value 
is calculated as shares outstanding times price, the actual size of majority-owned acquirers is 
understated. These acquirers account for the three largest relative size observations (1,066%, 432%, 
and 337%). Thus, the median relative size is more representative of the true relative size of targets to 
acquirers.
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the relative size o f  merger targets is much smaller than the relative size o f conventional 
tender offer targets.
The distribution o f methods used to establish control is reported in Table 3.
For the 271 incomplete acquisition announcements, there are three methods of 
acquisition that dominate the sample. These three methods are tender offers (27.7%), 
new equity issues (28.8%), and block purchases (25.1%). Incomplete acquisitions by 
open market purchases o f stock are relatively rare (4.4%). For this latter method o f 
acquisition, it is often difficult to determine the precise date that an attempt at control 
becomes public. There are also a small number o f  transactions in which an asset, such 
as a division o f  the acquirer, is exchanged for a controlling interest in the target (4.4%). 
The remaining transactions (9.6%) are a combination o f two or more o f these methods. 
Given this distribution o f transactions, the analysis o f incomplete acquisitions focuses 
primarily on the first three methods by which acquirers obtain control.
Table 3 — Distribution of Methods Used to Establish Control
Number and percentage o f incomplete acquisitions disaggregated by method used to 
establish control for 271 incomplete acquisitions.
M ethod # o f Events Percentage
Tender offer 75 27.7%
Issuance o f  new equity 78 28.8%
Biockhoider purchase 68 25.1%
Open market purchase 12 4.4%
Asset/equity exchange 12 4.4%
Tender offer & new equity issue 10 3.7%
Tender offer & block purchase 5 1.8%
New equity issue & block purchase 6 2.2%
Tender offer & open market purchase 1 0.4%
Block purchase & asset/equity exchange 4 1.5%
Total 271 100.0%
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The distribution o f incomplete acquisitions by industry classification based on 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for 274 targets and 227 acquirers is 
reported in Panels A and B o f Table 4. SIC codes are taken from Compustat when 
available. If  a sample firm is not on Compustat, the SIC code is collected from CRSP. 
The percentage o f  firms in each category is calculated as the number o f  firms in the 
category divided by the total number o f firms with SIC codes.
In Panel A, for incomplete acquisition targets, there are 128 target firms or 
almost half o f  the total sample that are in the category o f Manufacturing (SIC codes. 
20xx-39xx). Within this category, 12 firms are in the Food and Kindred Products 
group (SIC=20xx), 17 firms are in the Chemical and Allied Products group 
(SIC=28xx), 11 firms are in the Primary Metals Industries group (SIC=33xx), 17 firms 
are in the Industrial, Commercial Machinery, and Computer Equipment group 
(SIC=35xx), 15 firms are in the Electrical Equipment group (SIC=36xx), and 12 firms 
are in the Measuring Instruments, Photographic Goods, and Watches group 
(SIC=38xx). The category o f Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (SIC codes 60xx- 
67xx) contains 39 target firms or about 14% o f the sample. Within this category, nine 
companies are in the Insurance group (SIC=63xx). The category o f Transportation, 
Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (SIC codes: 40xx-49xx) contains 
25 target firms or about 9% o f the sample, with a concentration o f 11 firms in the 
Communications group (S IC ^Sxx). The category o f Services (SIC codes: 70xx- 
89xx) contains 23 target firms or about 8% o f the sample, with a concentration o f  six 
firms in the Business Services group (SIC=73xx). The category o f Mining (SIC codes: 
10xx-14xx) contains 20 target firms or about 7% o f  the sample, with a concentration o f
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Table 4 - Distribution of Incomplete Acquisition Targets and Acquirers by 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code
The number and percentage o f firms in each SIC group are reported for targets and 
acquirers in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. SIC codes are taken from Compustat 
when available. I f  the firm is not on Compustat, the SIC code is taken from CRSP. 
Percentages are calculated as the number o f firms in the SIC group divided by the 
number o f available SIC codes.
Panel A: Distribution of SIC codes for targets
Two-Digit SIC Description Number of
Group firms Percent
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 0.37%
10-14 Mining 20 7.33%
15-17 Construction 3 1.10%
20-39 Manufacturing 128 46.87%
40-49 Transportation, Communication,
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 25 9.16%
50-51 Wholesale Trade 14 5.13%
52-59 Retail Trade 20 7.33%
60-67 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 39 14.29%
70-89 Services 23 8.42%
91-97 Public Administration 0 0.00%
Total available 274 100.0%
Not available 1
Total 275
Panel B: Distribution of SIC codes for acquirers
Two-Digit SIC Description Number of
Group firms Percent
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 0.00%
10-14 Mining 20 8.81%
15-17 Construction 3 1.32%
20-39 Manufacturing 107 47.13%
40-49 Transportation, Communication,
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 24 10.57%
50-51 Wholesale Trade 10 4.41%
52-59 Retail Trade 12 5.29%
60-67 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 40 17.62%
70-89 Services 11 4.85%
91-97 Public Administration 0 0.00%
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15 firms in the Oil and Gas Extraction group (SIC=13xx). The category of Retail 
Trade (SIC codes: 52xx-59xx) contains 20 target firms or about 8% o f the sample, 
with no particular areas o f concentration.
In Panel B, for incomplete acquisition acquirers, there are 107 firms or almost 
half o f the total sample in the category o f Manufacturing (SIC codes: 20xx-39xx). 
Within this category, 17 firms are in Food and Kindred Products (SIC=20xx), 15 firms 
are in the Chemical and Allied Products group (SIC=28xx), 12 firms are in the 
Industrial, Commercial Machinery, and Computer Equipment group (SIC=35xx), and 
ten firms are in the Electrical Equipment group (SIC=36xx). The category o f Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (SIC codes: 60xx-67xx) contains 40 acquirer firms or about 
18% o f the sample, with 20 companies in the Insurance group (SIC=63xx). The 
category o f  Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (SIC 
codes: 40xx-49xx) contains 24 acquirer firms or about 11% o f the sample, with a 
concentration o f 13 firms in the Communications group (SIC=48xx). The category o f 
Mining (SIC codes: 10xx-14xx) contains 20 acquirer firms or about 9% o f the sample, 
with a concentration o f  12 firms in the Oil and Gas Extraction group (SIC=13xx). In 
general, the distribution o f SIC codes for incomplete acquisition targets and acquirers is 
similar to the distribution o f SIC codes in Guenther and Rosman’s (1994) sample o f  all 
NYSE and AMEX firms with data on both the 1989 Compustat and CRSP tapes.
The degree o f relatedness between the SIC codes o f 227 paired targets and 
acquirers is reported in Panel A o f Table 5. The target and acquirer have the same 
primary SIC code at the four-digit level in 35 transactions (15.4%). The target and 
acquirer have the same primary SIC code at the three-digit level or better in 45
49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
transactions (19.83%), at the two-digit level or better in 67 transactions (29.52%), and
at the one-digit level or better in 118 transactions (51.99%). There is no agreement in
the primary SIC code o f targets and acquirers in 109 transactions (48.01%).
Table 5 - Degree of Relatedness between Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Codes of Incomplete Acquisition Targets and Acquirers
The degree o f  relatedness between target and acquirer SIC codes for 227 paired target 
and acquirer firms with SIC codes available on either Compustat or CRSP.
Panel A: Full sample
Cumulative
SIC Level Number of firms Percent percent
Four-digit 35 15.42% 15.42%
Three-digit 10 4.41% 19.83%
Two-digit 22 9.69% 29.52%
One-digit 51 22.47% 51.99%
Zero-digit 109 48.01% 100.00%
Total 227 100.00%
Panel B: Relatedness between target and acquirer by SIC group
Degree of Relatedness (%)
SIC Group Description N 4-digit 3-digit 2-digit 1-digit
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing 1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
10-14 Mining 18 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 55.56%
15-17 Construction 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33.33%
20-39 Manufacturing 105 8.57% 14.29% 26.67% 53.33%
40-49 Transportation,
Communication, Electric,
Gas and Sanitary Services 23 21.74% 30.43% 47.83% 60.87%
50-51 Wholesale Trade 8 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 37.50%
52-59 Retail Trade 16 25.00% 25.00% 37.50% 37.50%
60-67 Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate 34 23.53% 29.41% 35.29% 70.59%
70-89 Services 19 10.53% 10.53% 10.53% 21.05%
While the assessment of the degree o f  relatedness between the target and 
acquiring firm based on SIC codes has the advantage o f  objectivity, it suffers from a 
potentially serious drawback because it may not accurately measure the degree o f
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relatedness between the target and acquirer. As an example, cookies and crackers (SIC 
code=2052) and potato chips, com chips and snacks (SIC code=2096) share the same 
2-digit SIC code and appear to be in reasonably similar lines o f business. In contrast, 
glass and glassware (SIC code=3220) and ready-mixed concrete (SIC code=3273) also 
share the same 2-digit SIC code but appear to have a much lower relatedness.
As an alternative measure o f relatedness, the Compustat SIC code description 
and the Wall Street Journal description o f the target and acquirer’s industry were 
examined to determine the degree o f relatedness between the target and acquiring firm. 
The degree o f relatedness was classified as high, medium, or low. Using the alternative 
measure o f  relatedness, 36% o f the incomplete acquisitions were classified as high­
relatedness, 25% were classified as medium-relatedness, and 39% were classified as 
low-relatedness. In comparison, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), using a 
classification system based on business descriptions and industry classifications from 
Value Line reports, classify 28% o f their sample o f  50 large mergers as high overlap, 
36% as medium overlap, and 36% as low overlap.
In Panel B o f Table 5, the degree o f relatedness between incomplete acquisition 
targets and acquirers is reported across industry classifications. Relatedness is highest 
in the Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services category and in the 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate category. Within the former category, high 
relatedness is observed when targets are in the Communications group (SIC=48xx) 
with 80% agreement at the two-digit level or better. Within the latter category, high 
relatedness is observed in the Insurance group (63xx) with 100% agreement at the
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two-digit level or better. Relatedness is lowest in the Wholesale Trade category and 
the Services category.
Since CRSP SIC codes are used when Compustat SIC codes are unavailable, 
Table 6 presents the degree o f agreement between CRSP and Compustat SIC codes 
when both are available. The results for 214 target firms are similar to Kahle and 
Walkling’s (1996) findings in which the cumulative percentages are 21% agreement at 
the four-digit level, 50% agreement at the three-digit level, 64% agreement at the two- 
digit level, and 79% agreement at the one-digit level. The results for 177 parent firms 
indicate slightly lower levels of agreement.
Table 6 - Degree of Agreement of Incomplete Acquisition Target and Acquirer 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes across the Compustat and CRSP 
Databases
The degree o f agreement in SIC codes for 214 target firms (Panel A) and 177 acquirer 
firms (Panel B) with SIC codes available on both Compustat and CRSP.
Panel A: Targets 
SIC Level Number of firms Percent
Cumulative
percent
Four-digit 49 22.90% 22.90%
Three-digit 51 23.83% 46.73%
Two-digit 34 15.89% 62.62%
One-digit 24 11.21% 73.83%
Zero-digit 56 26.17% 100.00%
Total 214 100.00%
Panel B: Acquirers 
SIC Level Number of firms Percent
Cumulative
percent
Four-digit 35 19.77% 19.77%
Three-digit 21 11.86% 31.64%
Two-digit 37 20.90% 52.54%
One-digit 27 15.25% 67.80%
Zero-digit 57 32.20% 100.00%
Total 177 100.00%
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution o f  control for the final sample o f  274 
incomplete acquisitions with data available on CRSP. The most common control 
frequencies are between 40% and 70%. The mean (median) control percentage for the 
usable sample is 54.4% (51.0%). The mode is 51.0%.
30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90-
39% 49% 59% 69% 79% 89% 99%
Percent Range
Figure 1 - Distribution of Control Percentage
Percentage control for 274 incomplete acquisition targets.
3.5 Summary
Three main findings emerge from the analysis o f  descriptive statistics. First, the 
primaiy methods used to effect an incomplete acquisition are tender offers, the issuance 
o f new equity by the target, and the establishment o f  a controlling interest through the 
purchase o f  existing blocks. Second, as in conventional mergers and acquisitions, the 
target is typically smaller than the acquirer. Third, incomplete acquisitions do not 
appear to  be concentrated in particular time periods, industry classifications, or degree 
o f relatedness between the target and acquirer.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF INCOMPLETE 
ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS
4.1 In troduction
This chapter presents the empirical results for the valuation effects o f 
announcements o f incomplete acquisitions using event study methodology described in 
Chapter 3. The share-price response to incomplete acquisitions is reported for both 
targets and acquirers. Average combined returns to incomplete acquisitions and 
combined wealth effects are also reported. These results are presented both in the 
aggregate and by the method used to establish control. The chapter ends with a 
summary o f  the conclusions that can be drawn from excess returns around the time o f 
these announcements.
4.2 T arget R eturns at Incomplete Acquisition A nnouncem ents 
Two-day announcement period returns cumulated over day -1 to day 0 are
reported in Panel A o f Table 7 for the full sample o f 224 target firms. The results for 
the full sample indicate a statistically significant reaction o f  8.12% to the announcement 
o f an incomplete acquisition (t-statistic = 22.58). The stock price reaction is positive 
for 73% o f the target firms. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that target 
firms experience a positive stock market reaction to incomplete acquisition 
announcements. Moreover, the magnitude o f this average gain suggests that target 
firm shareholders obtain a significant increase in wealth that is similar to the increase 
experienced by targets in conventional mergers, which are corporate control 
transactions that eliminate target shareholder interests in the target firm. For example,
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Table 7 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets by 
Acquisition Type
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f 224 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f  positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven- 
day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means tests for 
the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Acquisition type Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return




















Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Tender offers New equity Block Open market
issues purchases purchases
Tender offers -
New equity issues 1.055
Block purchases 3.887*** 2.180** -
Open market purchases 5.082*** 2.940** 0.781 -
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(Table 7 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Acquisition type Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return




















Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Tender offers New equity Block Open market
issues purchases purchases
Tender offers -
New equity issues 1.553
Block purchases 2.991*** 1.099 -
Open market purchases 5.690*** 3.051*** 2.061** -
^Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
in a summary o f studies o f  valuation effects on targets o f  mergers, Jensen and Ruback's 
(1983) report two-day average excess returns in the range o f 6.2% to 13.4% and a 
weighted average excess return o f 7.7%.
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Next, the full sample o f two-day share price responses for targets o f incomplete 
acquisitions are disaggregated by method o f origination. For incomplete acquisitions 
that originate via tender offers, the two-day average excess return is 12.82% (t-statistic 
= 24.38). The stock price reaction is positive for 84% o f  the target firms.13 The share 
price response for targets o f incomplete acquisitions via new equity issuance is 9.71% 
(t-statistic = 10.78). The stock price reaction is positive for 71% o f these target firms. 
It is well documented that the seasoned securities issuance phenomenon is a negative 
event that conveys negative information about firm value. Nevertheless, the results for 
incomplete acquisitions indicate that equity issuance that conveys control o f a  target to 
an acquiring firm enhances target shareholder value. Moreover these transactions 
generate positive average returns for target firm shareholders that exceed the returns 
for private placements o f equity reported by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith 
(1993), whose samples typically do not entail a change in control. Although target firm 
shareholders sustain a greater gain on average in tender offers associated with an 
incomplete acquisition than in new equity issuance transactions, a difference in means 
test between the two returns generates a calculated t-value o f only 1.06 which is not 
statistically significant, and the null hypothesis o f equality cannot be rejected. 
Nevertheless, both methods of incomplete acquisitions generate large gains to  target 
shareholders.
13 Amoako-Adu and Smith (1993) report abnormal returns to Canadian target firms of 22.36% over a 
31-day period surrounding the announcement of a partial tender offer. The study differs from the 
current research in two important aspects. First, bidders may be managers, controlling shareholders, 
or outsiders as well as corporations. Second, their sample of 33 partial offers includes 14 offers in 
which the tender offer is an any-or-all offer that fails to attract enough shares to take the target private.
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The share price response for targets o f incomplete acquisitions via block 
purchases is 3.60% (t-statistic = 5.68). The stock price reaction is positive for 66% o f 
these target firms. There are only 9 firms that are targets o f  incomplete acquisitions 
through open market repurchases, and the two-day average share price response to 
these announcements is 2.13% (t-statistic = 1.62). The stock price reaction is positive 
for 67% o f  these target firms.
Difference in means tests between the two-day share price responses for targets 
o f  incomplete acquisitions via tender offers versus block purchases, and for new equity 
issues versus block purchases, reported in Panel B of Table 7, generate calculated t- 
values o f  3.89 significant at the 1% level, and 2.18, respectively, significant at the 5% 
level. These results suggest that block purchases that convey control to an acquirer 
generate significantly smaller returns for target shareholders than transactions in which 
the incomplete acquisition is via tender offers or new equity issuance. Bebchuk (1994) 
has argued that the trading o f large blocks that convey control to an acquirer harms 
dispersed shareholders because large shareholders can obtain private benefits from 
control through wealth transfers from the dispersed shareholders. On this basis, he 
argues that minority shareholders should be able to  participate in the sale o f  a large 
block on the same terms as the large blockholder, a rule that follows European 
corporate law. Although incomplete acquisitions that convey control through block 
sales generate lower returns than transactions that involve tender offers or new equity 
issuance, target shareholders sustain positive returns, implying that these transactions 
increase the wealth o f both large blockholders and minority shareholders.
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Seven-day announcement period returns over day -5 to day +1 are reported in 
Panel C o f  Table 7 for a sample o f 226 target firms. The results for the full sample 
indicate a statistically significant share price reaction o f 12.60% for targets o f 
incomplete acquisition announcements over the longer window (t-statistic = 22.35). 
The reaction over the longer window is about 50% higher than the reaction over the 
two-day window, indicating either information leakage or imprecision in identifying the 
exact time of the information release. In comparison, Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) 
summary o f  studies o f conventional mergers reports average excess returns to targets 
over a one month period surrounding successful mergers that range from 13.30% to 
21.78%, with a weighted average excess return o f 15.90%. They also report average 
excess returns to targets over a one month period surrounding successful tender offers 
that range from 16.85% to 34.06%, with a weighted average excess return o f 29.09%. 
Overall, the returns to targets in incomplete acquisitions are positive, but somewhat 
lower than the returns to targets that have been documented in traditional mergers and 
acquisitions.
The seven-day share price response for targets o f  incomplete acquisitions is 
18.97% (t-statistic = 23.49) for tender offers, 12.89% (t-statistic = 9.05) for new 
equity issues, and 8.44% (t-statistic = 8.41) for block purchases. A difference in means 
test o f  the seven-day share price response to tender offers and block purchases in 
incomplete acquisitions, reported in Panel D o f  Table 7, generates a calculated t-value 
o f  2.99, which is significant at the 1% level. Difference in means tests between tender 
offers and open market purchases, and between new equity issues and open market 
purchases generate calculated t-values o f 5.69 and 3.05, respectively, both significant at
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the 1% level, which reject the null hypothesis o f  equality. A difference in means tests 
between block purchases and open market purchases generates a calculated t-value o f 
2.06, significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the announcement period gains to 
target stockholders are greater for incomplete acquisitions through tender offers than 
for incomplete acquisitions through block purchases. Again, target shareholder gains 
appear to be greater in tender offers than in new equity issuance transactions but the 
difference is not statistically significant.
4.3 Acquirer Returns at Incomplete Acquisition Announcements
Two-day announcement period returns over day -1 to day 0 are reported in 
Panel A o f Table 8 for a sample o f 182 acquiring firms. The results indicate that 
bidders in incomplete acquisitions exhibit a positive share price reaction o f 0.50% (t- 
statistic = 1.80), which is significant at the 10% level. The non-negative return to 
acquirers in incomplete acquisitions is contrary to the negative returns to acquirers 
documented in studies o f conventional mergers and acquisitions that suggest 
overbidding. These studies include Bradley et al., 1988, -2.90%; Jennings and Mazzeo, 
1991, -0.80%; Servaes, 1991, -3.30%; Byrd and Hickman, 1992, -1.20%. Moreover, 
the results for the various subsamples also provide no evidence of negative returns to 
bidders. Specifically, the share price response for bidders in incomplete acquisitions is 
0.99% (t-statistic = 1.67) for tender offers, 0.75% (t-statistic = 1.56) for new equity 
issues, and 0.18% (t-statistic = 0.35) for block purchases. Difference in means tests 
between each o f  these categories are insignificant, indicating that the share price 
response for bidders does not differ significantly across acquisition types.
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Table 8 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers by 
Acquisition Type
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f 182 incomplete 
acquisitions; t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f  positive returns is in 
brackets and N  is the sample size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in 
Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in 
means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, 
respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Acquisition type Excess return Distribution of returns_____
Quartile Return




















Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
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(Table 8 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Acquisition type Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
Full sample 1.45% 25% -3.45%
(3.31)“ * 50% 0.39%
[0.53] 75% 4.66%
N = 182
















Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns















‘ Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. “ ‘ Significant at the 1% level.
Seven-day announcement period returns over day -5 to  day +1 are reported in
Panel C o f  Table 8 for a  sample o f 182 acquiring firms. The results indicate that
bidders in incomplete acquisitions earn a positive share price reaction o f 1.45%
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(t-statistic = 3.31), which is significant at the 1% level, a result that is somewhat 
greater than for the two-day announcement period. The bidder share price responses 
to incomplete acquisitions are 1.06% (t-statistic =  1.13) for tender offers, 1.13% (t- 
statistic = 1.49) for new equity offerings, 1.04% (t-statistic = 1.26) for block 
purchases, and 1.75% (t-statistic = 0.73) for open market purchases. As in the case of 
the returns for the two-day announcement period, difference in means tests are 
insignificant, indicating that the share price response for bidders does not differ 
significantly across acquisition types.
4.4 Combined Returns at Incomplete Acquisition Announcements
Efficiency and information hypotheses o f mergers and acquisitions predict that 
corporate control events such as incomplete acquisitions should generate increases in 
overall wealth. Likewise, if incomplete acquisitions improve corporate performance as 
a result o f an increase in monitoring that is associated with the activities o f a majority 
biockholder, overall wealth should be enhanced. In contrast, the expropriation 
hypothesis and hypotheses that view takeover bids as a symptom o f managerial hubris 
or agency problems predict that there should be no overall gains from incomplete 
acquisitions. Thus, these hypotheses generate predictions about the combined returns
i
that occur in response to these transactions.
The average combined returns to incomplete acquisitions for which both the 
target and the bidder have returns on the CRSP tape, are reported in Panel A o f  Table 
9 for the two-day announcement period and in Panel B o f Table 9 for the seven-day 
announcement period. The combined excess return is calculated as the weighted 
average o f the excess returns for the target and acquirer firm, where the weights are the
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Table 9 - Average Com bined Excess R eturns to Incom plete Acquisition 
A nnouncem ents by Acquisition Type
Combined excess returns (in percent) at announcements o f 140 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. The combined excess return is the weighted average o f the excess 
returns for the target and acquirer, where the weights are the relative market values o f 
equity o f the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement. The average combined 
change in market value is computed as the cumulative excess return to the target times 
the target market value six week prior to the announcement plus the cumulative excess 
return to the acquirer times the acquirer market value six weeks prior to the 
announcement. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven- 
day announcement period returns are shown in Panel B.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Acquisition type Average combined Average (median) Distribution of
excess return  combined change combined excess
in m arket value return
in millions
Full sample 2.07% $54,849 25% -0.97%
(3.46)*** ($ 1.637) 50% 1.11%
[0.65] 75% 4.31%
N = 140
Tender offers 5.37% $21,391 25% 0.23%
(3.85)*** ($ 8.581) 50% 3.11%
[0.76] 75% 7.24%
Z II 4k Ui
New equity issues 0.47% $79,337 25% -2.09%





Block purchases -0.23% $11,707 25% -1.12%
(-0.26) ($ 0.058) 50% 0.16%
[0.54] 75% 2.37%
N = 37
Open market purcliases 0.21% $ 1.948 25% -0.06%
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(Table 9 continued)
Panel B: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Average combined Average (median) Distribution of 
excess return combined change combined excess 
in market value in return 
millions
Full sample 4.18% $64,501 25% -1.56%
(4.87)” * ($ 3.843) 50% 3.05%
[0.66] 75% 7.38%
N = 140
Tender offers 8.15% $45,824 25% 1.32%
(4.34)*” ($ 7.422) 50% 4.11%
[0.78] 75% 13.73%
Z II Cn
New equity issues 0.54% $72,193 25% -3.40%
(0.43) ($ 0.731) 50% 0.40%
[0.53] 75% 3.47%00112
Block purchases 2.32% $12,557 25% -1.81%
(1.56) ($ 1.685) 50% 2.07%
[0.65] 75% 5.01%
N = 37
Open market purchases -0.28% -$ 1.782 25% -3.31%
(-0.23) (-$ 0.233) 50% -0.25%
[0.29] 75% 1.45%
llZ
’ Significant at the 10% level. ’ ’ Significant at the 5% level. ’ ’ ’ Significant at the 1% level.
relative market values o f equity for the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement 
date. The two-day average combined excess return for the full sample o f 140 paired 
targets and acquirers is 2.07% (t-statistic = 3.46), which is significant at the 1% level. 
There are 65% o f the combined returns that are positive. The average two-day 
increase in the combined wealth o f target and acquirer shareholders is $54.8 million, 
with target wealth increasing on average by $25.9 million and acquirer wealth
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increasing on average by $28.9 million. Thus, incomplete acquisitions generate a large 
increase in wealth relative to the pre-announcement value o f the target firms, 
suggesting that the market expects the post-transaction entity to sustain enhanced 
profitability. The large increase in the overall wealth o f  the combined entity that is 
associated with incomplete acquisitions is inconsistent with the expropriation and 
hubris hypotheses o f corporate control transactions.
When the sample is disaggregated with respect to the method that is used to 
effect the incomplete acquisition, the combined average excess return is 5.37% (t- 
statistic = 3.85) for the paired sample o f 45 tender offers, which is significant at the 1% 
level. The average combined return is positive for 76% o f these transactions. The 
average two-day increase in the combined wealth o f target and acquirer shareholders 
for incomplete acquisitions through tender offers is $21.4 million, with $18.3 million 
accruing to  target shareholders and about $3.1 million accruing to acquiring firm 
shareholders. In contrast, the remaining samples generate returns that are positive but 
are not statistically significant. For the sample of 38 transactions that entail equity 
offerings, the average combined return is 0.47% (t-statistic = 0.57), which is not 
statistically significant although the average combined wealth effect is a relatively large 
$79.3 million for the paired sample o f new equity issues. A similar result applies to the 
sample o f 37 block purchases, which generates a small negative combined return o f 
-0.23% (t-statistic = -0.26), although the average combined wealth effect is a small 
positive figure, $11.7 million. There are only 7 open market transactions with a paired 
sample o f  target and bidder. The average combined return is 0.21% (t-statistic = 0.25). 
which is not statistically significant.
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The seven-day announcement period returns reported in Panel B o f Table 9 
show a pattern that is similar to the two-day returns. The average combined seven-day 
excess return for the full sample o f 140 paired targets and acquirers is 4.18% (t-statistic 
= 4.87), which is significant at the 1% level. There are 66% o f the combined returns 
that are positive. The average increase in the combined wealth o f target and acquirer 
shareholders for these transactions is $64.5 million. This return is in large part the 
result o f the tender offer transactions. More specifically, the average combined return 
for the paired sample o f  45 tender offers is 8.15% (t-statistic = 4.34), which is 
significant at the 1% level. The average combined return is positive for 78% o f these 
transactions. The average seven-day increase in the combined wealth o f target and 
acquirer shareholders for incomplete acquisitions effected through tender offers is 
$45.8 million. In contrast, for the paired sample o f 38 new equity offering transactions, 
the average combined return is 0.54% (t-statistic = 0.43), which is not statistically 
significant, although the implied average combined wealth effect is $72.2 million. For 
the paired sample o f 37 block purchases, there is a stronger average combined return o f 
2.32% (t-statistic = 1.56), which falls short o f statistical significance at the usual 
confidence intervals. The average combined wealth effect o f  these transactions is $12.6 
million. Once again, there are only 7 open market transactions with a paired sample of 
target and bidder. The average combined return for these transactions is -0.28% (t- 
statistic = -0.23), which is not statistically significant.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that incomplete 
acquisitions result in an increase in aggregate wealth. The results indicate that the 
method used to effect these transactions has an important influence on the wealth
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effects o f  an incomplete acquisition, with the greatest wealth effects associated with the 
use o f tender offers.
4.5 Returns by Degree of Relatedness between Target and Acquirer Industry
The first measure of the degree o f relatedness between target and acquirer 
industry is based on the agreement between target and acquirer SIC codes. Two-day 
announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and acquirer SIC codes 
are reported in Panel A o f Table 10 for a sample o f  170 targets. The two-day share 
price response o f  targets is 8.80% (t-statistic = 9.82) when the target and acquirer 
share the same 4-digit SIC code, 8.80% (t-statistic = 4.97) when the target and 
acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code, 11.66% (t-statistic = 11.98) when the target 
and acquirer share the same 2-digit SIC code, 5.50% (t-statistic = 5.88) when the 
target and acquirer share the same 1-digit SIC code, and 9.99% (t-statistic = 5.76) 
when there is no agreement between the target and acquirer SIC codes. Difference in 
means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, indicating that the share 
price response o f targets does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness 
among target and acquirer SIC codes.
Seven-day announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and 
acquirer SIC code are reported in Panel C of Table 10 for a sample o f 171 targets. The 
seven-day share price response o f targets is 16.33% (t-statistic = 11.52) when the 
target and acquirer share the same 4-digit SIC code, 8.80% (t-statistic = 3.14) when 
the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code, 17.79% (t-statistic = 12.24) 
when the target and acquirer share the same 2-digit SIC code, 9.59% (t-statistic =
6.48) when the target and acquirer share the same 1-digit SIC code, and 14.36%
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Table 10 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets by 
Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer SIC Code
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f  170 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. Returns are reported by the degree o f relatedness between target and 
acquirer SIC codes. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; 
seven-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means 
tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, 
respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
















No agreement between SIC codes 9.99% 25% 0.57%
(5.76)*** 50% 6.10%
[0.78] 75% 16.21%
z 1! 00 in
Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Same 4-digit Same 3-digit Same 2-digit Same 1-digit No agreement
Same 4-digit
Same 3-digit 0.001 -
Same 2-digit 0.6S0 0.433
Same 1-digit 0.904 0.540 1.224 -
No agreement 0.460 0.214 0.386 1.264 -
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(Table 10 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return




Same 3-digit SIC code 8.80% 25% 2.37%
(3.14)” * 50% 4.88%
[0.78] 75% 14.29%
N = 9




Same 1-digit SIC code 9.59% 25% -1.70%
(6.48)” * 50% 8.36%
[0.68] 75% 20.38%
N = 33
No agreement between SIC codes 14.36% 25% 1.39%
(15.28)*” 50% 10.81%
[0.76] 75% 24.12%00IIZ
Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Same 4-digit Same 3-digit Same 2-digit Same 1-digit No agreement
Same 4-digit
Same 3-digit 1.049 -
Same 2-digit 0.242 1.350
Same 1-digit 1.149 0.122 1.572 -
No agreement 0.376 0.935 0.763 1.116
’ Significant at the 10% level. ’ ’ Significant at the 5% level. ’ ’ ’ Significant at the 1% level.
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(t-statistic = 15.28) when there is no agreement between the target and acquirer SIC 
codes. Difference in means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, 
again indicating that the share price response o f targets does not differ significantly by 
the degree o f relatedness among target and acquirer SIC codes.
Two-day announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and 
acquirer SIC code are reported in Panel A o f Table 11 for a sample o f 183 acquirers. 
The two-day share price response o f acquirers is 1.62% (t-statistic = 2.26) when the 
target and acquirer share the same 4-digit SIC code, 1.30% (t-statistic = 1.00) when 
the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code, 0.18% (t-statistic = 0.94) 
when the target and acquirer share the same 2-digit SIC code, 0.69% (t-statistic =
1.45) when the target and acquirer share the same 1-digit SIC code, and 0.27% (t- 
statistic = 0.63) when there is no agreement between the target and acquirer SIC codes. 
Difference in means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, indicating 
that the share price response o f acquirers does not differ significantly by the degree of 
relatedness among target and acquirer SIC codes.
Seven-day announcement period returns by degree o f  relatedness in target and 
acquirer SIC code are reported in Panel C of Table 11 for a sample o f 183 acquirers. 
The seven-day share price response o f acquirers is 3.15% (t-statistic = 2.78) when the 
target and acquirer share the same 4-digit SIC code, 13.24% (t-statistic = 6.46) when 
the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code, 1.46% (t-statistic = 1.01) 
when the target and acquirer share the same 2-digit SIC code, 1.36% (t-statistic =
1.81) when the target and acquirer share the same 1-digit SIC code, and -0.16% (t- 
statistic = -0.25) when there is no agreement between the target and acquirer SIC
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Table II - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers 
by Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer SIC Code
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f 183 incomplete 
acquisitions; t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in 
brackets and N  is the sample size. Returns are reported by the degree of relatedness 
between target and acquirer SIC codes. Two-day announcement period returns are 
shown in Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. 
Difference in means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B 
and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return




















Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Same 4-digit Same 3-digit Same 2-digit Same 1-digit No agreement
Same 4-digit
Same 3-digit 0.192 -
Same 2-digit 0.891 0.968
Same 1-digit 0.583 0.543 0.481 -
No agreement 0.824 0.867 0.079 0.384 -
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(Table 11 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement 
Relatedness
period returns (-5 to 
Excess return
+ D
Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return










Same 2-digit SIC code 1.46% 25% -2.33%














Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Same 4-digit Same 3-digit Same 2-digit Same 1-digit No agreement
Same 4-digit -
Same 3-digit 1.359 -
Same 2-digit 0.698 1.596 -
Same 1-digit 0.827 1.627 0.047
No agreement 1.639 1.846* 0.875 1.024
’ Significant at the 10% level. ’ 'Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
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codes. Difference in means tests between the share price response o f acquirers when 
the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code and the share price response o f 
acquirers when there is no agreement between the target and acquirer SIC codes 
generate a calculated t-value o f 1.846, significant at the 10% level.
The average combined returns to incomplete acquisitions by the degree of 
relatedness between target and bidder SIC codes are reported in Panel A o f Table 12 
for the two-day announcement period. The two-day average combined excess return is 
2.51% (t-statistic = 1.61) when the target and acquirer share the same 4-digit SIC 
code, 3.02% (t-statistic -  0.62) when the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit 
SIC code, 1.58% (t-statistic = 1.27) when the target and acquirer share the same
2-digit SIC code, 0.09% (t-statistic = 0.73) when the target and acquirer share the 
same 1-digit SIC code, and 2.32% (t-statistic = 2.61) when there is no agreement 
between the target and acquirer SIC codes. Difference in means tests between each o f 
these categories are insignificant, indicating that the two-day average combined return 
does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness among target and acquirer SIC 
codes.
The seven-day average combined excess returns, reported in Panel C of Table 
12, are 5.67% (t-statistic = 2.80) when the target and acquirer share the same 4-digit 
SIC code, 4.17% (t-statistic = 1.40) when the target and acquirer share the same
3-digit SIC code, 3.37% (t-statistic = 1.71) when the target and acquirer share the 
same 2-digit SIC code, 3.09% (t-statistic = 1.63) when the target and acquirer share 
the same 1-digit SIC code, and 3.66% (t-statistic = 2.94) when there is no agreement 
between the target and acquirer SIC codes. Difference in means tests between each o f
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Table 12 - Average Combined Excess Returns to Incomplete Acquisition 
Announcements by Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer SIC Code
Combined excess returns (in percent) at announcements o f 147 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage of positive returns is in brackets and N’ is 
the sample size. The combined excess return is the weighted average o f the excess 
returns for the target and acquirer, where the weights are the relative market values o f 
equity o f the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement. The average combined 
change in market value is computed as the cumulative excess return to the target times 
the target market value six week prior to the announcement plus the cumulative excess 
return to the acquirer times the acquirer market value six weeks prior to the 
announcement. Combined returns are reported by the degree o f relatedness between 
target and acquirer SIC codes.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Relatedness Average combined
excess return
Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return




Same 3-digit SIC code 3.02% 25% -1.38%
(0.62) 50% 1.26%
[0.63] 75% 2.93%00IIz












Panel B. Difference in means test for two-day returns
Same 4-dieit Same 3-dieit Same 2-dieit Same 1-dieit No aereement
Same 4-digit
Same 3-digit 0.979 -
Same 2-digit 0.472 0.558
Same 1-digit 0.809 0.148 0.383 -
No agreement 0.109 1.191 0.488 0.929
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(Table 12 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1) 
Relatedness Average combined
excess return
Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return
Same 4-digit SIC code 5.67% 25% -1.81%
























Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Same 4-digit Same 3-digit Same 2-digit Same 1-digit No agreement
Same 4-digit -
Same 3-digit 0.419 -
Same 2-digit 0.815 0.224 -
Same 1-digit 0.930 0.305 0.102
No agreement 0.846 0.157 0.125 0.251
’ Significant at the 10% level. ’ ’ Significant at the 5% level. ’ ’ ’ Significant at the 1% level.
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these categories are insignificant, indicating that the seven-day average combined return 
does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness among target and acquirer SIC 
codes.
The second measure of the degree o f  relatedness between target and acquirer 
industry is based on classification from an analysis o f  the SIC code descriptions and the 
description o f the target and acquirers industry contained in the Wall Street Journal 
announcement. Relatedness is classified as either high, medium, or low. Two-day 
announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and acquirer industry 
are reported in Panel A o f Table 13 for a sample o f 215 targets. The two-day share 
price response o f  targets is 8 .64% (t-statistic = 16.05) when the target and acquirer are 
classified as high-relatedness, 9.41% (t-statistic = 11.10) when the target and acquirer 
are classified as medium-relatedness, and 6.78% (t-statistic = 11.87) when the target 
and acquirer are classified as low-relatedness. Difference in means tests between each 
o f these categories are insignificant, indicating that the share price response o f targets 
does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness among target and acquirer 
industry relatedness.
Seven-day announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and 
acquirer industry are reported in Panel C of Table 13 for a sample o f 217 targets. The 
seven-day share price response o f targets is 13.33% (t-statistic = 15.66) when the 
target and acquirer are classified as high-relatedness, 17.19% (t-statistic = 13.34) when 
the target and acquirer are classified as medium-relatedness, and 9.83% (t-statistic = 
10.88) when the target and acquirer are classified as low-relatedness. A difference in 
means test between the low- and medium- relatedness categories generates a  calculated
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Table 13 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets by 
Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer Industry
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f 215 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. Returns are reported by the degree o f  relatedness between target and 
acquirer industry based on business description. Two-day announcement period 
returns are shown in Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are shown in 
Panel C. Difference in means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in 
Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return



















Low 0.826 0.945 -
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(Table 13 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
High 13.33% 25% -0.75%
(15.66)“ * 50% 10.94%
[0.73] 75% 26.18%o00IIz












Low 1.135 1.964“ -
‘ Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. ‘ “ Significant at the 1% level.
t-value o f 1.964, significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that target 
shareholder returns are higher when the target and acquirer are in moderately related 
industries than when the target and acquirer are in very different industries.
Two-day announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and 
acquirer industry are reported in Panel A o f Table 14 for a sample of 180 acquirers. 
The two-day share price response o f acquirers is -0.29% (t-statistic = -0.51) when the 
target and acquirer are classified as high-relatedness, 0.47% (t-statistic = 0.91) when
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Table 14 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers 
by Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer Industry
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f 180 incomplete 
acquisitions; t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in 
brackets and N  is the sample size. Returns are reported by the degree o f relatedness 
between target and acquirer industry based on business description. Two-day 
announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven-day announcement period 
returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means tests for the two-day and seven-day 
returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
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(Table 14 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Relatedness Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
















Low 1.040 1.007 -
'Significant at the 10% level. "Significant at the 5% level. '"Significant at the 1% level.
the target and acquirer are classified as medium-relatedness, and 1.14% (t-statistic = 
2.86) when the target and acquirer are classified as low-relatedness. Difference in 
means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, indicating that the share 
price response o f  acquirers does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness 
among target and acquirer industry.
Seven-day announcement period returns by degree o f relatedness in target and 
acquirer industry are reported in Panel C o f Table 14 for a sample o f  180 acquirers. 
The seven-day share price response o f acquirers is 0.68% (t-statistic = 0.77) when the
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target and acquirer are classified as high-relatedness, 0.57% (t-statistic = 0.69) when 
the target and acquirer are classified as medium-relatedness, and 2.41% (t-statistic = 
3.83) when the target and acquirer are classified as low-relatedness. Difference in 
means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, indicating that the share 
price response o f acquirers does not differ significantly by the degree o f relatedness 
among target and acquirer industry.
The average combined returns to incomplete acquisitions by the degree of 
relatedness between target and bidder industiy are reported in Panel A o f  Table 15 for 
the two-day announcement period and in Panel C o f Table 15 for the seven-day 
announcement period. The two-day average combined excess return is 1.27% (t- 
statistic = 1.31) when the target and acquirer are classified as high-relatedness, 2.94% 
(t-statistic = 3.61) when the target and acquirer are classified as medium-relatedness, 
and 1.77% (t-statistic = 1.69) when the target and acquirer are classified as low- 
relatedness. Difference in means tests between each o f these categories are 
insignificant, indicating that the two-day average combined return does not differ 
significantly by the degree of relatedness among target and acquirer industry.
The seven-day average combined excess return is 3.50% (t-statistic = 2.61) 
when the target and acquirer are classified as high-relatedness, 4.23% (t-statistic = 
2.89) when the target and acquirer are classified as medium-relatedness, and 3.89% (t- 
statistic = 2.70) when the target and acquirer are classified as low-relatedness. 
Difference in means tests between each o f these categories are insignificant, indicating 
that the seven-day average combined return does not differ significantly by the degree 
o f  relatedness among target and acquirer industry.
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Table 15 - Average Combined Excess Returns to Incomplete Acquisition 
Announcements by Degree of Relatedness in Target and Acquirer Industry
Combined excess returns (in percent) at announcements o f 147 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage of positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. The combined excess return is the weighted average o f the excess 
returns for the target and acquirer, where the weights are the relative market values o f 
equity o f the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement. The average combined 
change in market value is computed as the cumulative excess return to the target times 
the target market value six week prior to the announcement plus the cumulative excess 
return to the acquirer times the acquirer market value six weeks prior to the 
announcement. Combined returns are reported by the degree of relatedness between 
target and acquirer based on business description.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Relatedness Average combined Distribution of returns
excess return
Quartile Return
















Low 0.353 0.879 -
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(Table IS continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-S to +1)
Relatedness Average combined Distribution of returns
excess return
Quartile Return
High 3.50% 25% -1.60%
(2.61)“ 50% 2.64%
[0.64] 75% 7.57%t"tTIIZ
Medium 4.23% 25% -1.73%
(2.89)“ * 50% 3.13%
[0.69] 75% 10.76%
N = 39








Low 0.202 0.165 -
‘ Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. “ ‘ Significant at the 1% level.
4.6 Tender Offer Returns by Management’s Reaction to the Offer
For the purposes of this section, management hostility is defined as litigation or 
other defensive measures initiated by management against the acquirer in an effort to 
thwart the acquisition. In contrast, the assertion by management that the offer price is 
too low is viewed as a negotiation strategy rather than a hostile stance against the 
acquirer. An analysis o f  management’s reaction to incomplete acquisitions across 
acquisition methods indicates that incomplete acquisitions via new equity issues are 
always friendly transactions. This is not surprising given that the transaction is 
negotiated between the acquirer and the managers, and subsequently approved by the
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target shareholders. In addition, incomplete acquisitions via blockholder purchases are 
almost always friendly. This is also not surprising given that in many o f the 
blockholder transactions, the blockholder is a  founding family or several members o f  
top management. In contrast, one-third o f the 75 incomplete acquisitions via tender 
offers are characterized by management hostility toward the acquirer.
Two-day announcement period returns to tender offer targets by target 
management’s reaction are reported in Panel A of Table 16. The two-day target share 
price response to  friendly offers is 13.74% (t-statistic = 21.43). The two-day target 
share price response to  hostile offers is 10.86% (t-statistic = 11.81). Seven-day 
announcement period returns to tender offer targets by target management’s reaction 
are reported in Panel B of Table 16. The seven-day target share price response to 
friendly offers is 18.32% (t-statistic = 18.07). The seven-day target share price 
response to hostile offers is 20.22% (t-statistic = 15.23). Difference in means tests 
between the target share price response to friendly and hostile tender offers are 
insignificant, indicating that management’s reaction does not significantly affect the 
returns to target shareholders.
Two-day announcement period returns to tender offer acquirers by target 
management’s reaction are reported in Panel A o f Table 17. The two-day acquirer 
share price response to  friendly offers is 1.62% (t-statistic = 2.57). The two-day 
acquirer share price response to hostile offers is -0.18% (t-statistic = -0.15). Seven-day 
announcement period returns to tender offer acquirers by target management’s reaction 
are reported in Panel B o f Table 17. The seven-day acquirer share price response to 
friendly offers is 1.67% (t-statistic = 1.67). The seven-day target share price response
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Table 16 -  Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets in 
Tender OfTers by Target Management’s Reaction to the Offer
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f  67 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f  positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. Returns are reported by whether target management supports 
(friendly) or opposes (hostile) the tender offer. Two-day announcement period returns 
are shown in Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel B. 
Difference in means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel C.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Target Management Attitude Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return










Panel B: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Target Management Attitude Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return










Panel C: Difference in means test for two-day and seven-day returns
Two-day target returns Seven-day target returns
Friendly vs. Hostile 0.892 0.410
♦Significant at the 10% level. " ‘ Significant at the 3% level. “ "Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 17 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers in 
Tender Offers by Target Management's Reaction to the Offer
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f  51 incomplete 
acquisitions; t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f  positive returns is in 
brackets and N  is the sample size. Returns are reported by whether target management 
supports (friendly) o r opposes (hostile) the tender offer. Two-day announcement 
period returns are shown in Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are 
shown in Panel B. Difference in means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are 
shown in Panel C.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Target Management Attitude Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return








Panel B: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Target Management Attitude Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return
Friendly 1.67% 25% -3.92%
(167) 50% 0.43%
[0.55] 75% 3.75%IIz




Panel C: Difference in means test for two-day and seven-day returns
Two-day target returns Seven-day target returns
Friendly vs. Hostile 0.772 0.543
♦Significant at the 10% level. ♦♦Significant at the 5% level. ♦♦♦Significant at the 1% level.
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to hostile offers is -0.07% (t-statistic = -0.04). While the acquirer share price response 
to friendly tender offers is significantly positive, the acquirer share price response to 
hostile tender offers is insignificantly different from zero. However, difference in 
means tests between the acquirer share price response to friendly and hostile tender 
offers are insignificant, indicating that management’s reaction does not significantly 
affect the returns to acquirer shareholders.
4.7 Summary
The overall empirical results o f  the valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisitions 
indicate that these transactions are value enhancing for targets and have a non-negative 
effect on acquirers. The empirical analysis o f incomplete acquisition announcements 
indicates that target firm shareholders experience significant gains regardless o f the 
method o f acquisition. However, the gains appear to be greatest when the incomplete 
acquisition is effected via a tender offer. In addition, the gains to target shareholders 
are greater for incomplete acquisitions via new equity issues than for incomplete 
acquisitions via block purchases. Finally, targets appear to capture the lion’s share o f 
the average combined increase in wealth tender offer transactions.
Overall, the incomplete acquisition announcement returns to acquirers are 
significantly positive, but strong positive returns are largely limited to acquirers in 
tender offers. The combined wealth effects on acquirer and target shareholders are 
positive and this gain also appears to be mostly attributable to incomplete acquisitions 
that entail tender offers.
In general, the degree o f  relatedness between target and acquirer industry does 
not have a significant effect on the returns to targets and acquirer or on the combined
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wealth effects o f  incomplete acquisitions. In addition, target management’s reaction 
toward tender offers does not significantly affect the share price response of tender 
offer targets and acquirers.
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CHAPTERS
PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION OPERATING PERFORMANCE
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines how a change in control induced by an incomplete 
acquisition affects target firm operating performance. Mergers and acquisitions have 
become a pervasive element o f contemporary corporate finance and an important topic 
in financial research. There is substantial evidence that such acquisitions increase the 
wealth o f  target firm shareholders, but little evidence that these transactions benefit the 
shareholders o f acquiring firms. Several recent empirical papers in the accounting and 
finance literature have studied the subsequent operating and stock price performance of 
corporations following major corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions. The 
primary purpose o f most o f these studies is to assess whether a particular event results 
in improvements or deterioration in subsequent performance. Such an investigation o f 
operating performance is o f particular interest in the case o f changes in corporate 
control because these transactions are major discrete events that can provide evidence 
on alternative economic hypotheses that attempt to explain the major gains in 
shareholder wealth associated with acquisition announcements.
The efficiency hypothesis suggests that the premium paid to target firm 
shareholders in acquisitions is justified by the acquirer's expectations o f making 
subsequent improvements in the target firm's operating performance, or by exploiting 
synergies between the two firms. These improvements must be sufficient (in present 
value terms) to  justify the premium paid to acquire the target firm and should be 
reflected in improved operating performance o f the merged firm relative to the two
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stand-alone firms. Unlike a standard corporate acquisition, in which a target is 
completely absorbed into (a typically much larger) acquirer, in an incomplete 
acquisition the target firm continues to publicly trade. Thus, any improved 
performance in the target's operations due to operating synergies or gains in efficiency 
can be observed directly via required disclosure reporting and stock price movements. 
The inefficient (target) management hypothesis implies that target firms perform poorly 
prior to the acquisition, but with the advent o f new management, the target firm's 
future operating performance will improve. The expropriation hypothesis suggests that 
target firm operating performance will deteriorate after the acquisition as the parent 
firm allocates to itself a disproportionate share o f the combined entity's income through 
self-dealing transactions. The information hypothesis suggests that an acquirer 
possesses important private information about the value o f  the target, which implies 
either superior or normal target firm operating performance after an acquisition.
Recent research has raised the issue of the appropriate method for evaluating 
the operating performance gains from an acquisition. The key aspect o f  such 
methodology requires finding an appropriate benchmark to judge the post-acquisition 
operating performance o f the merged firm. Some studies assess the effect o f  a merger 
by calculating alternative measures o f profitability, including the return on assets or 
return on sales, and comparing the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition operating 
performance o f  the relevant firms. Alternatively, such profitability measures can be 
used to  compare the pre-acquisition and post- acquisition performance o f the target 
firms to  control firms, that is similar but non-acquiring firms, to gauge whether there 
are any gains in performance. The difficulties o f  this process are exacerbated by the
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fact that, subsequent to  the merger, the bidder and the target firms no longer exist as 
separate firms. From this perspective, incomplete acquisitions offer a unique 
opportunity to  directly assess the subsequent operating performance o f target firms 
because the target firm remains a publicly traded entity that continues to conduct 
normal financial reporting throughout the relevant period. Thus, an examination o f the 
post-acquisition operating performance o f incomplete acquisition targets may shed light 
on the motivations for these transactions and provide insight into the source o f the 
shareholder wealth gains from incomplete acquisitions that are documented in Chapter 
4.
The results o f  several studies o f stock price performance are presented since 
these studies also attempt to measure the pre-acquisition performance o f targets and 
the post-acquisition performance o f the combined firm. However, Fama (1998) argues 
that the results o f  most o f these studies are difficult to interpret due to methodological 
problems. Specifically, long-run performance results are highly sensitive to the method 
used to measure performance. For this reason, an investigation o f the stock price 
performance o f  incomplete acquisition targets is not undertaken in the present study.
5.2 L ite ra tu re  on Pre- and Post- Acquisition Perform ance
In an efficient market, the observed changes in target firm and acquiring firm 
equity values associated with announcements o f changes in control will reflect the 
market's expectations about efficiency gains, information effects, and wealth transfers 
between the bidder and the target. If the overall gains in shareholder wealth observed 
in response to incomplete acquisitions are the result o f  expectations about the improved 
operating performance or the efficiency o f target firms, then target firms should exhibit
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improved operating performance subsequent to incomplete acquisitions. Previous 
studies o f mergers and acquisitions have attempted to investigate the issue o f 
improvements in operating performance indirectly by examining the subsequent 
operating performance o f  the combined bidder and target after a change in control.
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), Jarrell (1997), and Parrino and Harris 
(1999) find that merged firms exhibit improved operating performance following a 
merger. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback examine the post-acquisition cash-flow returns o f 
the 50 largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. They find that, although 
non-industry adjusted performance deteriorates after a merger, the merged firms show 
significant improvements in asset productivity relative to their industries, which leads to 
higher operating cash flows. Specifically, for the five years preceding the merger, 
median industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns are 0.3% while in the five years 
following the merger, median industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns are 2.8%.
In addition, they find that performance improvements are greater when the acquirer and 
target are in closely related businesses. They also find a strong positive relationship 
between post-merger performance and abnormal stock returns at the merger 
announcement, indicating that the stock price reaction reflects anticipation o f post- 
merger economic gains.
Jarrell (1997) uses a different methodology that is based on generating forecasts 
for how the merging firms would have performed had they not merged, by using 
analysts' pre-merger forecasts. She finds that the post-merger performance o f  the 
combined firms is significantly negative in the year immediately following the merger 
but significantly positive in the period four to six years after the merger. She also
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documents a strong positive relationship between the stock market response to the 
merger announcement and subsequent operating performance. In contrast to Healy, 
Palepu, and Ruback, she finds that performance is not affected by the degree of 
relatedness between the industries o f the target and acquirer. Both studies use Value 
Line industry descriptions to classify targets and acquirers in terms o f relatedness. 
However, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback stratify firms into three groups: high relatedness, 
medium relatedness, and low relatedness. In contrast, Jarrell considers both horizontal 
and vertical mergers to be related mergers and all others to be conglomerate mergers. 
This alternative definition o f relatedness may be a factor in the difference in their 
findings.
Earlier studies o f operating performance, such as Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987) and Herman and Lowenstein (1988), examine earnings performance after 
takeovers and conclude that merged firms display no operating improvements.14 
However, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback point out several methodological problems that 
make prior results difficult to interpret. The Ravenscraft and Scherer study examines 
performance from 1974 to 1977 for mergers that occurred between 1950 and 1977 so 
that post-merger years are not aligned with the actual mergers. The Herman and 
Lowenstein study uses a return on equity measure o f performance that does not control 
for differences in pooling and purchase accounting, methods o f  merger financing, or the 
effects o f common industry shocks. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that diversifying 
acquisitions are almost four times more likely to be subsequently divested than related
l<The Hoidemess and Sheehan (1988) study of majority owners documents a mean (median) return on 
equity of 12.2% (12.4%) for firms with corporate majority owners versus 4.6% (13.8%) for difluscly- 
held firms. However, these differences are not significant at conventional levels.
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acquisitions, but they find no performance-related evidence that diversifying 
acquisitions are less successful than related ones.
I f  expectations o f subsequent improvements in operating performance from 
operating synergies are responsible for the gains in wealth observed at announcements 
o f mergers and acquisitions, then observed improvements in operating performance 
should be related to the degree to which the parent and target are in similar lines o f 
business. This suggests that subsequent target firm performance should be better when 
the acquirer and target are in related industries than when they are in unrelated 
industries.
Many recent studies in finance analyze the long-run behavior o f stock returns 
following major corporate events. Generally, these studies examine stock price 
performance for a period o f three to five years following the event. If the future 
benefits o f  an acquisition are correctly assessed by the market at the time o f the 
announcement then post-acquisition share price performance should be equal, on 
average, to benchmark returns. The results o f  several studies that examine the post­
acquisition stock price performance o f acquiring firms are summarized in Jensen and 
Ruback (1983). Jensen and Ruback conclude that there are generally significantly 
negative average abnormal returns during the twelve months following a takeover. 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) argue that these post-acquisition results are sensitive 
to the benchmark used to measure abnormal returns. Using an eight-portfolio 
benchmark, they find no evidence o f abnormal performance by bidders over the three 
year period following takeovers. However, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandeiker (1992) 
argue that prior studies do not properly adjust for the firm size effect and do not allow
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for time-varying betas. After adjusting for the size effect and beta risk, they conclude 
that acquiring firms experience a statistically significant wealth loss o f  about 10% over 
the five years subsequent to the merger completion date.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the post-acquisition returns to acquirers 
depend on the mode o f acquisition and the form o f payment. Specifically, over the 
five-year period following an acquisition, firms that complete stock mergers earn 
significantly negative excess returns o f -25.0% while firms that complete cash tender 
offers earn significantly positive excess returns o f 61.7%. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
also find evidence that means o f payment and mode o f acquisition affect long-run 
performance. However, they argue that the long-term underperformance o f acquiring 
firms in mergers is predominantly due to the poor post-acquisition performance o f low 
book-to-market value “glamour” firms.
Several studies examine the pre-acquisition stock price performance of target 
firms. Ellert (1976), Asquith (1983) and Agrawal and Jaffe (1997) find that, consistent 
with the inefficient management hypothesis, target firms experience negative abnormal 
returns prior to the acquisition announcement. However, Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Langetieg (1978), Martin and McConnell (1991), Agrawal and Walkling (1994), and 
Agrawal and Jaffe (1995) document insignificant pre-acquisition period abnormal 
returns. Moreover, Malatesta (1983) and Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (1995) find 
significantly positive pre-acquisition period abnormal returns for target firms, a finding 
that is inconsistent with the inefficient management hypothesis. Thus, the evidence on 
pre-acquisition target firm stock price performance varies depending on the time period 
and methodology used.
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S.3 Methodology
This chapter provides an assessment o f whether there is evidence that an 
acquirer in an incomplete acquisition makes significant improvements in the target's 
firm's future operating performance. The determination o f actual performance gains 
requires that an appropriate benchmark be developed against which to assess the post­
acquisition performance o f the target firm. Since the long-term operating performance 
o f the target firm is a function o f numerous factors, the methodology for analyzing 
long-term operating performance focuses on a comparison o f  the performance o f the 
target firms with a sample o f control firms. The comparison is made for a period prior 
to and a period subsequent to the target’s acquisition. The procedure first requires the 
matching o f target firms to control firms. The primary method used in this study 
matches target firms to control firms based on industry and past performance. Second, 
operating performance data are obtained for the target firms and for the control firms in 
order to compare the post-acquisition performance o f the target firms to firms that are 
in similar industries and have comparable pre-acquisition performance. The control 
firms’ operating performance provides the benchmark to assess the target firm's 
operating performance. This evidence is used to test the null hypothesis that 
incomplete acquisitions have no effect on the target firm's long-term operating 
performance. The methodology assumes that random errors that arise in the process of 
generating this evidence will cancel out as the performance results are aggregated 
across incomplete acquisition events.
To investigate the long-run operating performance o f the target firms, pre-event 
and post-event accounting data are collected from the Compustat Industrial and
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Research files and from Moody’s Manuals. The fiscal year in which the incomplete 
acquisition is announced is defined as year 0 and available data are collected for each 
year from year -5 to  year +5. Since year -1 is used to match sample firms with control 
firms, firms with no data in year -1 are not included in the sample. Accounting data for 
year -1 is available for 136 target firms. Due to the unavailability o f certain data items 
needed to calculate specific performance measures and to the unavailability o f data in 
years other than year -1, sample sizes vary across performance measures and across 
years.
Accounting measures o f operating performance are subject to three potential 
drawbacks.13 First, balance sheet items are recorded at historical cost while income 
statement items are recorded in current dollars. Second, total asset measures reflect all 
assets o f the firm rather than operating assets alone. Third, operating income is an 
accrual-based measure subject to manipulation by managers. As a result, this study 
uses several alternative measures o f performance to ensure the robustness o f  the 
results. The measures employed are return on assets (ROA), return on cash-adjusted 
assets (CAROA), return on sales (ROSALE), and cash-flow return on assets 





15 See Baiber and Lyon (1996).
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OIBDP, -  ARECT, -  AINVTt -  A/fCO, + A/i/3, + ALCO, 
(a T,+AT,_x) / 2
The specific variables are defined as follows: OIBDP is operating income before 
depreciation, interest, and taxes, AT is total assets, CHE is cash and cash equivalents, 
SALE is total sales, RECT is accounts receivable, INVT is inventory, ACO is other 
current assets, AP is accounts payable, LCO is other current liabilities, and A denotes 
the change between time t and time t-1.
Barber and Lyon (1996) investigate the empirical power and specification o f 
test statistics for studies in which the objective is the detection o f  abnormal operating 
performance. They find that, in general, the expectations models that yield well- 
specified, powerful test statistics are those that incorporate past performance in the 
benchmark selection process. However, previous studies, such as Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback (1992) and Parrino and Harris (1999), generally match sample firms to control 
firms based only on industry.
For these reasons, sample firms are matched to control firms using two 
procedures: industry matching and past performance/industry matching. The industry 
matching procedure matches sample firms with control firms in the same 4-digit SIC 
code. If  no matching firms are found, an alternative rule is used that matches the 
sample firm to control firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. The performance/industry 
matching procedure matches sample firms with control firms that have the same 2-digit 
SIC code and performance in year -1 within 90-100% o f the sample firm’s performance
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in year -1. I f  no matching firms are found, the same performance criteria are used to 
match the sample firm, but the matching is done with firms in the same 1-digit SIC 
code. Finally, if no matching firms with similar performance and the same 1-digit SIC 
code are found, the same performance criteria are used to match the target firm with 
control firms regardless o f  SIC code.
Kahle and Walkling (1996) find that matched samples based on Compustat SIC 
codes rather than those based on CRSP classifications are more powerful in detecting 
abnormal operating performance. As a result, Compustat SIC codes are primarily used 
for industry matching in this study. However, CRSP SIC codes are used in a small 
number o f cases where Compustat SIC codes are not available.
To assess operating performance, the expected performance in the absence o f 
the change in control must be specified to provide a benchmark to compare against 
observed performance. The model used is one where the firm’s expected performance 
is equal to its past performance plus the change in performance for the control group:
In this specification Pa and Pu-i denote the performance o f firm i in year t and year t-1, 
PIu denotes the median performance of the control group for firm i in year t, A denotes 
the change between time t and time t - 1, and E (■) is an expectations operator.
A preliminary analysis indicates that extreme observations have a distorting
effect on mean abnormal performance due to the relatively small sample sizes. To
eliminate the influence o f these extreme observations on the distribution o f the
operating performance measures, performance ratios greater than or equal to  2 and
performance ratios less than or equal to -2 are eliminated for both target firms and
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control firms.16 The analysis focuses on median abnormal performance and tests of 
significance using non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics while also 
presenting mean abnormal performance and tests o f significance using parametric 
t-statistics.
The analysis o f  operating performance is conducted both in the aggregate and 
by disaggregating the performance sample in two ways. One, the sample is 
disaggregated in accordance with the manner by which control o f the target firms is 
established. Two, following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), this study analyzes the 
relationship between post-event operating performance and the degree to which the 
acquirer and target are in related businesses. Two measures o f relatedness are used. 
The first measure is the degree o f agreement between target and acquirer SIC codes. 
The advantage o f  this measure is its objectivity. However, this procedure has a 
drawback because, as discussed previously, SIC codes are an imperfect measure o f the 
true degree o f  relatedness between industries. Therefore, a second measure of 
relatedness is employed. This second measure is the degree o f relatedness between 
target and acquirer industry classified according to the descriptions o f the target firm 
and acquiring firm industries at the time of the initial acquisition announcement. There 
are two major advantage o f  this classification method. First, it permits the 
classification o f a larger number o f  sample observations due to the greater availability 
o f industry descriptions relative to SIC codes. Second, it uses the description o f the 
target and acquirer industry at the time o f the acquisition whereas Compustat reports
16 All tests were also conducted without the elimination of extreme observations. The results were 
qualitatively the same except that the mean abnormal performance was often distorted by outliers and 
hence, less meaningful.
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only current SIC codes. The procedure used to classify paired targets and acquirers by 
degree o f relatedness is based on Healy, Palepu, and Ruback’s classification procedure. 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback use industry descriptions reported in Value Line, a practical 
source o f such data since their study examines the SO largest mergers completed 
between 1979 and 1983. For this study, the descriptions o f target firm and acquiring 
firm industries that are contained in Wall Street Journal articles are used as the basis for 
determining the degree o f relatedness to classify paired targets and acquirers into 
groups ofhigh-relatedness, medium-relatedness, or low-relatedness.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
The number and percentage o f matching firms using the return on assets 
performance measure are reported in Table 18 for both procedures for control firm 
matching described in Section 5.3. For the first comparison group, industry matching, 
all but two sample firms are matched with control firms in the same 4-digit SIC code. 
Moreover, 117 sample firms (86%) are matched with more than five control firms. For 
the second comparison group, industry and performance matching, 110 sample firms 
(80.9%) are matched with control firms in the same 2-digit SIC code and with 
performance within 90-100% o f sample firm performance in year -1. Sixty-two sample 
firms (45.6%) are matched with more than five control firms. The alternative rules 
which match sample firms to control firms with performance within 90-100% of sample 
performance in year -1 based on 1-digit SIC code or regardless o f SIC code are used to 
match 26 sample firms (19.1%) with control firms.
To enhance comparability and to more accurately reflect the economic impact 
o f  the event, the variables used in the four performance measures are as follows. The
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Table 18 - Number and Percentage of Firms with Available Matching Firms by 
Matching Criteria for Return on Assets Performance Measure
Two matching criteria are used to match sample firms with control firms. The first 
criteria matches sample firms with all firms in the same four-digit SIC code. The second 
criteria matches sample firms with all firms in the same two-digit SIC code and 
between 90%-110% o f  sample firm performance in year -1. Alternative matching rules 
are described in detail in the text.
Matching criteria: 
Four-digit S IC Two-digit S IC  and perform ance
Num ber of 
matching firms Num ber of %  of all N um ber of %  of all
observations. observations. observations. observations.
1 4 2.9 16 11.8
2 2 1.5 15 11.0
3 1 0.7 6 4.4
4 2 1.5 6 4.4
5 8 5.9 5 3.7
>5 117 86.0 62 45.6
Alt. 2 1.5 26 19.1
All observations 136 100.0 136 100.0
income variable used is operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes, and 
extraordinary items. Return on assets is calculated as operating income divided by 
average total assets. Cash-adjusted return on assets is defined similarly, except that 
cash and cash equivalents are subtracted from total assets. The use o f this measure 
may be particularly important for incomplete acquisitions via new equity issuance since 
these firms are expected to record a large increase in cash in year 0. Return on sales 
data are also provided, with the return on sales calculated as operating income divided 
by total sales. Scaling operating income by sales can overcome the historic cost and 
non-operating assets problems associated with return on assets measures. Cash-flow 
return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, and 
taxes plus decreases in current assets plus increases in current liabilities divided by
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average total assets. This measure can overcome the potential earnings manipulation 
problem associated with accrual based measures o f operating income. Because the 
distribution o f  these rates o f return tend to be skewed, the analysis focuses on the 
medians and a non-parametric test o f  significance, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
5.5 Empirical Results
Operating performance results for the full sample o f  136 incomplete acquisition 
target firms are reported in Table 19. The median unadjusted operating performance is 
monotonically decreasing for the five years prior to and including the year o f the 
incomplete acquisition announcement (years -5 to 0) for each o f  the measures of 
performance. Thus, at the time o f the acquisition, the typical target firm is experiencing 
a rate o f  return on assets or return on sales that is lower than any o f the five preceding 
years. In contrast, for the five years following the incomplete acquisition 
announcement (years +1 to +5), median unadjusted operating performance is generally 
modestly higher than in the year o f the incomplete acquisition announcement (year 0) 
for all performance measures. The unadjusted post-acquisition performance shows 
little evidence of a trend and the median rates o f return on assets and sales after the 
acquisition typically remain below the rates o f return for the pre-acquisition period.
The results for the operating performance o f target firms relative to the matched 
control portfolios provide little evidence o f operating performance improvement or 
deterioration. The adjusted operating performance o f targets is generally statistically 
insignificant and no clear pattern emerges over the pre- or post-acquisition period. In 
general, the adjusted operating performance results suggest that targets o f  incomplete 
acquisitions sustain normal performance prior to the acquisition announcement, and this
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Table 19 - Operating Performance of Incomplete Acquisition Targets
Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets (panel A). Cash-adjusted return on assets is similar to return on assets except that cash and cash equivalents are 
subtracted from total assets in the denominator (Panel B). Return on sales is calculated as total sales divided by average total assets 
(Panel C). Cash-flow return on assets is similar to return on assets except that the effects of changes in current assets and liabilities 
are excluded from operating income (Panel D). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by subtracting the median 
performance measure for a group of matched companies. Year 0 denotes the fiscal year in which the incomplete acquisition 
announcement is made. Sample sizes are the number of observations in year -1.
Panel A: Median (mean) return on assets in percent 
Year N -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 45
Unadjusted 136 11.00 10.60 10.25 8.45 8.30 7.80 8.55 8.50 7.10 8.80 6.90
(8.81) (8.22) (7.85) (6.41) (4.43) (4.48) (7.75) (7.80) (8.06) (7.37) (4.67)
N=95 N=115 N=i20 N=130 N=136 N=131 N=126 N=110 N=91 N=81 N=66
Industry- 129 -0.50 -0.04 0.75 -0.60 -0.85 1.60** 0.28 -0.20 0.98 -1.13**
adjusted (-0.95) (-0.13) (-129) (-2.38) (0.09) (3.53)* (-139) (-0.91) (-0.11) (-3.92)***
N=73 N=99 N=112 N=129 N=131 N=125 N=108 N=88 N=76 N=62
Industry-and 121 0.70 -0.10 0.53 0.20 -0.83 1.10 0.40 -1.65 0.60 -1.85**
performance- (-1.05) (-0.35) (-0.24) (-0.59) (•0.88) (3.44)* (-0.51) (-2.32)*** (-0.47) (-2.52)**
adjusted N=62 N=84 N=98 N=121 N=130 N=123 N=105 N=86 N=78 N=62
Panel B: Median (mean) cash-adjusted return on assets in percent
Year N -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 45
Unadjusted 134 11.55 11.20 11.00 -10.20 9.30 8.20 10.50 9.85 8.45 10.70 7.90
(1112) (10.01) (9.78) (7.64) (7.45) (3.25) (8.19) (9.56) (9.80) (9.94) (6.01)
N=94 N=113 N=119 N=127 N=134 N=130 N=125 N=110 N=92 N=81 N=66
Industry- 121 1.30 -0.20 -0.08 -0.10 -0.70 1.20* -1.10 -0.10 0.53 -0.38
adjusted (111) (2.49) (-2.25) (-123) (-0.35) (5.22)* (-2.07) (-0.65) (-1.58) (-2.76)**
N=67 N=91 N=102 N=121 N=128 N=124 N =lll N=94 N=80 N=66
Industry-and 114 0.02 -0.90 0.20 -0.05 -0.40 1.38 -0.30 -1.60 0.70 -3.45***
performance- (1.45) (1.38) (-1.61) (-0.64) (0.39) (3.85) (-1.09) (0.62) (-2.60) (-4.45)***


















Panel C: Median (mean) return on sales in percent 
Year N -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 44 45
Unadjusted 132 11.40 11.00 10.20 8.85 8.85 7.60 8.20 10.50 10.45 11.75 8.10
(8.54) (10.33) (10.11) (6.61) (7.50) (8.61) (10.28) (12.07) (9.10) (14.13) (8.03)
N=105 N=1I8 N=125 N=132 N=132 N=128 N=124 N=107 N=92 N=82 N=68
Industry- 130 0.33 -0.93 0.48 0.03 -0.70 0.58 -0.25 -0.35 0.70 -2.10*
adjusted (-005) (-0 18) (0.85) (0.63) (-0.13) (1.28) (1.45) (-3.26) (0.93) (-3.89)**
N=86 N=104 N=118 N=130 N=125 N=122 N=105 N=88 N=77 N=63
Industry-and 120 -1.10 1.70* 0.15 •0.23 0.70* 1.38 0.10 -1.00 1.95*“ -1.83*
performance- (1.12) (1.22) (-1.67) (0.21) (1-92) (163) (-2.00) (-2.67) (4.22)** (-5.29)**
adjusted N=68 N=91 N=104 N=120 N=125 N=120 N=102 N=84 N=76 N=58
Panel D: Median (mean) cash-flow return on assets in percent
Year N -5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 44 45
Unadjusted 129 10.25 10.10 7.80 8.35 8.60 6.20 7.60 8.25 7.30 8.10 6.35
(6.88) (5.88) (6.53) (3.59) (4.39) (5.05) (6.55) (7.45) (4.94) (7.50) (7.42)
N=86 N=108 N=114 N=122 N=129 N=125 N=118 N=102 N=83 N=74 N=58
Industry- 114 0.15 1.25 -1.00 -0.28 -0.35 0.35 -0.10 2.78 -0.05 -0.78
adjusted (3.40) (3.08) (-2.88) (0.65) (0.65) (0.53) (2.08) (-1.37) (1.66) (0.36)
N=60 N=85 N=95 N=114 N=123 N=115 N=98 N=78 N=67 N=54
Industry- and 114 3.00 -0.58 0.55 0.35 -1.93 -0.55 0.00 1.75 1.00 -1.10
performance- (0.36) (2.91) (-0.13) (174) (-1.39) (1.31) (1.17) (-2.58) (154) (-0.89)
adjusted N=57 N=84 N=95 N=114 N=124 N=113 N=94 N=72 N=65 N=51
‘ Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. ‘ “ Significant at the 1% level.
normal performance continues during the period after the incomplete acquisition. The 
one exception is year +5 in which target firms appear to underperform relative to control 
firms. However, it is important to note that this result may be biased towards 
unsuccessful acquisitions. For example, in the industry and performance adjusted sample 
for return on assets, only 62 target firms remain by year +5 compared to the total sample 
o f 136 target firms. Thus, more than half o f  the sample firms has disappeared from the 
sample by year +5. I f  certain outcomes are more likely for the successful (unsuccessful) 
targets, then the sample becomes biased toward unsuccessful (successful) acquisitions 
over time. For the industry and performance adjusted return on assets sample, the 74 
firms eliminated from the year +5 results disappear from the sample for the following 
reasons. In 37 cases, the target firms are merged with the acquirer. In 18 cases, the target 
firms are recent acquisitions (i.e., year +5 data are not available). In 9 cases, the target 
firms file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In S cases, the target firms are merged with a third 
party. In 4 cases, the target firms are deleted from the sample because the majority stake 
is sold by the original acquirer to a third party. There is one case in which the target firm 
is liquidated. Thus, the percentage of firms eliminated from the sample due to merger 
with the parent and the number eliminated due to bankruptcy appears high relative to the 
overall distribution o f outcomes. Overall, the mean and median results for adjusted 
operating performance for both the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods can be 
attributed to random statistical fluctuation.
The finding that there is normal pre- and post-acquisition operating performance 
for targets o f  incomplete acquisition relative to control firms suggests that the 
announcement period increase in wealth that is generated by incomplete acquisitions is
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not the result o f increases in efficiency that the market expects from the acquirer's 
managing o f target firm’s future operations. Although target firms are typically 
experiencing a decline in unadjusted performance prior to the incomplete acquisition, 
there are no significantly negative departures from the changes in performance 
experienced by control firms during this period. This finding suggests that incomplete 
acquisitions are not likely to be undertaken as a means to discipline underperforming 
target firm managers.
The synergy hypothesis predicts that the premium paid to target firm shareholders 
in an acquisition is based on the acquirer’s expectations o f  exploiting synergies between 
the two firms. However, the operating performance results for target firms after 
incomplete acquisitions suggests that there is no evidence o f operating synergies since 
target firms’ subsequent operating performance does not differ significantly from that o f 
control firms. In contrast to the concept o f synergy, the expropriation hypothesis implies 
that an acquirer is able to gain from the acquisition of a target firm by allocating to itself 
a disproportionate share o f the combined entity's post-acquisition operating earnings by 
means such as self-dealing transactions between the parent and its new subsidiary. 
However, the operating earnings o f targets of incomplete acquisitions indicate that there 
is no evidence o f deterioration in the operating performance o f target firms, relative to 
that of control firms, after the change in control. Thus, the post-acquisition operating 
performance is also inconsistent with the expropriation hypothesis.
The finding o f normal pre- and post-acquisition performance o f  target firms, 
combined with the evidence o f significant gains in aggregate shareholder wealth in 
response to announcements o f incomplete acquisitions, is consistent with the information
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hypothesis o f  acquisitions. Specifically, the event study results suggest that target firm 
shareholder wealth increases significantly at the announcement o f  an incomplete 
acquisition. Moreover, there are non-negative returns to acquirers in these transactions, 
so the gains to the target firms are not the result o f a wealth transfer from the acquirers to 
the targets. The event study results and the finding that there are no significant changes 
in the subsequent operating performance o f  target firms relative to control firms, suggest 
that incomplete acquisition announcements convey credible, private information to the 
market concerning the value o f the target firm. As a result o f  the acquirer's bid to 
purchase the target firm’s stock, the value o f the target firm increases, and this increase in 
value is shared among all target shareholders. From this perspective, the acquiring firm's 
bid alters the market's assessment o f value without changing the actual pattern o f target 
firm earnings.
Further evidence about the efficiency hypothesis is obtained by disaggregating the 
operating performance results in accordance with the degree to which the target and the 
acquirer are in related industries. If acquisitions o f related firms are characterized by 
important product line synergies, while conglomerate acquisitions are motivated by 
empire building or by diversification that can be easily duplicated by investors, then the 
operating performance o f target firms should be closely associated with the degree o f  the 
relatedness o f the firms involved in incomplete acquisitions. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
(1992) find that improvements in productivity for acquirers after acquisitions are 
strongest for firms in closely related industries, evidence that is supportive o f  the 
efficiency hypothesis.
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To provide evidence on this issue, the adjusted operating performance o f targets is 
disaggregated by the degree o f  relatedness in target and acquirer SIC codes. The results 
are reported in Table 20. For the years in which a subsample has fewer than five 
observations, no statistics are reported. The results indicate that there is some evidence 
that unrelated acquisitions (i.e., those with no agreement in SIC codes and those with 
only 1-digit agreement) perform more poorly than control firms in years +3 and +5. 
However, there is also evidence of significantly positive abnormal operating performance 
in year +4 for these firms using the return on sales measure o f operating performance. 
Moreover, adjusted post-acquisition operating performance for these two groups is 
positive for 9 o f  the 15 measures. Overall, it appears that the subsequent performance o f 
incomplete acquisition targets is unrelated to the degree of agreement between target and 
acquirer SIC codes.
The industry and performance adjusted operating performance o f targets 
disaggregated by the degree o f relatedness o f target and acquirer industries as classified 
according to industry description is reported in Table 21. While there are years in which 
adjusted operating performance is significant, there is no clear pattern across any o f the 
groups. These results combined with the results in Table 20 generally suggest that there 
is normal operating performance both before and afier the incomplete acquisition 
regardless o f the degree o f relatedness between the target and acquirer industry. Thus, 
the pattern o f the results suggests that the performance o f  acquisitions between related 
firms is indistinguishable from that o f conglomerate acquisitions. As such, the evidence 
fails to support the synergy hypothesis; instead, it is supportive o f the information 
hypothesis.
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Table 20 - Adjusted Operating Performance of Incomplete Acquisition Targets by Degree of Relatedness in Target and 
Acquirer SIC Codes
Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets (Panel A). Cash-adjusted return on assets is similar to return on assets except that cash and cash equivalents are 
subtracted from total assets in the denominator (Panel B). Return on sales is calculated as total sales divided by average total assets 
(Panel C). Cash-flow return on assets is similar to return on assets except that the effects of changes in current assets and liabilities 
are excluded from operating income (Panel D). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by subtracting the median 
performance measure for a group of matched companies. Year 0 denotes the fiscal year in which the incomplete acquisition 
announcement is made. Sample sizes are the number of observations in year -1.
Panel A  Median (mean) return on assets in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Same 4-digit 18 -0.90 -0.48 0.05 1.50 -0.70 2.08 -2.83 -0.15 0.75 -0.93
SIC code (0.82) (-o.oi) (-7.70)* (5.31) (1.65) (2.59) (-5.67) (2.81) (-4.00) (-2.21)
Same 3-digit 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.60 0.50 0.05 0.40 -0.40 0.65 n.a.
SIC code (-5.01) (5.43) (■0.14) (-2.24) (-0.81) (1.41)
Same 2-digit 12 1.80 0.40 2.05** 1.40 -0.85 4.10 -1.20 -0.23 -1.08 -1.65
SIC code (2.17) (-0.39) (3.53)** (0.40) (-3.09) (6.13) (-3.45) (1.87) (4.97) (-153)
Same 1-digit 14 2.70 -2.90 -1.30 1.00 -0.98 -1.53 0.05 -1.95 0.85* -0.73
SIC code (3.50) (0.35) (3.30) (-3.64) (132) (-0.70) (-1.30) (1.89) (2.20) (-0.24)
No agreement 48 -1.30 1.55 0.00 -0.43 0.28 0.25 2.83 -3.15*** 0.60 -3.35*
in SIC codes (-3.22) 12.25) (-0.90) (-1.29) (-0.72) (1.48) (3.57) (-5.74)** (-1.84) (-3.78)*
Panel B: Median (mean) cash-adjusted return on assets
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Same 4-digit 17 -0.85 0.45 -0.88 -1.20 -0.30 3.45 -2.80 2.05 2.65 -4.45
SIC code (1.38) (1.62) (-7.77) (3.81) (2.35) (3.23) (-5.57) (5.31) (-3.00) (-4.44)
Same 3-digit 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.70 0.40 0.40 0.10 -0.40 0.60 n.a.
SIC code (-7.39) (863) (-0.10) (0.18) (-1.44) (2.85)
Same 2-digit 12 1.80 -1.63 1.95 0.78 -2.10* 1.03 -2.90 0.58 -4.78 -3.73
SIC code (3.29) (-133) (3.37) (-0.86) (-3.19) (6.56)* (-4.35) (2.84) (-4.31) (-5.23)
Same 1-digit 14 3.90 -3.80 -3.05 0.13 1.28 0.08 0.15 -1.80 0.90 0.00
SIC code (4.49) (-179) (-3.46) (-4.63) (125) (0.56) (-2.13) (5.94) (0.42) (-1.62)
No agreement 45 0.15 -0.15 -0.25 0.20 1.10 1.25 2.80 -2.98* 0.20 -4.45**


















Panel C: Median (mean) return on sales in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Same 4-digit 17 -1.85 0.65 1.20 -1.20 -0.95 5.85 -0.95 5.75 3.10 -0.30
SIC code (3.15) (*7.12) (2.63) (0.48) (2.42) (-5.10) (0.96) (3.44) (-114) (-6.13)
Same 3-digit 6 n.a. -2.13 0.65 •0.33 0.50 0.85 3.95 -1.30 1.00 n.a.
SIC code (-2.13) (5.44) (-0.09) (7.48) (-162) (104) (2.86) (8.77)
Same 2-digit 11 0.95 1.25 0.20 •0.50 0.70 2.25 0.30 5.30 -0.70 -1.45
SIC code (5.88) (2.77) (177) (-3.91) (104) (2.05) (2.24) (3.77) (-5.34) (-2.40)
Same 1-digit 14 n.a. 1.68 -2.60* 2.98 2.50 -1.20 0.80 -1.90" 1.30* 0.00
SIC code (0.53) (-4.84)* (4.51) (2.60) (-2.80) (-1.64) (-6.48) (6.19) (-5.64)
No agreement 49 -2.55 4.18"* -1.35 -0.20 1.23* 1.60 2.30 -3.50 2.65** -3.80"
in SIC codes (-2.28) (7.08)*" (-6.80)* (-2.96) (-0.50) (5.86) (-0.33) (-6.29) (8.52)*" (-7.81)**
Panel D. Median (mean) cash-flow return on assets in percent
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Same 4-digit 14 6.20 -2.40 3.50 1.03 -0.18 0.20 1.18 0.00 -3.13 n.a.
SIC code (3.92) (-0.61) (2.19) (3.77) (168) (-0.95) (2.88) (-1.53) (-3.71)
Same 3-digit 5 n.a. -4.50 3.20 1.10 -11.15 1.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SIC code (-4.83)* (7.01) (-10.32) (-4.13) (7.55)
Same 2-digit 12 -11.55 -4.35 9.35 -4.30* -1.70 1.53 -1.53 0.85 5.35 1.63
SIC code (-6.26) (8.56) (0.62) (-6.57)* (-1.48) (-0.43) (-12.55) (6.65) (1124) (-4.11)
Same 1-digit 13 n.a. -0.45 -5.95 0.00 -1.50 -2.45 -1.98 1.30 -0.40 -1.10
SIC code (14.71) (-4.34)* (-0.04) (0.09) (2.01) (-6.55) (-3.54) (-0.65) (14.31)
No agreement 46 4.40 1.10 -4.53 1.93 -4.10 -1.10 -5.80 7.50 4.88 -3.00
in SIC codes (2.80) (2.60) (-5.12) (6.65) (-2.85) (-3.62) (4.98) (3-05) (0.21) (-4.25)

















Table 21 - Adjusted Operating Performance of Incomplete Acquisition Targets by Degree of Relatedness in Target and 
Acquirer Industry
Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets (Panel A). Cash-adjusted return on assets is similar to return on assets except that cash and cash equivalents are 
subtracted from total assets in the denominator (Panel B). Return on sales is calculated as total sales divided by average total assets 
(Panel C). Cash-flow return on assets is similar to return on assets except that the effects of changes in current assets and liabilities 
are excluded from operating income (Panel D). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by subtracting the median 
performance measure for a group of matched companies. Year 0 denotes the fiscal year in which the incomplete acquisition 
announcement is made. Sample sizes are the number of observations in year -1.
Panel A. Median (mean) return on assets in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
High 51 2.05 -0.10 -0.33* 1.20 -0.50 1.25 -3.20** -0.10 1.40 -1.10
(1.29) (-117) (-5.29)** (129) (-1.52) (4.72) (-7.24)** (2.32) (3.80) (-1.30)
Medium 27 -0.10 0.40 1.50 -2.80** -0.98 -0.80 3.65** -2.80** -1.78 -1.85
1—4 (-3.38)* (4.11) (1.94) (-515) (3.00) (-1.03) (4.56)* (-3.83) (-2.26) (-3.54)
u> Low 43 -1.70 -0.75 1.95 0.80 -1.15 0.83 0.25 -1.90** -0.25 -2.25
(-176) (-2.08) (3.86) (0.12) (-2.83) (5.10) (176) (-3.89)** (-2.72) (-2.29)
Panel B: Median (mean) cash-adjusted return on assets
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
High 50 2.60 -0.23 0.00 0.20 -0.50 1.88 -3.65*** 2.10 1.20 4.85**
(2.86) (-1.97) (-4.40) (0.80) (-0.72) (3.88) (-7.08)*** (7.17)** (-1.21) (4.16)**
Medium 25 -0.80 -0.40 0.35 -5.70*** -0.40 0.70 3.35** 4.80* -1.10 -2.60
(-195) (6.88) (114) (-6.63)*** (8.05) (-3 05) (5.41) (-5.89) (-159) (-5.22)
Low 39 0.20 -2.20 0.20 0.55 -0.40 1.60 0.18 -1.80 0.70 -3.40


















Panel C: Median (mean) return on sales in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 45
High 50 0.55 0.75 0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -1.25 -0.50 -0.10 4.20*** -0.30
(7.11) (-1.09) (-0.40) (0.88) (1.23) (-0.36) (-0.04) (3.40)* (4.38) (-3.15)
Medium 26 -1.70 2.90 -1.30 -0.28 0.40 2.38** 1.45 -3.53 0.45 -1.45
(-1.80) (4.05)* (0.50) (-3.51)* (-0.87) (3.98)* (0.77) (-12.61) (2.01) (-5.12)
Low 44 -2.20 3.43 1.55 0.08 1.30** 1.33 -1.78 -2.15 0.85 -4.03
(-3.54) (2.11) (-4.52) (1.66) (4.78)** (2.23) (-5.27) (-0.19) (5.59) (-7.00)*
Panel D.: Median (mean) cash-flow return on assets in percent
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 44 45
High 45 1.20 0.00 2.50 1.10 -4.10 0.28 0.70 2.45* 1.30 0.65
(-5.79) (5.73) (-0.52) (-1.87) (-1.26) (3.60) (-3.64) (6.42)** (5.50) (-5.64)
Medium 27 -0.50 0.10 -6.13 0.00 -3.15 2.55 -1.60 1.00 -0.10 -5.10
(-0.26) (12.13)* (-0.97) (4.34) (0.73) (1.29) (-7.34) (2.75) (-1.26) (2.52)
Low 40 4.90* -3.55** 1.70 -0.25 1.50 -1.70 -0.60 0.55 4.15 0.55
(7.34)* (-5.79)** (1.14) (3.57) (-2.88) (-1.49) (11.18) (-13.52) (0.90) (-0.86)
’Significant at the 10% level. ’ ’ Significant at the 5% level. ’ ’ ’Significant at the 1% level.
The industry and adjusted operating performance o f targets o f  incomplete 
acquisitions is next disaggregated by the mechanism used to conduct the acquisition. 
The results are reported in Table 22. In general, pre-acquisition performance and post­
acquisition performance appear normal across all acquisition types. There is some 
evidence that target firms acquired by tender offer are underperforming relative to the 
benchmark in the year o f  the incomplete acquisition announcement (year 0). For this 
set o f  firms, the return on assets is significantly negative at the five percent level for 
both the median and the mean, and the mean cash-adjusted return on assets is 
significantly negative at the ten percent level. Subsequent to the acquisition, targets o f 
tender offers have consistently normal performance. Moreover, while 8 o f the 15 
adjusted performance measures are negative for tender offers in years -5 to 0, only 3 o f 
the 15 adjusted performance measures are negative in years +1 to +5. These results are 
mildly suggestive o f  slight improvements in the performance o f tender offer targets.
Target firms that are acquired through new equity issues have a significantly 
higher return on sales than matched firms in year 0, but both target and control firms 
display similar performance for the two return on assets measures. In year +2, there is 
also evidence that the targets acquired through new equity issues perform significantly 
better than their peers as measured by the return on sales. Moreover, for these target 
firms, the return on assets measure is a less reliable measure o f operating performance 
because they experience a large cash infusion around year +1 that is unlikely to produce 
an immediate increase in operating income. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of 
continuing improvement relative to the control group o f  firms in subsequent years for 
any o f the three measure o f operating performance.
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Table 22 - Adjusted Operating Performance of Incomplete Acquisition Targets by Acquisition Type 
Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets (Panel A). Cash-adjusted return on assets is similar to return on assets except that cash and cash equivalents are 
subtracted from total assets in the denominator (Panel B). Return on sales is calculated as total sales divided by average total assets 
(Panel C). Cash-flow return on assets is similar to return on assets except that the effects of changes in current assets and liabilities 
are excluded from operating income (Panel D). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by subtracting the median 
performance measure for a group of matched companies. Year 0 denotes the fiscal year in which the incomplete acquisition 
announcement is made. Sample sizes are the number of observations in year -1.
Panel A. Median (mean) return on assets in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 45
Tender offers 20 -1.30 0.35 1.50 -1.28 -1.50** 1.20 2.58 -1.80 1.40 0.50
(-1.16) (0.25) (-0.54) (-1.87) (-5.75)** (-125) (2.50) (-3 94) (5.93) (-0.12)
New equity 43 1.80 -1.60 -2.08 0.20 0.15 -0.18 1.63 -1.35 -0.08 -4.20
issuance (0.42) (-2.43) (-3.26) (0.91) (-0.27) (3 58) (1.38) (128) (-151) (-3-84)
Block 30 -1.70* -1.50 2.18* 2.05** -0.85 1.33 -1.65 -1.35 0.85 -2.10
purchases (-4.88)** (-2.25) (1.85) (123) (0.32) (1.61) (-4.42) (-1.73) (-3.08) (-3.04)
Panel B: Median (mean) cash-adjusted return on assets
Year N -4 -3 -2 -I 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Tender offers 20 0.05 -2.35 1.75** 0.05 -1.25 1.05 2.35 -1.90 1.35 0.70
(5.08) (-11.00) (5.62) (142) (-4.65)* (-315) (-0.88) (-2.94)** (104) (-126)
New equity 41 2.90 -1.80 -2.80 -1.10 0.70 2.45 1.70 -1.00 0.70 -6.65
issuance (2.30) (-4.31) (-5.26) (0.06) (-118) (6.00) (2.58) (4.59) (-1.79) (-6.10)*
Block 27 -0.90 -0.50 0.90 0.50 -1.00 1.45 -3.33** 0.60 0.90 -3.50*


















Panel C: Median (mean) return on sales in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Tender offers 21 -2.00 0.90 1.93 -0.85 -0.40 2.10 1.33 1.35 1.35 -1.08
(-161) (2.90) (1.42) (-1.01) (-0.71) (-9.03) (-191) (2.40) (3.19) (-174)
New equity 42 0.75 3.10 -2.33 -0.15 3.15” 2.30 4.05* -1.60 1.00 -3.00
issuance (6.71)* (-1.60) (-2.28) (-176) (366) (7.50) (4.72) (-5.75) (4.06) (-4.21)
Block 32 -2.43’ 0.90 -0.30 0.00 -0.10 1.25 -2.50” -0.38 2.48 -3.05
purchases (-8.73)** (3.60) (-4.88) (1.40) (1.85) (2.68) (-6.10)* (1.48) (2.26) (-5.43)*
Panel D: Median (mean) cash-flow return on assets in percent
Year N -4 - 3 - 2  - 1 0  +1 + 2 + 3  + 4 + 5
Tender offers 18 1.38 0.80 0.70 -1.15 -4.55* -3.35 5.40** -4.15 1.30 -4.73
(-11.04) (4.07) (-3.09) (-3.63) (-5.56)’ (-4.67) (20.86)” (-24.78) (-173) (-4.17)
— New equity 41 3.83 0.00 0.48 0.10 -0.80 -1.35 2.15 5.10* 4.98 -8.30
issuance (189) (1.45) (0.24) (3.29) (0.68) (-3.85) (3.57) (4.99) (10.13) (-8.55)
Block 28 5.20 -1.40 -0.05 4.23” -4.00 3.55 -4.20” 0.38 -2.70 0.63
purchases (0.48) (0.85) (-2.15 (5.63)’ (-0.35) (2.99) (-10.13)’ (0.45) (-2.66) (-2.93)
’Significant at the 10% level. ’ ’Significant at the 5% level. ’ ’ ’Significant at the 1% level.
For incomplete acquisitions by block purchases, there is significant evidence of 
poor performance relative to the control firms in year +2 and year +5 for two measures 
o f performance. However, there is no evidence o f significant underperformance for the 
third measure (return on assets) and no clear pattern o f abnormal performance appears 
over the post-acquisition period.
In general, the pattern of the operating performance results, disaggregated by 
acquisition method, is mildly suggestive o f the differences in abnormal returns at 
incomplete acquisition announcements. Specifically, target firms acquired through 
tender offers and new equity issues have some evidence o f  improvements in operating 
performance, while block purchases exhibit no evidence o f improvements in operating 
performance. However, consistent with the results for the overall sample, there is little 
evidence o f significant improvements in operating performance or o f significant 
differences in pre- and post-acquisition operating performance across acquisition types. 
Thus, the differential announcement returns across acquisition types do not appear to 
be driven by differences in the subsequent operating performance displayed by firms 
that are acquired through these alternative acquisition mechanisms.
5.6 Summary
In general, the analysis of pre- and post-acquisition operating performance of 
incomplete acquisition targets indicates that target firm operating performance is 
normal relative to the median performance o f control firms both before and after the 
acquisition. Thus, there is neither deterioration nor improvement in target firm 
operating performance in the five years following the change in control. This finding of 
normal performance suggests that acquiring firm expropriation o f minority shareholder
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wealth through self-dealing transactions and access to target firm assets, is not a 
motivation for incomplete acquisitions. In addition, the finding that target firm 
performance is normal prior to the incomplete acquisition indicates that targets are not 
performing poorly relative to control firms, which suggests that the target firms are not 
likely to be mismanaged firms.
Since target firm performance does not significantly improve subsequent to the 
change in control, the analysis o f operating performance indicates that there is no 
evidence o f efficiency gains or operating synergies. Moreover, the analysis o f  the post­
acquisition operating performance o f targets disaggregated by the degree o f relatedness 
between the target firm and acquirer industries, indicates that the subsequent 
performance o f unrelated incomplete acquisition targets is similar to that o f  target firms 
that are in an industry that is closely related to the acquirer. The finding that the 
performance o f industry-related acquisitions is similar to that o f conglomerate 
acquisitions is consistent with the valuation effects reported in Chapter 4 which indicate 
that wealth gains in industry-related incomplete acquisitions are comparable to wealth 
gains in incomplete acquisitions where the target firm has low-relatedness with the 
parent.
It remains possible that there are important gains in efficiency that result in 
significant improvements in the performance o f targets that occur subsequent to a five- 
year period o f analysis or that occur after a target firm becomes a wholly owned 
subsidiary when merged with the parent. If  such gains exist, however, they are unlikely 
to be large enough in the present value sense to justify the announcement period 
returns documented for these transactions. In addition, there may be gains in operating
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performance that occur within the parent firm and that are not observable in target firm 
performance. Such possibilities are not pursued in the current study.
The analysis o f  the valuation effects o f incomplete acquisitions presented in 
Chapter 4 indicates that target firm shareholder wealth increases significantly at the 
time o f  the acquisition announcement and that this increase does not come at the 
expense o f the acquirer (i.e., the acquirer share price response is non-negative).
Overall, the results o f the analysis in this chapter combined with the evidence presented 
in Chapter 4 is consistent with the view that private positive information concerning the 
value o f the target is generated by acquirers and that this information generation is a 
central element o f the market for corporate control. More specifically, these findings 
are consistent with the view that acquiring firms are able to identify undervalued firms 
even when the target is in an industry o f low relatedness. Thus, the use o f an 
incomplete acquisition, which entails the continued observability o f target operating 
performance subsequent to the acquisition, rather than a complete acquisition, enables 
the acquirer to certify that the target firm’s adjusted operating performance is 
sustainable throughout the period o f  continued public trading o f  the minority shares. If 
the benefits o f an incomplete acquisition arise from the certification role played by the 
maintenance o f this costly transparency, then incomplete acquisitions are likely to be a 
transitory form o f  corporate governance. This hypothesis is further explored in the 
following chapter by examining the ultimate disposition of the acquirer’s controlling 
interest in the target firm.
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CHAPTER 6
THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF DISPOSITION OF THE MAJORITY STAKE
6.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the ultimate disposition o f the parent's controlling 
stake and the minority interest in the target firm. I f  there are ongoing benefits to 
continued public trading o f  the minority interest in the target firm that are sufficient to 
outweigh the costs o f  disclosure and attendant requirements o f  being a public firm, then 
incomplete acquisitions should persist as the organizational form for the corporate 
entity. In contrast, if the benefits o f  a publicly traded minority interest diminish over 
time, then incomplete acquisitions should be a temporary form o f  corporate 
organization. In this case, the publicly traded minority interest would be terminated by 
the acquirer when the benefits o f maintaining the minority interest fall below the costs 
o f  the associated disclosure.
The first part o f  this chapter contains an examination o f  the limited literature 
that exists about the disposition o f  majority ownership, and also reviews the extensive 
research on divestitures o f wholly owned subsidiaries. The next part o f the chapter 
reports the results o f  a search to determine the subsequent disposition o f the majority 
ownership and/or the minority interest that emanates from an incomplete acquisition, 
and the mechanisms parent firms use to effect the disposition. These results provide 
evidence about the duration of incomplete acquisitions as a form o f corporate 
governance.
The remaining part o f the chapter provides empirical results about the effect o f 
disposition transactions on target and acquirer firm value. This analysis o f  the wealth
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effects o f  disposition announcements can shed light on the motivation behind these 
transactions and their implications for parent and minority shareholder wealth. The 
announcement o f an incomplete acquisition may influence market expectations 
concerning a subsequent control event, such as a parent-subsidiary merger or a third 
party buyout o f the minority interest (e.g., a complete merger). Financial market 
efficiency implies that share price responses to the initial announcement o f an 
incomplete acquisition will capitalize gains or losses expected to ensue from subsequent 
disposition events. Thus, market-based evidence is used to evaluate whether share 
price responses to incomplete acquisition announcements reflect future disposition 
events. In addition, as Malatesta and Thompson (1985) indicate, when an expected 
event actually occurs, there will also be a market reaction that reflects the resolution of 
uncertainty and impounds residual economic effects not capitalized at the time o f the 
initial event, the incomplete acquisition announcement. Thus, an analysis is provided of 
the stock market response to the announcement o f the disposition o f  the majority 
interest, with the results disaggregated by the alternative types of disposition outcomes. 
This analysis is followed by an examination o f the operating performance o f target 
firms, disaggregated by the type o f disposition outcome to determine whether interim 
operating performance affects the outcome o f incomplete acquisitions.
6.2 The Role and Disposition of Control
There is a large literature that analyzes the role o f blockholders as corporate 
monitors and the role that these investors play in corporate control contests. 
Nevertheless, the existing literature focuses almost entirely on specific blockholders, 
both corporate and individual blockholders, who have blocks o f stock that are
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significantly smaller than the concentrated majority holdings that are the topic o f this 
study. An exception is the work o f  Holdemess and Sheehan (1988) who conduct a 
study o f majority held firms and find that corporate majority-owned firms are more 
likely to be involved in mergers than a control sample o f diffusely-held firms. In 
addition, firms with corporate majority shareholders are more likely to  experience a 
change in the identity o f the largest shareholder than are firms that are controlled by 
individual blockholders. They argue that the frequency o f control transactions among 
corporate majority-owned firms could be due to the premiums paid in sales o f 
controlling blocks. They also suggest that a third party who purchases a controlling 
block with the intention o f subsequently effecting a complete merger may have an 
incentive to delay the purchase o f the minority shares in order to avoid legal 
prohibitions on differential offers to the remaining shareholders.
In a study o f toeholds, Mikkelson and Ruback (198S) follow a sample o f 13D 
filings from the initial announcement date through the announcement o f the final 
outcome o f the 13D filing. They find that, over the three years following establishment 
o f  these toehold positions, one-third o f  the targets are fully-acquired, one-third remain 
a publicly traded firm, and the remaining one-third are spread across third-party 
takeovers, targeted repurchases, and open market sale o f the shares. Mikkelson and 
Ruback find that the 13D entity’s share price response at the outcome announcement is 
significantly positive for cases o f targeted share repurchases (greenmail), the sale o f the 
ownership stake in the market, or the sale o f the stake to a third party. The returns to 
13D entities are insignificantly different from zero for complete takeovers by the 13D 
entity or by a third party. The cumulative share price response o f 13D entities from the
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initial announcement to the final outcome is significantly positive for targeted share 
repurchases, the open market sale o f shares, and third party takeovers, but is 
insignificantly different from zero for cases when the 13D entity takes over the target.
For target firms, Mikkelson and Ruback find that the share price response at the 
outcome announcement is significantly positive for takeovers completed by the 13D 
entity and significantly negative in the case o f targeted share repurchases. The 
cumulative share price response o f target firms from the initial announcement to the 
final outcome is significantly positive across all outcomes, but is much greater when the 
outcome is either a takeover by the 13D entity or a takeover by a third party.
Mikkelson and Ruback's results indicate that these transactions create value regardless 
o f the outcome, and that targets capture the greater share o f the gains. However, there 
is evidence o f a transfer o f  wealth from the target to the 13D entity when the 
transaction ends in a targeted share repurchase.
Slovin and Sushka (1998) argue that there are two key differences between a 
merger o f a subsidiary into its parent and a conventional corporate control transaction. 
First, a conventional merger or acquisition entails a change in corporate control 
whereas a parent-subsidiary merger does not entail a change in control. Second, in a 
merger or acquisition between unaffiliated companies, each side bargains for its own 
interests through arm’s length negotiations and approval typically requires a simple 
majority shareholder vote. In a tender offer, the acquirer deals directly with 
shareholders who individually decide whether to accept or reject the offer. In contrast, 
a parent with majority ownership o f a subsidiary can force a parent-subsidiary merger 
by voting its majority shareholding in the subsidiary in favor o f the merger. Thus,
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unlike a parent-subsidiary merger, a third party buyout o f a majority-controlled 
subsidiary entails arm’s length negotiations within a contestable environment and 
results in a change in control. These characteristics suggest that minority shareholders 
o f the subsidiary may experience a greater increase in wealth in third party buyouts than 
in parent-subsidiary mergers.
Moreover, studies by Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983,1984) and 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) find that control shares are more valuable than non­
control shares. These findings suggest that the offer for shares o f a subsidiary should 
be higher in a third party buyout where the acquirer is purchasing control, than in a 
parent-subsidiary merger where control has already been established and only non- 
control shares are being acquired.
Slovin and Sushka (1998) examine a sample o f parent-controlled publicly 
traded subsidiaries that are either merged with the parent company or sold to a third 
party buyer. Their sample o f majority-owned subsidiaries includes those that originate 
from equity carve-outs, incomplete acquisitions, and partial spin-offs. They find that 
when majority-owned subsidiaries are subsequently merged with the parent, minority 
shareholders experience significant increases in wealth and that the minority 
shareholders’ portion o f the overall gains in value exceeds their proportional ownership 
in the subsidiary. They also document positive returns to parents and conclude that 
parent-subsidiary mergers are value-enhancing transactions for both the subsidiary and 
the parent. Interestingly, the returns to subsidiaries sold to third parties are not 
significantly different from those in parent-subsidiary mergers. The returns to parents 
are greater in third party buyouts than in parent-subsidiary mergers, while the returns to
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third party buyers are negative, suggesting that there is a wealth transfer from buyers to 
parents.
Slovin and Sushka (1998) argue that the elimination o f minority shareholders 
through a parent-subsidiary merger can enhance overall value by reducing proprietary 
costs that arise from disclosure, conflicts o f interest and legal concerns, and/or by 
generating gains in productive efficiency. If parent-subsidiary mergers and/or third 
party mergers following an incomplete acquisition are value enhancing, their 
announcement should increase the combined value o f the parties to the transaction. I f  
the price paid to the minority shareholders is equivalent to the pre-announcement value 
o f their shares, then any gains will accrue to the parent or third party acquirer.
However, if  the parent or third party acquirer pays a premium for the minority shares, 
then there will be positive abnormal returns to the minority shareholders. Furthermore, 
if all gains accrue to the subsidiary, as is typical in mergers and tender offers between 
unaffiliated firms, the parent and minority shareholders will capture all o f  the value 
from third party buyouts o f the subsidiary.
Several studies o f acquisitions in which the acquired firm was subsequently 
divested interpret the divestiture as a failure o f  the original acquisition.17 However, 
Weston (1989) argues that acquirers may later divest targets for a number o f  reasons 
that do not involve poor performance. For instance, the acquirer may sell a business 
that it has improved or a business with which it once had synergies but no longer does. 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) study divestitures o f complete acquisition targets. They
17 See Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Porter (1987).
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find that the abnormal returns o f acquirers and the combined abnormal returns to 
targets and acquirers at the acquisition announcement are significantly lower for 
unsuccessful acquisitions than for successful acquisitions and acquisitions that are not 
divested. As a result, they suggest that at the initial announcement o f an acquisition, 
the stock market can differentiate between unsuccessful and successful acquisitions. 
Nevertheless, they find that at the acquisition announcement, the abnormal returns o f 
targets o f  unsuccessful acquisitions are not significantly different from the abnormal 
returns to successful acquisitions and acquisitions that are not divested, suggesting that 
the future performance o f the acquisition does not affect the acquisition price. While 
Kaplan and Weisbach's results indicate that unrelated acquisitions are more likely to be 
divested than related acquisitions, they find little evidence that unrelated acquisitions 
are less successful than related acquisitions or that the stock market reaction to the 
acquisition announcement differs across relatedness.
Slovin and Sushka (1998) find that parent-subsidiary mergers are frequently 
followed by subsidiary restructurings. After the wholly-owned subsidiary is 
restructured, parent retention o f the unit and parent divestiture o f the unit are about 
equally likely. Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) argue that voluntary asset 
sell-ofrs may in fact be positive net present value investment decisions. Under these 
circumstances, both the original acquisition and the divestiture may be value-enhancing 
transactions. Consistent with these arguments, Schipper and Smith (1983), Alexander, 
Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984), Jain (1985), Klein (1986), and Hite, Owers, and 
Rogers (1987) find that the average share price reaction to divestiture announcements 
is significantly positive for the divesting firm.
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The merger o f  a majority-controlled subsidiary into the parent should be a 
value-increasing transaction if the decision to merge conveys information about the 
success o f the acquisition or that the proprietary costs associated with a publicly-traded 
minority interest are no longer offset by the benefits o f  being publicly traded. The 
parent's establishment o f complete control o f  the subsidiary should allow it to capture 
at least some o f these benefits. The sale o f a majority-controlled subsidiary to a third 
party should also be value-increasing if the sale moves assets to higher valued uses and 
the parent is able to capture part o f  the gain. Alternatively, the sale o f the subsidiary to 
a third party may convey negative information about expectations o f  poor subsidiary 
performance that may result in a loss in value if the majority owner divests the unit at a 
price lower than the market's previous assessment o f its value.
6.3 Sample Development and Methodology
For each incomplete acquisition in the sample developed in Chapter 3, a search 
for the disposition o f the controlling interest or the minority interest is conducted using 
the Wall Street Journal Index, the Directory o f Obsolete Securities, and Moody’s 
Manuals. Disposition dates are identified using the Wall Street Journal Index and the 
Lexis-Nexis Company News database. Relevant news articles are obtained and 
examined to determine the substance o f the transaction and the means by which the 
controlling interest is dissolved. If  the acquirer was itself subsequently acquired by 
another firm, but still holds a majority interest in the target, the disposition is classified 
according to the disposition that is made by the new owner (i.e., the acquirer o f  the 
original parent firm). Information subsequent to the disposition announcement is 
examined to determine that the transaction is successfully completed. For the sample
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observations where no indication o f dissolution is found, the continued trading o f  the 
controlling interest is verified using Moody’s Manuals.
These procedures result in a sample o f 229 incomplete acquisitions for which 
the method o f subsequent disposition o f the majority interest could be determined and 
36 incomplete acquisitions in which it is determined that the subsidiary continues to 
trade as a majority-controlled subsidiary o f the acquirer. The disposition 
announcement date and method o f disposition are available for 221 target firms and 
188 parent firms. Share price data are available for both targets and acquirers for 188 
transactions. Event study methodology, as described in Chapter 4, is used to ascertain 
the share price effects o f  the disposition announcements.
6.4 Descriptive Statistics
The distribution o f disposition announcements by year is reported in Table 23. 
Not surprisingly, there are fewer dispositions in the earlier years o f the sample period 
since there are fewer incomplete acquisitions in the sample to be potentially 
extinguished. Some concentration o f disposition announcements is observed in 1978, 
during the late 1980s, and during the early 1990s.
The frequency distribution o f 264 disposition outcomes is reported in Table 24. 
The data indicate that the dominant type o f disposition (45 .9%) o f an incomplete 
acquisition is the elimination of the minority shareholding through the merger o f the 
majority-controlled subsidiary with the parent firm. Two corporate control outcomes 
are observed with identical frequency in the sample. These are the buyout and merger 
o f  the subsidiary with a third party acquirer (12.1%), a transaction that eliminates the 
minority interest, and the sale o f the parent's controlling stake to a third party (12.1%),
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Table 23 - Distribution of Disposition Announcements by Year
Number o f dispositions occurring in each year, 1967-1997.
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Table 24 -  Distribution of Outcomes
Disposition by method for 264 incomplete acquisitions.
Method # of Events Percentage
Merged with acquirer 121 45.9%
Merged with third party 32 12.1%
Still trades as majority owned subsidiary 36 13.6%
Sale of controlling stake to third party 32 12.1%
Repurchase of stake by subsidiary 14 5.3%
Bankruptcy 19 7.2%
Liquidation 7 2.7%
Spin-off of majority stake 3 1.1%
Total 264 100.0%
a transaction that transfers majority control but does not eliminates the publicly traded 
minority interest. Outcomes that occur less frequently are the bankruptcy o f the 
subsidiary (7.2%), and the repurchase by the subsidiary o f the parent's controlling stake 
(5.3%). The small number o f remaining disposition events are accounted for by the 
liquidation o f the subsidiary (2.7%), and the spin-off o f  the majority interest in the 
subsidiary to the shareholders o f  the parent (1.1%).
The data indicate that only in a modest percent o f  cases (13 .6%) does the target 
o f  an incomplete acquisition continue as a majority-owned subsidiary with a publicly 
traded minority interest. Moreover, to the extent that these target firms will experience 
a disposition outcome subsequent to the period under study, this figure represents an 
upper-bound on the percentage o f targets o f  incomplete acquisitions that continue as 
majority-controlled entities with publicly traded minority interests. Thus, the data 
indicate that incomplete acquisitions are typically a temporary, rather than a permanent 
form o f  corporate governance structure.
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Two methods o f disposition, specifically the merger o f  the target with the 
acquirer and the continued majority control by the parent with public trading o f the 
minority interest, can be viewed as comparable to Kaplan and Weisbach’s definition of 
non-divested acquisitions in their sample o f complete acquisitions. Kaplan and 
Weisbach find that 56% o f the acquisitions in their sample are not divested by the end 
o f the period studied. In comparison, 59.5% o f the incomplete acquisitions in this 
study subsequently merge with the parent or continue to trade as majority-owned 
subsidiaries. This is a slightly higher rate than the figure reported in Kaplan and 
Weisbach even though the period o f possible divestiture in this study is longer than in 
Kaplan and Weisbach's study. However, this study does not investigate possible 
divestitures during the period that is subsequent to a parent-subsidiary merger. 
Nevertheless, in terms o f the overall rate o f divestiture, the results o f this study of 
incomplete acquisitions appear to  be broadly similar to the Kaplan and Weisbach results 
for complete acquisitions.
The time that elapses between the incomplete acquisition announcement and the 
disposition announcement is reported in Table 25. The overall mean (median) time 
elapsed between the acquisition o f  control and the relevant disposition event is 5 .7 
(4.2) years. These data, together with the finding in Table 24 that less than 14% o f the 
sample still exists as a  majority controlled subsidiary with a publicly traded interest, 
suggest that incomplete acquisitions are a transitory form o f organization. This modest 
degree o f  permanence suggests that the benefits o f  a publicly traded minority interest 
are temporary. Moreover, parent-subsidiary mergers and the sale o f the stake to a third 
party appear to occur more quickly than third party mergers and subsidiary repurchases
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Table 25 - Time Elapsed from Announcement of Incomplete Acquisition to 
Announcement of Disposition
Statistics for the time elapsed in years from the acquisition announcement to the 
disposition announcement for 263 incomplete acquisitions. For targets that still trade, 
these calculations are truncated at December 31, 1997.
Disposition Type N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Full sample 263 5.7 4.2 0.5 25.5
Still trades 36 9.0 6.9 0.5 24.3
Merges with parent 121 4.5 3.2 0.5 25.5
Merges with third party 32 6.7 5.7 1.4 21.5
Stake sold to third party 32 4.2 3.5 1.0 12.6
Repurchased by subsidiary 13 5.9 4.2 2.1 15.9
Subsidiary files for 
bankruptcy or reorganization 19 5.3 3.4 0.5 18.1
o f their own stock from the parent firm. Moreover, the figures shown in the table for 
the full sample and for incomplete acquisitions that still trade as majority-owned 
subsidiaries represent a lower bound on the true duration from initial acquisition until 
disposition since the calculations are truncated at December 31, 1997. In comparison, 
Kaplan and Weisbach report a median duration o f 7.0 years for complete acquisitions in 
which the target is subsequently divested. Similarly, Slovin and Sushka (1998) report a 
mean (median) duration o f 6.0 (5 .0) years between the establishment o f  a publicly 
traded minority interest and parent-subsidiary mergers and 6.1 (3.6) years between the 
establishment o f the minority interest and third-party mergers. Thus, evidence o f the 
modest duration of incomplete acquisitions is broadly similar to the results o f previous 
studies that examine the period that elapses between acquisitions and divestitures.
6.5 Empirical Results
To investigate whether the market response at the announcement o f the 
incomplete acquisition differs depending on the ultimate disposition, that is whether the
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capital market anticipates the outcome, the share price responses o f targets and 
acquirers at the initial announcement are disaggregated by the type o f disposition that 
ultimately occurs. The two-day incomplete acquisition announcement period returns 
by disposition type for 206 target firms are reported in Panel A o f Table 26. Targets 
that are subsequently merged into the acquirer have the most favorable share price 
reaction to the initial announcement o f the incomplete acquisition, with an average 
two-day excess return o f  10.18% (t-statistic = 18.45). This result is consistent with the 
view that the market partially anticipates the ultimate acquisition o f the minority 
interest in the subsidiary and that this anticipation o f the transaction generates, on 
average, the most value enhancement among the incomplete acquisitions. In contrast, 
the two-day excess return is a modest 2.67% (t-statistic = 2.14) for the set o f  targets 
that eventually repurchase the controlling interest from the acquirer. This type of 
repurchase transaction can be viewed as a reversal o f  the original incomplete 
acquisition. Thus, the small return suggests that the market partially anticipates the 
ultimate resale o f the majority interest to the subsidiary and that these transactions are 
anticipated to generate, on average, the least value enhancement among the incomplete 
acquisitions.
The second most positive stock price response is observed for targets that experience 
financial distress after the acquisition. These target firms have a two-day excess return 
o f  8.11% (t-statistic = 6.69). The strongly significant return suggests that incomplete 
acquisition announcements convey positive information about the value o f  these target 
firms, a set o f firms that are characterized by poor pre-acquisition operating 
performance, as documented in Chapter 5. Despite the favorable market response to
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Table 26 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets by 
Disposition Type
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f 206 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven- 
day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means tests for 
the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return
Still trades 7.55% 25% -2.97%
























Subsidiary files for bankruptcy or 8.11% 25% 0.01%
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(Table 26 continued)
Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Still Merges Third Third Subsidiary Financial
trades with party party repurchase distress
___________parent merger sale________________________
Still trades
Merges with parent 0.914 
Third party merger 0.400 
Third party sale 0.042 











Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)










































Repurchased by subsidiary 3.66% 
(185)* 
[0.70] 







Subsidiary files for bankruptcy or 15.89% 25% 4.88%
reorganization (8.28)*** 
[0.89] 
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(Table 26 continued)
Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Still Merges Third Third Subsidiary Financial
trades with party party repurchase distress
parent merger sale
Still trades -
Merges with parent 2.034" -
Third party merger 0.014 1.638 -
Third party sale 0.298 1.624 0.235 -
Subsidiary repurchase 1.254 2.923*" 1.101 1.460 -
Financial distress 1.486 0.058 1.316 1.226 2.313" -
'Significant at the 10% level. ''Significant at the 5% level. '"Significant at the 1% level.
the acquisition announcement, on average the incomplete acquisition fails to rescue 
target firms from financial demise, so the market response poorly anticipates the 
ultimate outcome for this set o f  firms.
The remaining groups o f  firms, which consist o f targets that are ultimately 
divested by the acquirer or that continue to trade, have two-day announcement period 
returns that show no pattern consistent with respect to market anticipation o f whether 
or not a subsequent disposition event occurs. Specifically, the two-day excess return 
for targets that will continue to trade as majority-owned subsidiaries is 7.55% 
(t-statistic = 7.07). The two-day excess return is 6.11% (t-statistic = 6.68) for the set 
o f target firms that are subsequently merged with a third party. This result is similar to 
the two-day return o f 7.68% (t-statistic = 6.38) for the set o f target firms in which the 
majority interest is later sold to a third party without the minority interest being 
acquired. Overall, this pattern o f returns indicates that there is modest evidence of 
market anticipation o f subsequent events. Moreover, difference in means tests between 
the various categories o f events are almost consistently insignificant, so that the null
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hypothesis o f  equality cannot be rejected. The sole exception is the difference in means 
test between the share price responses to incomplete acquisitions when the target later 
merges with the parent versus cases in which the majority interest is later repurchased 
by the target. This difference generates a calculated t-value o f  2.20, significant at a 5% 
level. This result confirms that the stock market response is more favorable for targets 
that later merge with the acquirer than for targets that later repurchase the controlling 
interest and thus reverse the transaction.
The seven-day returns to targets at incomplete acquisition announcements are 
also disaggregated by disposition type. The results are reported in Panel C o f Table 26. 
The pattern o f these returns is very similar to the two-day excess returns. The seven- 
day share price response at the incomplete acquisition announcement is 15.62% 
(t-statistic = 18.08) for targets that are later merged with the parent, versus 3.66% 
(t-statistic = 1.85) for events in which the majority stake is later repurchased by the 
subsidiary. A difference in means test between these two returns has a calculated t- 
value o f 2.92, which is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the seven-day 
target share price reaction to the acquisition announcement is significantly greater for 
targets that later merge with the parent than for targets that later repurchase the 
majority interest from the acquirer.
As in the case o f the two-day returns, the seven-day share price response is 
relatively high for targets that subsequently experience financial distress, 15.89% 
(t-statistic -  8.28), indicating that the market poorly anticipates the ultimate outcome 
for this set o f  firms. Moreover, the returns for targets are similar in the cases in which 
the targets are subsequently sold to and merged with a third party acquirer, 8.95%
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(t-statistic = 6.19), and the cases in which the majority stake is subsequently sold to a 
third party, 9.96% (t-statistic = 5.23). These returns are almost identical to the returns 
o f  8.89% (t-statistic = 5.26) for targets that continue to trade. None o f the differences 
in returns between these three groups are statistically significant. However, the 
difference in returns between targets that are ultimately merged into the parent versus 
targets that continue to trade is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, given a 
calculated t-value o f 2.03.
Overall, the results reported in Table 26 suggest that target firm shareholders 
fare equally well at the announcement o f  an incomplete acquisition regardless of 
whether the parent continues to have a minority interest in the subsidiary that is 
publicly traded or whether the parent subsequently eliminates the public minority 
interest. However, there is some evidence that target acquisition announcement returns 
are higher for incomplete acquisitions that are followed by parent-subsidiary mergers, 
suggesting that the market is capable o f  partially anticipating the acquirer's ultimate 
acquisition o f the remaining minority stake.
The two-day returns at incomplete acquisition announcements, disaggregated 
by disposition type for 170 acquirer firms are reported in Panel A of Table 27. These 
returns are typically positive, but are modest in size and significance. The two-day 
announcement period returns for acquirers are 1.88% (t-statistic = 1.97) when the 
target continues to trade as a majority-owned subsidiary. The returns are 0.37% 
(t-statistic = 0.89) when the target later merges with the parent. The returns are - 
1.25% (t-statistic = -1.68) when the target is subsequently sold to, and merges with, a 
third party. The returns are 2.76% (t-statistic = 3.89) when the majority interest is later
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Table 27 - Incomplete Acquisition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers 
by Disposition Type
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f 170 incomplete 
acquisitions; t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in 
brackets and N  is the sample size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in 
Panel A; seven-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in 
means tests for the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Pane! D, 
respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return
Still trades 1.88% 25% -1.94%
(1.97)* 50% -0.01%
[0.47] 
N =  17
75% 2.04%




















Subsidiary files for bankruptcy or 2.57% 25% -0.07%
reorganization (2.33)** 50% 0.47%
[0.69] 
N =  13
75% 3.27%
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(Table 27 continued)
Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Still Merges Third Third Subsidiary Financial
trades with party party repurchase distress
parent merger sale
Still trades -
Merges with parent 0.763 -
Third party merger 1.506 1.587 -
Third party sale 0.280 0.931 1.515 -
Subsidiary repurchase 0.830 0.262 0.872 0.987 -
Financial distress 0.275 1.266 2.066** 0.063 1.257 “
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-S to +1)
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns_________
Quartiie Return





Merges with parent 0.93% 25% -4.07%



















Subsidiary files for bankruptcy or 10.19% 25% -0.08%
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(Table 27 continued)
Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Still Merges Third Third Subsidiary Financial
trades with party party repurchase distress
parent merger sale
Still trades -
Merges with parent 0.224 -
Third party merger 0.660 0.754 -
Third party sale 0.087 0.214 0.864 -
Subsidiary repurchase 0.702 0.735 0.153 0.838 -
Financial distress 1.628 1.640 1.416 1.683' 1.320 -
'Significant at the 10% level. "Significant at the 5% level. '"S ignificant at the 1% level.
sold to  a third party but the minority interest is not acquired. When the target later 
repurchases the controlling interest from the acquirer, the returns are 0.02% (t-statistic 
= 0.02). When the target subsequently experiences financial distress, the returns are 
2.57% (t-statistic = 2.33). None o f the differences between these returns approach 
statistical significance, with the sole exception o f the difference between the acquirer 
share price response to incomplete acquisitions when the target later merges with a 
third party and the share price response when the target subsequently experiences 
financial distress. The difference between these means generates a calculated t-value of 
2.07, significant at a 5% level. Overall, the results for acquirers suggest that the 
market response at the announcement o f the incomplete acquisition does not differ 
depending on the ultimate disposition o f the acquisition.
The seven-day returns at incomplete acquisition announcement, disaggregated 
by disposition type for 170 acquirer firms are reported in Panel C o f Table 27, and are 
generally similar to the two-day returns to acquirers at incomplete acquisition 
announcements. The seven-day average returns to acquirers are 0.36% (t-statistic
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= 0.24) when the target continues to trade as a majority-owned subsidiary. The returns 
are 0.93% (t-statistic = 1.42) when the target later merges with the parent. The returns 
are 2.11% (t-statistic = 1.81) when the target subsequently merges with a third party. 
The returns are 0.59% (t-statistic = 0.53) when the majority interest is later sold to a 
third party. When the target later repurchases the controlling interest, the returns are 
2.45% (t-statistic = 1.54). When the target later experiences financial distress, the 
returns are 10.19% (t-statistic = 5.83). The latter result, which is consistent across 
acquirers and targets, indicates that the share price response to acquisitions in which 
the target later experiences financial distress is significantly positive. Indeed, the three 
most positive individual acquirer share price responses o f 67.7%, 35.1%, and 12.6% 
are events in which target firms ultimately file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization 8.6, 3.3, and 12.6 years after the acquisition, respectively. Thus, the 
market response to incomplete acquisition announcements poorly anticipates the 
ultimate outcome for this set o f  firms.
The average two-day combined returns at incomplete acquisitions for 136 
paired targets and acquirers are reported by disposition type in Panel A o f Table 28.
As in Chapter 4, the combined excess return is calculated as the weighted average of 
the excess returns for the target firm and the acquirer firm, where the weights are the 
relative market values o f equity for the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement 
date. The two-day average combined excess returns at incomplete acquisition 
announcements are 2.54% (t-statistic = 1.42) when the target continues to trade as a 
majority-owned subsidiary, 2.90% (t-statistic = 3.11) when the target is later merged 
with the parent, -0.20% (t-statistic = -0.22) when the target is subsequently merged
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Table 28 - Average Combined Excess Returns to Incomplete Acquisition 
Announcements by Disposition Type
Combined excess returns (in percent) at announcements o f 136 incomplete acquisitions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage of positive returns is in brackets and N  is 
the sample size. The combined excess return is the weighted average o f the excess 
returns for the target and acquirer, where the weights are the relative market values of 
equity o f  the two firms six weeks prior to the announcement. The average combined 
change in market value is computed as the cumulative excess return to the target times 
the target market value six week prior to the announcement plus the cumulative excess 
return to the acquirer times the acquirer market value six weeks prior to the 
announcement. Two-day announcement period returns are reported in Panel A; seven- 
day announcement period returns are reported in Panel B.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Disposition type Average Average (median) Distribution of
combined excess combined change combined excess
return in market value in return
millions
Still trades 2.54% $260,022 25% -1.12%
(1.42) ($ 0.665) 50% 0.29%
[0.60] 75% 5.85%
N = 15
Merges with parent 2.90% $42,933 25% -1.29%
(3.11)*** ($ 1.863) 50% 0.98%
[0.64] 75% 4.96%
N = 72
Merges with third party -0.20% $28,569 25% -1.45%
(-0.22) ($ 1.628) 50% 0.35%
[0.53] 75% 2.27%
N = 17
Stake sold to third party 1.71% $8,014 25% -0.66%
(2.52)** ($ 1.398) 50% 2.15%
[0.67] 75% 4.65%
N =  15
Repurchased by -0.51% $0,604 25% -3.19%
subsidiary (-0.34) ($-2,376) 50% -0.46%
[0.50] 75% 2.26%
N = 6
Subsidiary files for 3.34% $25,739 25% 0.38%
bankruptcy or (2.32)** ($13,203) 50% 2.34%
reorganization [0.82] 75% 5.33%
N =  11
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(Table 28 continued)
Panel B: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Disposition type Average Average (median) Distribution of
combined excess combined change combined excess
return in market value in return
millions
Still trades 1.82% $284,455 25% -3.54%
(0.82) 
[0.60] 













Merges with third party 2.82% $78,918 25% 0.55%
(1.97)* 
[0.76] 





Stake sold to third party 2.43% $5,219 25% -1.14%
(148) 
[0.67] 













Subsidiary files for 7.99% $45,508 25% 0.36%




‘Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. “ ‘ Significant at the 1% level.
with a third party, 1.71% (t-statistic = 2.52) when the majority interest is later sold to a 
third party, -0.51% (t-statistic = -0.34) when the majority interest is later repurchased 
by the target, and 3.34% (t-statistic = 2.32) when the target subsequently experiences 
financial distress.
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The average seven-day combined returns at incomplete acquisition 
announcements for 136 paired targets and acquirers are reported by disposition type in 
Panel C o f Table 28. The seven-day average combined excess returns at incomplete 
acquisition announcements are 1.82% (t-statistic = 0.82) when the target continues to 
trade as majority-owned subsidiaries, 5.49% (t-statistic = 4.51) when the target is later 
merged with the parent, 2.82% (t-statistic = 1.97) when the target is subsequently 
merged with a third party, 2.43% (t-statistic = 1.48) when the majority interest is later 
sold to  a third party, -0.80% (t-statistic = -0.68) when the majority interest is later 
repurchased by the target, and 7.99% (t-statistic = 3.10) when the target firm 
subsequently experiences financial distress.
The results in Table 28 indicate that incomplete acquisition announcements are 
typically associated with an increase in value o f  the combined entity regardless o f 
whether the acquirer ultimately retains or disposes its majority interest in the target. 
There is some evidence that the greatest gains in shareholder wealth at the 
announcement occur for cases in which the subsidiary is later merged with the parent. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that the market is, at least in part, capable o f  
anticipating these subsequent mergers. Given the market response to incomplete 
acquisitions that ultimately culminate in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the target, these 
results do not corroborate Kaplan and Weisbach’s (1992) finding that the acquirer 
share price response and combined returns at the acquisition announcement are 
strongly related to the subsequent success o f the acquisition.
To investigate the wealth effects o f  disposition announcements, the share price 
responses o f targets and acquirers are at the disposition announcement are
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disaggregated by disposition type. The two-day stock price reaction at the time o f  the 
disposition announcement for a sample o f  177 targets is reported in Panel A o f Table 
29. The target share price response for this full sample o f disposition events is 8 .76% 
(t-statistic = 22.55), significant at a 1% level. This result indicates that, on average, 
disposition events generate a substantial increase in the wealth o f minority shareholders 
of the subsidiary.
When these events are disaggregated by the type o f disposition, a clear pattern 
emerges among the returns. There are large gains in minority shareholder wealth 
associated with disposition events in which the holdings o f minority shareholders are 
acquired and the minority stake is extinguished, compared to relatively modest gains 
for events in which minority shares are not acquired.
In the case o f  parent-subsidiary mergers, which are transactions that eliminate 
the minority shareholding but are conducted without arm's length bargaining and do not 
generate a change in control, the two-day share price response for target firms is 
10.48% (t-statistic = 23.12). The other type o f disposition event in which the minority 
shareholding is eliminated is third party buyouts, a transaction in which the majority 
blockholding o f the parent is sold to a third party that also acquires all o f  the minority 
shares at the same price. These transactions generate a two-day return o f  15.04% 
(t-statistic = 17.24). The difference between the returns for these two types o f 
transactions is not statistically significant since a difference in means test generates a 
calculated value o f 1.00. The two-day stock price response is significantly positive for 
all disposition types except for the set o f events in which the acquirer’s stake is sold to 
a third party, which has an average excess return that is not significantly different from
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Table 29 - Disposition Announcement Excess Returns to Targets by Disposition 
Type
Excess returns (in percent) to targets at announcements o f 177 dispositions; t-statistics 
are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is the sample 
size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven-day 
announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means tests for the 
two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0) 
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns 
Quartile Return

























Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Merges with Third party Third party Subsidiary
parent merger sale repurchase
Merges with parent -
Third party merger 1.003 -
Third party sale 3.271*** 2.915*** -
Subsidiary repurchase 2.037** 2.283** 0.447 -
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(Table 29 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)





























































Merges with parent 
Third party merger 







‘ Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level. ‘ “ Significant at the 1% level.
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zero. These subsidiary share price responses are lower than those documented by 
Slovin and Sushka (1998) who report returns o f 18.53% for parent-subsidiary mergers 
and 20.92% for third party buyouts, and indicate that the difference between the two 
returns is not statistically significant.
The target returns for disposition events that do not eliminate the minority 
shareholders are 1.33% (t-statistic = 0.99) for events in which the acquirer’s stake is 
sold to  a third party without the buyout o f the minority shareholders. The returns are 
3.04% (t-statistic = 2.41) when the acquirer's controlling interest is repurchased by the 
subsidiary. The results o f a difference in means test indicates that the target share price 
responses to these two events are not significantly different (calculated t-value = 0.45). 
However, the results o f  diiference in means tests indicate that the target share price 
response to the sale o f the stake to a third party is significantly lower than the target 
share price response to a parent-subsidiary merger (t-value = 3.27) or to a third party 
merger (t-value = 2.92). Likewise, the target share price response to subsidiary 
repurchases is also significantly lower than the target share price response to a parent- 
subsidiary merger (t-value = 2.04) and the share price response to a third party merger 
(t-value = 2.28).
The seven-day stock price reaction for targets in response to disposition 
announcements shows an identical pattern to the two-day returns. The results are 
reported in Panel C o f Table 29. The target share price response for the full sample o f  
dispositions is 10.53% (t-statistic = 17.24), significant at a 1% level. The seven-day 
target returns are 12.44% (t-statistic = 17.52) for parent-subsidiary mergers, 16.95% 
(t-statistic = 12.28) for third-party mergers, 1.92% (t-statistic = 0.94) for the sale of
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the controlling stake to a third party without the buyout o f  the minority shares, and 
4.20% (t-statistic = 2.11) when the controlling interest is repurchased by the subsidiary. 
Again, the stock price responses are significantly positive for all disposition types 
except the sale o f the majority stake to a third party and difference in means tests are 
consistent with the results for the two-day returns.
Interestingly, the sum o f the gains to target firms at the incomplete acquisition 
announcement and at the disposition announcement is similar for parent-subsidiary 
mergers and third party mergers (approximately 21 % over the two-day window). The 
sum o f  the revaluations at the acquisition and disposition announcements is lower when 
the stake is subsequently sold to a third party and when the stake is subsequently 
repurchased by the subsidiary (about 9% and 6%, respectively, over the two-day 
window).
The two-day stock price returns for a sample o f 151 acquirers in response to 
disposition announcements are reported in Panel A of Table 30. The acquirer share 
price response for the full sample o f dispositions is 0.00% (t-statistic = 0.01). Thus, 
disposition transactions do not generate significant gains in shareholder wealth for 
parent firms. This suggests that, as in the case o f conventional mergers and 
acquisitions, all o f  the gains in wealth generated by disposition transactions are 
captured by target firms, that is, by minority shareholders.
When disaggregated by the type o f  disposition transaction, none o f the acquirer 
two-day share price responses is significantly different from zero at conventional 
significance levels. The average excess returns are -0.14% (t-statistic = -0.32) for 
parent-subsidiary mergers, -0.41% (t-statistic = -0.43) for third-party mergers, 0.08%
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Table 30 - Disposition Announcement Excess Returns to Acquirers by Disposition 
Type
Excess returns (in percent) to acquirers at announcements o f 151 dispositions; 
t-statistics are in parentheses, the percentage o f  positive returns is in brackets and AT is 
the sample size. Two-day announcement period returns are shown in Panel A; seven- 
day announcement period returns are shown in Panel C. Difference in means tests for 
the two-day and seven-day returns are shown in Panel B and Panel D, respectively.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns
Quartile Return








Merged with third party -0.41% 25% -4.04%
(-0.43) 50% -0.01%
[0.43] 75% 2.80%
N =  19








Panel B: Difference in means test for two-day returns
Merges with Third party Third party Subsidiary
parent merger sale repurchase
Merges with parent
Third party merger 0.181 -
Third party sale 0.153 0.282 -
Subsidiary repurchase 0.353 0.445 0.185 -
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(Table 30 continued)
Panel C: Seven-day announcement period returns (-5 to +1)
Disposition type Excess return Distribution of returns_______
Quartile Return








Merged with third party 2.61% 25% -2.53%
(171) 50% 0.49%
[0.48] 75% 5.67%
N =  19








Panel D: Difference in means test for seven-day returns
Merges with Third party Third party Subsidiary
parent merger sale repurchase
Merges with parent -
Third party merger 1.226 -
Third party sale 1.403 0.153
Subsidiary repurchase 0.851 1.570 1.645* -
"Significant at the 10% level. ••Significant at the 5% level. •••Significant at the 1% level.
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(t-statistic = 0.07) for sale o f  the controlling stake to a third party, and 0.42% 
(t-statistic = 0.32) when the controlling interest is repurchased by the subsidiary. These 
figures can be compared to the 2.03% parent share price response to parent-subsidiary 
mergers documented by Slovin and Sushka (1998). Difference in means are 
consistently not significant, indicating that the acquirer share price response to 
dispositions does not differ significantly across disposition methods.
The seven-day stock price reactions for 151 acquirers in response to disposition 
announcements are reported in Panel C o f Table 30. The results are largely similar to 
the results for the two-day returns. The acquirer share price response for the full 
sample o f dispositions is 0.04% (t-statistic = 0.06). The acquirer share price responses 
are -0.96% (t-statistic = -1.40) for parent-subsidiary mergers, 2.61% (t-statistic = 1.71) 
for third-party mergers, 2.11% (t-statistic = 1.21) for sale o f the controlling stake to  a 
third party, and -3.70% (t-statistic = -1.82) when the controlling interest is repurchased 
by the subsidiary. None o f these returns is significantly different from zero at 
conventional significance levels. As in the case o f the two-day returns, none o f  the 
difference in means calculated t-values are significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
the acquirer share price response to dispositions does not differ significantly across 
disposition methods.
The two-day average combined returns at the disposition announcement, 
disaggregated by disposition type, are reported in Panel A o f Table 31. The two-day 
average combined excess return for the full sample o f 125 paired targets and acquirers 
is 0.97% (t-statistic = 1.81), significant at the 10% level. The proportion o f combined 
returns that are positive is 61%. The average (median) two-day change in combined
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Table 31 - Average Combined Excess Returns to Disposition Announcements by 
Disposition Type
Combined excess returns (in percent) at announcements o f 125 dispositions; t-statistics 
are in parentheses, the percentage o f positive returns is in brackets and N  is the sample 
size. The combined excess return is the weighted average o f the excess returns for the 
target and acquirer, where the weights are the relative market values o f equity o f  the 
two firms six weeks prior to the announcement. The average combined change in 
market value is computed as the cumulative excess return to the target times the target 
market value six week prior to the announcement plus the cumulative excess return to 
the acquirer times the acquirer market value six weeks prior to the announcement. 
Two-day returns are reported in Panel A; seven-day returns are reported in Panel B.
Panel A: Two-day announcement period returns (-1 to 0)
Disposition type Average combined Average Distribution of
excess return (median) combined excess
combined change return 
in market value 
in millions
Full sample 0.97% -$11,021 25% -
0.81)* ($ 1.783) 50% 1.70%
[0.61] 75% 0.79%
N = 125 3.59%
Merged with parent 1.13% -$20,263 25% -
(149) ($ 1.466) 50% 0.90%
[0.64] 75% 0.92%
N = 77 3.79%
Merged with third party 2.04% $22,639 25% •
(1.55) ($ 7.695) 50% 2.56%
[0.63] 75% 1.45%
N =  19 6.21%
Stake sold to third party 0.35% -$21,573 25% •
(0.30) (-$ 1.148) 50% 1.70%
[0.47] 75% -
N = 17 1.20%
2.83%
Repurchased by subsidiary -0.25% $ 1.116 25% -
(-0.31) ($ 2.932) 50% 2.22%
[0.56] 75% 0.14%
N = 9 1.41%
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(Table 31 continued)
Panel B: Seven-day announcement period returns (-S to +1)
Disposition type Average combined Average Distribution of
excess return (median) combined excess
combined change return 
in market value 
in millions
Full sample 1.38% -$39,624 25% -
(159) ($ 0.945) 50% 2.91%
[0.56] 75% 0.76%
N = 126 4.98%
Merged with parent 0.69% -$58,556 25% -
(0.59) ($ 0.945) 50% 3.22%
[0.58] 75% 1.10%
N = 78 5.05%
Merged with third party 4.57% -$5,325 25% -
(2.14)** ($4,217) 50% 1.60%
[0.58] 75% 0.77%
N = 19 9.94%
Stake sold to third party 2.12% $27,409 25% .
(0.86) ($ 3.863) 50% 1.21%
[0.59] 75% 2.32%
N = 17 5.46%
Repurchased by subsidiary -0.49% -$38,862 25% -
(-0.46) ($ 1.772) 50% 1.50%
[0.56] 75% 0.93%
N = 9 1.67%
^Significant at the 10% level. ^^Significant at the S% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
wealth is -$ 11.0 million ($1.8 million). When the sample is disaggregated with respect 
to disposition method, the combined average excess returns are 1.13% (t-statistic = 
1.49) for parent-subsidiary mergers, 2.04% (t-statistic = 1.55) for third party mergers, 
0.35% (t-statistic = 0.30) for sales o f the stake to a third party, and -0.25% (t-statistic 
= -0.31) for repurchases o f  the stake by the subsidiary.
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The seven-day average combined returns at the disposition announcement, 
disaggregated by disposition type, are reported in Panel B o f Table 31. The average 
combined excess return for the full sample o f 126 paired targets and acquirers is 1.38% 
(t-statistic = 1.59), which is not significant at conventional levels. The proportion of 
combined returns that are positive is 56%. The average (median) change in combined 
wealth for the seven-day period is -$39.6 million ($0.9 million). When the sample is 
disaggregated with respect to disposition method, the combined average excess returns 
are 0.69% (t-statistic = 0.59) for parent-subsidiary mergers, 4.57% (t-statistic = 2.14) 
for third party mergers, 2.12% (t-statistic = 0.86) for sales o f the stake to a third party, 
and -0.49% (t-statistic = -0.46) for repurchases o f the stake by the subsidiary.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a large gain in wealth to target firm 
(minority) shareholders in response to disposition events that eliminate the publicly 
traded minority interest that remains after an incomplete acquisition, but there are no 
gains to the acquirer firm. There are only modest gains in wealth to target firm 
(minority) shareholders, and no gains to acquirers, in response to disposition events 
that do not eliminate the publicly traded minority interest that remains after an 
incomplete acquisition. The results also suggest that there is a small gain in combined 
wealth for disposition transactions in which the publicly traded minority interest that 
remains after an incomplete acquisition is eliminated. This seems especially clear in 
transactions in which the target is subsequently merged with a third party. For 
disposition transactions in which the minority shareholding is not extinguished, there is 
no evidence o f  any combined gains in wealth.
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The industry and adjusted operating performance o f  targets is disaggregated on 
the basis o f ultimate disposition to determine whether interim operating performance 
affects the disposition o f the minority interest. The results are reported in Table 32. 
Overall, adjusted performance appears normal across all disposition types both before 
and after the incomplete acquisition occurs. There is some evidence that targets in 
which the stake is later sold to a third party or repurchased by the subsidiary perform 
poorly in year -1. However, caution should be exercised in drawing inferences because 
o f  the small sample sizes. Target firms that ultimately end up in financial distress 
exhibit poor performance prior to the incomplete acquisition, but seemingly have 
normal performance in most o f the post-acquisition years. On average, the unadjusted 
performance o f these firms deteriorates rapidly over the five years preceding the 
acquisition but stabilizes around year -1. Thus, even though the unadjusted 
performance o f these target firms is poor relative to the typical firm in the industry in 
the post-acquisition years, expected performance, which is based on the sample firm’s 
own past performance adjusted for the change in performance o f  other poorly 
performing firms, is close to actual performance. Finally, there is weak evidence that 
the target firms that ultimately merge with the parent, but have not done so in the five 
years following the incomplete acquisition announcement, experience poor 
performance in year +5. However, the results generally suggest that post-acquisition 
operating performance is not a good predictor o f  the ultimate disposition o f the 
controlling stake.
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Table 32 - Adjusted Operating Performance of Incomplete Acquisition Targets by Disposition Type
Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets (Panel A). Cash-adjusted return on assets is similar to return on assets except that cash and cash equivalents are 
subtracted from total assets in the denominator (Panel B). Return on sales is calculated as total sales divided by average total assets 
(Panel C). Cash-flow return on assets is similar to return on assets except that the effects of changes in current assets and liabilities 
are excluded from operating income (Panel D). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by subtracting the median 
performance measure for a group of matched companies. Year 0 denotes the fiscal year in which the incomplete acquisition 
announcement is made. Sample sizes are the number of observations in year -1.
Panel A: Median (mean) return on assets in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Still trades 27 2.10 0.15 0.15 0.80 -2.95** 1.20 -1.20 -1.43 -0.95 -1.88
(0.85) (-1.28) (2.42) (0.92) (-6.05)* (9.18) (-0.51) (-3.71) (-0.25) (-1.06)
Merged with 48 -1.70 1.30 0.05 1.20 -0.65 0.80 -0.45 -1.90 0.63 -1.18
parent (-2.35) (0.61) (-4.67)** (2.25) (-1.31) (3.19) (-2.62) (1.61) (-0.37) (-3.02)*
Merged with 15 2.30 -1.95 2.40 0.80 0.18 3.38 -0.10 -1.35 1.10 -3.70
third party (1.21) (-5.22) (3.72) (4.30) (-0.52) (6.92) (-1.69) (-0.30) (-4.88) (-2.94)
Stake sold to 10 -4.60 0.15 0.20 -7.55** -1.10 5.20 -6.78 -1.80 1.50 -1.85
third party (-3.94) (10.56) (1.79) (-9.53)** (-1.87) (1.18) (-3.97) (-5.11) (1.83) (-7.52)
Repurchased 7 4.70 -1.05 0.70 -3.25 -1.05 0.55 0.85 -3.70* 0.85 1.30
by subsidiary (5.07)** (-3.16) (2.53) (-14.97) (14.20) (-0.73) (3.85) (-8.93) (-0.20) (2.36)
Financial 10 -2.78 -5.15 -3.50 -6.08 0.60 -2.75 1.85 -1.35 -0.25 -0.60


















Panel B. Median (mean) cash-adjusted return cm assets 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Still trades 26 2.60 -1.75 -2.00 2.65 -1.05 1.98 -0.30 -1.80 0.80 -4.30
(2.29) (-3.34) (-0.01) (1.81) (-1.53) (11.63) (-148) (-5.78) (-8.18) (-3.48)
Merged with 45 -1.10 -0.38 -0.10 0.50 -0.30 1.60 -0.85 -1.60 1.03 -2.60*
parent (-0.95) (-1.98) (-7.84)** (1.23) (-2.27) (5.03) (-2.88) (3.51) (-0.23) (-4.29)**
Merged with 13 1.80 1.30 7.90** 0.60 0.20 6.30 -1.15 6.05* -7.90 -5.50
third party (0.07) (146) (6.48)*** (0.62) (-0.67) (6.11) (-279) (2.10) (-6.06) (-6.67)
Stake sold to 10 -3.58 -0.90 0.10 -5.30** 2.80 0.60 -5.65 -3.63 0.90 -3.50
third party (-3.13) (16.59) (1.26) (-13.54)* (2.31) (-4.37) (-4.39) (-116) (4.78) (-10.16)
Repurchased 7 3.90 0.85 4.50 -9.90** 0.70 0.75 0.60 -3.15 0.05 -3.50
by subsidiary' (4.70)* (-2.13) (3.60) (-8.49)** (20.71) (-2.95) (9.57) (-18.07) (-4.44) (-319)
Financial 9 5.63 -5.65 -2.80 -6.45 -0.80 -0.70 2.08 -1.40 -0.30 -0.60
distress (13.15) (-18.91) (-1.29) (-5.93) (2.31) (-4.83)* (3.10) (-2.47) (-1.12) (1.14)
Panel C: Median (mean) return on sales in percent
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 45
Still trades 27 3.40* 1.73 -2.00* 2.10 -0.85 -1.85 -0.70 -2.95 0.85 0.35
(4.29) (-124) (-5.43)** (3.51) (0.82) (2.54) (-0.13) (-2.90) (-3.91) (-1.53)
Merged with 47 -2.15 1.90 0.35 0.20 2.55 1.98 -0.30 -0.10 2.73*** -4.65*
parent (5.99) (-1.15) (0.31) (0.79) (119) (4.09) (-4.64) (5.65)* (11.44)** (-7.88)**
Merged with 14 -4.65* 0.85 1.08 -0.40 1.80 2.33 1.25 -1.00 2.70 -2.70
third party (-7.88)** (4.17)* (0.28) (-0.74) (4.79) (6.80) M.03) (2.10) (185) (4.32)
Stake sold to 10 -2.70 2.00 -3.30 -5.18** 2.40 1.70 -3.20 -3.85 4.60 -1.45
third party (-6.27) (9.89) (-120) (-9.91) (2.76) (0.24) (-252) (-4.41) (8.15) (-1.31)
Repurchased 6 n.a. 1.65 1.55 -4.15** -1.20 5.50** 0.30 -1.30 3.10 4.20
by subsidiary (-2.03) (-1.48) (-9.96) (2.09) (5.23)** (-7.50) (-11.40) (6.10) (-2.09)
Financial 12 -0.90 4.80 1.45 -0.03 0.15 -0.50 3.95 -4.05 -2.83 0.30


















Panel D: Median (mean) cash-flow return on assets in percent 
Year N -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Still tracks 27 2.40 -0.45 3.40 -1.25 -0.60 -1.45 2.35 2.90 0.75 0.33
(-0.99) (0.44) (7.69) (-2.68) (-2.04) (4.57) (5.69)* (-6.29) (-1.44) (-1.18)
Merged with 45 1.20 0.00 2.50 2.45 -5.80** -0.40 0.45 1.30 0.35 -3.00
parent (-0.75) (1.59) (-3.61) (4.61) (-3.99) (-1.66) (9-45) (-3.90) (1.57) (3.79)
Merged with 15 4.60 -3.63 -1.00 2.25 0.10 -1.00 -1.65 2.20* 6.30 6.60
third party (8.20) (-5.27) (0.32) (2.67) (-1.85) (1.81) (-6.48) (11.73) (-528) (4.53)
Stake sold to 11 2.45 1.78 -3.33 -1.75* -1.85 0.05 2.25 -3.83 -0.70 -5.55*
third party (-2.35) (2.02) (1.61) (-11.06)* (0.12) (-215) (-0-12) (-5.56) (8.36) (-18.93)*
Repurchased 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.80 -1.63 24.08* -9.83* -0.65 6.73 21.45
by subsidiary (21.72) (191) (17.91)** (-25.70) (3.22) (15.29) (12.22)
Financial 8 6.00 0.75 -7.65 -0.50 0.60 -0.55 -8.58 -1.15 n.a. n.a.
distress (3.93) (2-58) (-8.84) (1.24) (7.30) (9.44) (-3,63) (3:24L_.
*Significant at the 10% level. ♦♦Significant at the 5% level. ♦♦♦Significant at the 1% level.
6.6 Summary
The evidence reported in this chapter suggests that incomplete acquisitions are 
a transitory form o f corporate governance that lasts on average less than six years. The 
most common disposition o f an incomplete acquisition is a parent-subsidiary merger, a 
transaction that extinguishes the publicly traded minority interest. Other common, 
though less frequent, outcomes are third party mergers in which the publicly traded 
minority interest is also extinguished, and sales o f the majority interest to a third party 
in which the minority interest continues to publicly trade but is under the control o f  a 
different entity.
The empirical results on the valuation effects o f incomplete acquisition 
announcements across disposition methods indicate that target firm shareholder wealth 
is enhanced regardless o f the eventual outcome. However, there is some evidence that 
target firm shareholders experience greater acquisition announcement gains when the 
ultimate outcome is a parent-subsidiary merger. The results for the valuation effects of 
disposition announcements indicate that target firm shareholders sustain large gains in 
wealth in response to parent-subsidiary mergers and third party mergers, and only small 
gains in response to third party acquisitions or subsidiary repurchases o f majority 
stakes. There are no gains to acquirers at disposition announcements. Overall, target 
firm shareholders experience the greatest gains when the target is subsequently merged, 
regardless o f  whether the merger is with the parent or a third party.
The main result o f the empirical analysis o f the valuation effects o f incomplete 
acquisition announcements on acquirers, disaggregated by disposition method, is that, 
on average, acquirer wealth is not diminished at the time o f the incomplete acquisition
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announcement regardless o f the subsequent disposition. The analysis o f  the valuation 
effects o f  the disposition announcement on acquirers indicates that acquirer shareholder 
wealth is not affected by the disposition. There is some evidence that the acquirer fares 
marginally better when the majority interest is sold to a third party.
Finally, the evidence from the analysis o f  the combined wealth effects o f 
dispositions indicates that the overall wealth o f parents and subsidiaries is modestly 
enhanced at the disposition o f the incomplete acquisition. Moreover, there is some 
evidence that overall wealth is significantly enhanced when the minority interest in the 
subsidiary is subsequently merged with the parent or a third party.
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This dissertation provides an extensive examination o f incomplete acquisitions, 
which are a type o f corporate control transaction that has not been previously examined 
in the finance literature. For purposes o f this study, an incomplete acquisition is 
defined as an offer for a sufficient amount o f equity in a target firm that gives the bidder 
effective control o f  the target firm that is not accompanied by a disclosed intention to 
acquire the remaining minority shares. Subsequent to the incomplete acquisition 
transaction, the target firm is a legally separate, parent-controlled, operating entity that 
has a publicly traded minority interest and continues to be subject to all o f  the mandates 
required o f  a public corporation.
An original database o f  incomplete acquisitions is developed in this dissertation. 
It is used to examine three major aspects o f  these unique control transactions. First, 
descriptive data about the prevalence o f  incomplete acquisitions and the alternative 
mechanisms that are used to effect these transactions are provided. Then event study 
methodology is used to assess the market valuation effects o f incomplete acquisition 
announcements. Second, the pre- and post-acquisition operating performance of 
incomplete acquisition targets is examined. By analyzing both the valuation effects and 
subsequent operating performance o f  incomplete acquisitions, this study provides 
evidence to distinguish among alternative hypotheses that generate differential 
predictions about the wealth effects o f  changes in control, the distribution o f  wealth 
between targets and acquirers, and the subsequent performance o f target firms. Third,
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the ultimate disposition o f the parent’s controlling stake and the minority interest in the 
target is detailed and the valuation effects o f  disposition transactions are examined.
This analysis provides evidence about the wealth effects o f  alternative forms o f  
disposition. Operating performance is further analyzed by disaggregating the sample o f 
target firms based on the alternative types o f  disposition outcomes. This affords the 
opportunity to  determine whether interim operating performance influences the 
subsequent disposition o f the majority interest.
Overall, combined evidence from the analysis o f  acquisition announcements, 
target firm operating performance, and dispositions of the majority or minority interests 
is used to generate conclusions about the effects of incomplete acquisitions as a 
mechanism for changing corporate control. The empirical results also provide insight 
into the reasons why incomplete acquisitions are undertaken.
7.2 Summary and Interpretation of Main Results
The descriptive analysis o f  incomplete acquisitions reported in Chapter 3 
indicates that there are three dominant methods by which control is established in these 
transactions. These methods are i) tender offers for a majority o f outstanding shares o f 
the target, ii) the issuance o f new equity by the target to the acquirer, and iii) the 
purchase o f several existing blocks to form a majority stake. The latter two methods 
are unique to this form of corporate control transaction because no shares are acquired 
from dispersed shareholders. The analysis o f  target and acquirer market valuation 
effects indicates that, as in studies o f conventional mergers and acquisitions, targets o f  
incomplete acquisitions are typically much smaller than acquiring firms. The analysis 
also indicates that incomplete acquisitions are well distributed over the sample period
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and across industries. These findings suggest that the use o f incomplete acquisitions as 
a  mechanism for changing control is not confined to a particular time period or 
concentrated in certain industries. In addition, the degree o f relatedness between the 
industries o f  the target and acquirer firms in the sample varies widely, ranging from 
transactions between firms in the same industry to transactions that are purely 
conglomerate. Thus, the sample o f incomplete acquisitions provides an opportunity to 
test the synergy hypothesis o f mergers and acquisitions.
The empirical results o f  the valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisitions in 
Chapter 4 indicate that these transactions are value enhancing for targets and have a 
non-negative effect on the wealth o f acquirers. When the sample o f incomplete 
acquisition announcements is disaggregated by acquisition method, the results indicate 
that target firm shareholders experience significant gains in wealth for each method o f 
acquisition. However, the gains to target shareholders are greatest when the 
incomplete acquisition is effected via a tender offer. In addition, target shareholder 
gains are greater for incomplete acquisitions via new equity issues than for incomplete 
acquisitions via block purchases.
For the full sample o f transactions, the returns to acquirers at incomplete 
acquisition announcements are significantly positive, but statistically significant positive 
returns to acquirers are largely limited to events in which the transaction occurs by 
tender offer. The combined wealth effects for acquirer firm shareholders and target 
firm shareholders are also positive. The greatest combined gains occur for incomplete 
acquisitions through tender offers. Target firm shareholders capture the preponderance 
o f  the average combined increase in wealth generated by incomplete acquisitions, a
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result that is similar to the well-documented evidence for conventional mergers and 
acquisitions.
The analysis o f pre- and post-acquisition operating performance o f incomplete 
acquisition targets, reported in Chapter 5, indicates that target firm operating 
performance is similar to operating performance for sets o f  control firms both before 
and after the acquisition. Thus, there is neither deterioration nor improvement in target 
firm operating performance following a change in control through an incomplete 
acquisition. Normal performance indicates that there is no evidence to support the 
view that acquiring firms use incomplete acquisitions to  expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders through activities such as self-dealing transactions and or direct 
access to target firm assets. The finding o f  normal operating firm performance prior to 
incomplete acquisitions indicates that targets are not performing poorly relative to 
control firms, which suggests that the target firms are not mismanaged firms
Since target firm operating performance does not improve significantly 
subsequent to  the change in control, the performance results provide no evidence o f 
efficiency gains or operating synergies for these transactions. Moreover, the analysis o f 
post-acquisition operating performance o f  targets indicates that the subsequent 
performance o f  target firms that are in an industry that is unrelated to the acquirer’s 
industry is similar to the performance o f target firms that are in an industry that is 
closely related to the acquirer’s industry. This finding is consistent with the pattern o f 
valuation effects reported in Chapter 4, which indicate that wealth gains in industry- 
related incomplete acquisitions are comparable to wealth gains in incomplete 
acquisitions where the target firm has low-relatedness with the acquirer.
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The data reported in Chapter 6 suggest that an incomplete acquisition is a 
transitory form o f corporate governance, lasting on average less than six years. The 
most common disposition o f an incomplete acquisition is a parent-subsidiary merger, a 
transaction that eliminates the publicly traded minority interest without a change in 
control. Other common outcomes, in which there is a change in control, are third party 
mergers, transactions that also eliminate the publicly traded minority interest, and sales 
o f the acquirer's controlling interest to a third party in which the minority interest 
continues to publicly trade.
Empirical results on the valuation effects o f  incomplete acquisition 
announcements across disposition methods, reported in Chapter 6, indicate that target 
firm shareholder wealth is enhanced regardless o f the eventual outcome o f the 
transaction. There is some evidence that target firm shareholders experience greater 
acquisition announcement gains when the ultimate outcome is a parent-subsidiary 
merger. The results for the valuation effects o f  disposition announcements indicate that 
target firm shareholders sustain large gains in wealth in response to parent-subsidiary 
mergers and third party mergers, but only small gains in wealth in response to third 
party acquisitions or subsidiary repurchases o f  majority stakes. Overall, target firm 
shareholders experience the greatest gains when the target is subsequently merged with 
either the parent or a third party. The valuation effects o f incomplete acquisition 
announcements on acquirers indicate that, on average, acquirer wealth is not 
diminished at the time o f  the incomplete acquisition announcement regardless o f the 
subsequent disposition. The analysis o f  the combined wealth effects o f  dispositions
168
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
indicates that the overall wealth o f parents and subsidiaries is modestly enhanced at the 
announcement o f  the disposition o f the incomplete acquisition.
The normal pre- and post-acquisition operating performance shown by target 
firms relative to  control firms, suggests that the increase in target shareholder wealth at 
incomplete acquisitions announcements is not due to the market’s anticipation of 
increased efficiency from the acquirer's management o f the target firm’s operations. 
Similarly, the pervasiveness o f normal pre- and post-acquisition target firm operating 
performance indicates that there is no evidence o f gains from operating synergies or 
improvements in managerial efficiency. In contrast to the efficiency hypothesis, the 
expropriation hypothesis implies that an acquirer is able to gain from an incomplete 
acquisition o f a target firm through its subsequent expropriation o f minority interests.
In particular, this hypothesis predicts that an acquirer will allocate to itself a 
disproportionate share o f the combined entity's post-acquisition operating earnings by 
means such as self-dealing transactions between the parent and its new subsidiary. 
However, the empirical results indicate that after the change in control, there is no 
evidence o f  deterioration in the operating performance of target firms relative to that o f 
the set o f  control firms. Thus, the post-acquisition operating performance o f target 
firms is inconsistent with the expropriation hypothesis. The information hypothesis 
posits that positive private information obtained by a bidder about target firm value is 
conveyed to the market by an acquisition announcement, resulting in a permanent 
upward revaluation o f target value. The finding o f normal pre- and post-acquisition 
performance o f  target firms, combined with the evidence o f  significant gains in 
aggregate shareholder wealth in response to announcements o f  incomplete acquisitions,
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is consistent with the information hypothesis. From this perspective, incomplete 
acquisitions are value enhancing corporate control transactions.
7.3 Future Research
This dissertation provides an analysis o f the valuation effects o f  incomplete 
acquisitions on targets and acquirers and an examination o f the operating performance 
o f target firms. The continued public trading o f the target permits a more detailed 
examination of the gains in value generated by control transactions than can be 
obtained by studying control transactions such as conventional mergers and 
acquisitions or divestitures. A benefit o f the continued trading in target firm shares 
subsequent to  the control transaction in incomplete acquisitions is that market prices 
can be used to help align the interests o f  managers and shareholders by basing 
compensation contracts on target, rather than parent, stock price performance. A 
future analysis o f  the structure o f management compensation and managerial ownership 
o f  shares can provide evidence on this issue. Another important avenue o f  future 
research is a direct comparison of incomplete acquisitions with a matched sample o f 
conventional corporate control transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, to 
provide evidence on alternative hypotheses about the motivations for the use o f 
incomplete acquisitions rather than conventional corporate control mechanisms.
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